DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION OF E-PASSPORT SCHEME USING CRYPTOGRAPHIC ALGORITHM ALONG WITH MULTIMODAL BIOMETRICS TECHNOLOGY

International Journal of Advanced Information Technology (IJAIT) Vol. 1, No. 6, December 2011
DOI : 10.5121/ijait.2011.1603 33
DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION OF E-PASSPORT
SCHEME USING CRYPTOGRAPHIC ALGORITHM
ALONG WITH MULTIMODAL BIOMETRICS
TECHNOLOGY
V.K. Narendira Kumar 1
and B. Srinivasan 2
1
Assistant Professor, Department of Information Technology,
2
Associate Professor, PG & Research Department of Computer Science,
Gobi Arts & Science College (Autonomous),
Gobichettipalayam – 638 453, Erode District, Tamil Nadu, India.
1
kumarmcagobi@yahoo.com,2
srinivasan_gasc@yahoo.com
ABSTRACT
Advancements in technology have created the possibility of greater assurance of proper travel document
ownership, but some concerns regarding security and effectiveness remain unaddressed. Electronic
passports have known a wide and fast deployment all around the world since the International Civil
Aviation Organization the world has adopted standards whereby passports can store biometric identifiers.
The use of biometrics for identification has the potential to make the lives easier, and the world people live
in a safer place. The purpose of biometric passports is to prevent the illegal entry of traveler into a specific
country and limit the use of counterfeit documents by more accurate identification of an individual. This
paper analyses the face, fingerprint, palmprint and iris biometric e-passport design. This papers focus on
privacy and personal security of bearers of e-passports, the actual security benefit countries obtained by
the introduction of e-passports using face, fingerprint, palmprint and iris recognition systems. Researcher
analyzed its main cryptographic features; the face fingerprint, palmprint and iris biometrics currently used
with e-passports and considered the surrounding procedures. Researcher focused on vulnerabilities since
anyone willing to bypass the system would choose the same approach. On the contrary, solely relying on
them may pose a risk that did not exist with previous passports and border controls. The paper also
provides a security analysis of the e-passport using face fingerprint, palmprint and iris biometric that are
intended to provide improved security in protecting biometric information of the e-passport bearer.
KEYWORDS
E-Passport, Biometrics, Cryptographic, Face, Fingerprint, Palmprint and Iris.
1. INTRODUCTION
An electronic passport (e-Passport) is an identification document which possesses relevant
biographic and biometric information of its bearer. It also has embedded in it a Radio Frequency
Identification (RFID) Tag which is capable of cryptographic functionality. The successful
implementation of biometric technologies in documents such as e-Passports aims to strengthen
border security by reducing forgery and establishing without doubt the identity of the documents'
bearer. Biometrics is measurable characteristics of an individual used to identify him or her.
Biometric systems can function in verification or identification modes depending on their

34
intended use. In a verification task, a person presents an identity claim to the system and the
system only needs to verify the claim. In an identification task, an unknown individual presents
himself or herself to the system, and it must identify them. In general, there are three approaches
to authentication. In order of least secure and least convenient to most secure and most
convenient, they are: Something you have - card, token, key. Something you know- PIN,
password. Something you are - biometric [1].
Introduction to the three constituent technologies in E-Passports: Biometric, RFID, and Public
Key Infrastructure. Researcher also effectively summarizes the contents of three technical reports
which describe the protocols and the functioning of the e-Passport specifications. This is the first
work that analyses the protocols behind the e-Passport. Researcher also presents some feasible
threats to the e-Passport protocol.
2. LITERATURE SURVEY
Juels et al (2005) discussed security and privacy issues that apply to e-passports. They expressed
concerns that, the contact-less chip embedded in an e-passport allows the e-passport contents to
be read without direct contact with an IS and, more importantly, with the e-passport booklet
closed. They argued that data stored in the chip could be covertly collected by means of
“skimming” or “eavesdropping”. Because of low entropy, secret keys stored would be vulnerable
to brute force attacks as demonstrated by Laurie (2007). Kc and Karger (2005) suggested that an
e-passport may be susceptible to “splicing attack”, “fake finger attack” and other related attacks
that can be carried out when an e-passport bearer presents the e-passport to hotel clerks. There
has been considerable press coverage (Johnson, 2006; Knight, 2006; Reid, 2006) on security
weaknesses in e-passports. These reports indicated that it might be possible to “clone” an e-
passport.
2.1. Technical Challenges
A system of international travel requires some degree of interoperability, and ICAO guidelines
have provided some of the framework for that interoperability. Individual states always remain
cautious in entering into any international agreement, however, fearing that they will lose some of
their individual rights. In its efforts to maintain national sovereignty over passports, the NTWG
avoided touching on several implementation issues, particularly in the security arena. These
questions are essential to ensuring interoperability between national systems now that advanced
electronics are being deployed. In order for widespread deployment to occur, though, more
vendors will need to reach similar performance levels with increased accuracy and detection rates
[8].
2.2. Domestic Challenges
The electronic passport is secure will prove substantially more difficult than actually securing it
biometric technology in passports. It is quite clear, however, that contactless chips offer
significant advantages, including larger capacities and lower costs. The technology also has yet to
experience widespread deployment in either the private or public sector, though such deployment
can be expected in the private sector in the next few years. Contact-based chips simply lack the
robustness of contactless technology. A lack of available barcodes, in addition to the fact that
RFID is a superior tracking technology compared to virtually any available, has led major
retailers like Walmart to investigate inclusion of RFID in its supply chain. As this deployment
occurs, RFID may also become an integral part of numerous other everyday tasks, such as
entering a place of work or making a credit card transaction.

35
2.3. International Challenges
Electronic passport rollout plans continue to move forward, but some many countries, continue to
lag behind. Certainly, the ongoing debate over how best to protect data stored on the RFID tags
may be preventing some nations from moving forward. Given the complex nature of the project
and the need for it to remain static for a substantial number of years, the international community
would be well served to take the time necessary to implement it correctly. Many countries to
begin issuing e-passports were too soon, and delayed it by one year. However, such a delay will
require Congressional action [8].
2.4. Face Recognition
The first task needed after the capture of an image is an initial alignment. The features commonly
used to identify the orientation and location of the face is the eyes, nose, and mouth. This
approach is the standard used on most facial biometric algorithms. After this stage, processing
varies based on whether the application is identification or verification. Identification is the
process of determining who someone is. Verification only needs to confirm that a subject is the
person they claim to be [9]. In identification, the system compares the captured image (probe) to
the gallery. The type of comparisons made depends both on the biometric used and on the
matching algorithm in question. After the comparison, the system returns a rank ordering of
identities.
2.5. Fingerprint
A fingerprint is a pattern of ridges and furrows located on the tip of each finger. Fingerprints were
used for personal identification for many centuries and the matching accuracy was very high [3].
Patterns have been extracted by creating an inked impression of the fingertip on paper. Today,
compact sensors provide digital images of these patterns. Fingerprint recognition for
identification acquires the initial image through live scan of the finger by direct contact with a
reader device that can also check for validating attributes such as temperature and pulse. In real-
time verification systems, images acquired by sensors are used by the feature extraction module
to compute the feature values. The feature values typically correspond to the position and
orientation of certain critical points known as minutiae points [4]. The matching process involves
comparing the two-dimensional minutiae patterns extracted from the user's print with those in the
template. One problem with the current fingerprint recognition systems is that they require a large
amount of computational resources.
2.6. Palm print
The palmprint recognition module is designed to carry out the person identification process for
the unknown person. The palmprint image is the only input data for the recognition process. The
person identification details are the expected output value. The input image feature is compared
with the database image features. The relevancy is estimated with reference to the threshold
value. The most relevant image is selected for the person’s identification. If the comparison
result does not match with the input image then the recognition process is declared as unknown
person. The recognition module is divided into four sub modules. They are palmprint selection,
result details, ordinal list and ordinal measurement. The palmprint image selection sub module is
designed to select the palmprint input image. The file open dialog is used to select the input
image file. The result details produce the list of relevant palmprint with their similarity ratio
details. The ordinal list shows the ordinal feature based comparisons. The ordinal measurement
sub module shows the ordinal values for each region.

36
2.7. Iris Recognition
Iris recognition technology is based on the distinctly colored ring surrounding the pupil of the
eye. Made from elastic connective tissue, the iris is a very rich source of biometric data, having
approximately 266 distinctive characteristics. These include the trabecular meshwork, a tissue
that gives the appearance of dividing the iris radically, with striations, rings, furrows, a corona,
and freckles. Iris recognition technology uses about 173 of these distinctive characteristics. Iris
recognition can be used in both verification and identification systems. Iris recognition systems
use a small, high-quality camera to capture a black and white, high-resolution image of the iris.
The systems then define the boundaries of the iris, establish a coordinate system over the iris, and
define the zones for analysis within the coordinate system [3].
4.8. Cryptographic
The data stored in the passport is highly confidential, the Contactless IC chip must have
mechanisms for protection and integrity of the data. The ICAO recommended that the passport
should have the following properties [6]:
A cryptographic checksum is used to protect data integrity. The system can detect if data has
been altered by comparing the checksum in the passport against the real-time computation of
the stored data. Symmetric or asymmetric secret keys can be used to ensure data privacy.
Passport-issuing countries have the option not to encrypt the data.
A digital watermark is used to protect the integrity of facial and iris image. Some digital bits
may be buried into an image for further verification purposes without degrading the quality of
the image.
Unique IC chip serial numbers are used to prevent cloning of chips.
A Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) for generation and management is required.
3. BIOMETRIC SYSTEM MODULES
Enrollment Unit: The enrollment module registers individuals into the biometric system database.
During this phase, a biometric reader scans the individual’s biometric characteristic to produce its
digital representation.
Feature Extraction Unit: This module processes the input sample to generate a compact
representation called the template, which is then stored in a central database or a smartcard issued
to the individual.
Matching Unit: This module compares the current input with the template. If the system performs
identity verification, it compares the new characteristics to the user’s master template and
produces a score or match value (one to one matching). A system performing identification
matches the new characteristics against the master templates of many users resulting in multiple
match values (one too many matching).
Decision Maker: This module accepts or rejects the user based on a security threshold and
matching score [1].
4. E-PASSPORT SYSTEM DESIGN
System design is a transition from a user-oriented document to a document oriented to
programmers or database personnel. It goes through logical and physical design walkthrough
before implementation.

37
4.1. Logical Data Structure
The ICAO issued a standardized data structure called Logical Data Structure (LDS) for the
storage of data elements. This was to ensure that global interoperability for e-Passport Tags and
Readers could be maintained. The specifications state that all the 16 data groups are write
protected and can be written only at the time of issue of the e-Passport by the issuing state shown
in table 1. A hash of data groups 1-15 are stored in the security data element (SOD), each of these
hashes should be signed by the issuing state.
Table 1 E-Passport Logical Data Structure
Data Group Data Element
DG 1 Document Details
DG 2 Encoded Headshot
DG 3 Encoded Face
DG 4 Encoded Fingerprint
DG 5 Encoded Palmprint
DG 6 Encoded Iris biometrics
DG 7 Displayed Portrait
DG 8 Reserved for Future Use
DG 9 Signature
DG 10 Data features
DG 11-13 Additional Details
DG 14 CA Public Key
DG 15 AA Public Key
DG 16 Persons to Notify
SOD Security Data Element
4.2. E-Passport Certification
The Biometric authentication procedure for electronic passports involves two processes -
Registration and Verification. During the registration phase, the e-Passport applicant registers
their biometric at a secure location under human supervision. A feature extraction program is
used to encode this biometric data after which it is stored on the user’s e-Passport Tag. For user
authentication and identity Verification at an inspection terminal, the user is made to supply a

38
sample of their biometric. The same feature extraction algorithm is used to encode the freshly
supplied biometric. A matching algorithm is run at the terminal to obtain the degree of similarity
between the registered and supplied biometric. If the degree of similarity is deemed to be greater
than a certain threshold value, the biometric is accepted and the user's identity is verified
successfully. Unfortunately, without human supervision, it is not always possible to detect the use
of prosthetics at the biometric registration or Verification stages. It is easy to see that biometric
spoofing attacks will become easier to perform as automation increases and human supervision of
the biometric process decreases [4].
5. IMPLEMENTATION OF E-PASSPORT SYSTEM
In order to implement this biometric electronic passport system for person identification using
face, fingerprint, palmprint and iris recognition efficiently, ASP.NET program is used. This
program could speed up the development of this system because it has facilities to draw forms
and to add library easily.
5.1. Public Key Infrastructure
In normal situations, certificate-issuing organizations known as Certificates Authorities (CA’s)
are grouped in a trusted hierarchy, where the children CA’s trust the parent CA’s. All CA’s
directly or indirectly trust the top-level Root CA. Revoking one certificate means all its children
CA’s are no longer trusted. However, in ICAO, when a private key is compromised, the country
cannot automatically invalidate all the passports issued with this key. The passport signed by any
private key is expected to last for the issuing period. It is not feasible to ask hundreds or even
thousands of passport holders to renew their passports every time a key is revoked. Instead, these
passports should be used as normal, and a mechanism should notify the custom officials inspect
the passport in greater detail. For each country such as the US, there is a Country Signing CA
responsible for creating a public/private key pair, which is used to sign the Document Signer
Certificates. This key pair should be generated and stored in a highly protected, offline CA
infrastructure by the issuing country [5]. The lifetime of a Country Signing CA Key should be the
longer of: The length of time the key will be used to issue passports.
5.2. Passive Authentication
Passive Authentication is the only mandatory cryptographic protocol in the ICAO. Its primary
goal is to allow a Reader to verify that the biometric face, fingerprint, palmprint and iris data in
the e-Passport is authentic. This scheme is known as passive authentication since the Tag
performs no processing and is only passively involved in the protocol. One must note that Passive
Authentication does not tie the Tag to a passport i.e. researcher can only establish that the face,
fingerprint, palmprint and iris data on the Tag is correct, not the authenticity of the Tag itself. The
Inspection System retrieves the certificate of the issuing document verifier; using the public key
from the certificate it verifies the digital signature and biometric used to sign the biometric face,
fingerprint, palmprint and iris data. Once the validity of the signature is established, the Reader
computes the hash of each of these data elements and compares them with the hashed values
stored. If there is a match, it can be established that the data on the Tag was not manipulated [7].
5.3. Active Authentication
Active Authentication is an optional protocol in the ICAO specifications. Using a simple
challenge-response mechanism, it aims to detect if a Tag has been substituted or cloned. If Active
Authentication is supported, the Tag on the e-Passport stores a public key (KPuAA) in Data and its
hash representation. The corresponding private key (KPrAA) is stored in the secure section of Tag
memory. In order for the Tag to establish its authenticity, it must prove to the Reader that it
possess this private key.

39
The Reader sends a randomly generated 64 bit string (R) to the Tag.
The Tag signs this string using the key KPrAA and sends this signature to the Reader.
The Reader obtains the public key KPuAA stored in biometric Data.
The Reader verifies the correctness of the signed string using its knowledge of R and KPuAA.
5.4. Basic Access Control
Basic Access Control (BAC) is an optional protocol that tries to ensure that only Readers with
physical access to the passport can read Tag data. When a reader attempts to scan the BAC
enabled e-Passport, it engages in a protocol which requires the Reader to prove knowledge of a
pair of secret keys (called `access keys') that are derived from biometric data on the Machine
Readable Zone (MRZ) of the passport. From these keys, a session key which is used for secure
messaging is obtained [8].
5.5. Chip Authentication
The Chip Authentication protocol is aims to replace Active Authentication as a mechanism to
detect cloned e-Passports. If CA is performed successfully it establishes a new pair of encryption
and MAC keys to replace BAC derived session keys and enable secure messaging. It does this
using the static key agreement protocol. Note that the e-Passport Tag already has a Chip
Authentication public key and private key (in secure memory).
5.6. Terminal Authentication
The Terminal Authentication protocol is a protocol that is executed only if access biometrics data
is required. It is a challenge-response mechanism that allows the Tag to validate the Reader used
in Chip Authentication. The Reader proves to the Tag using digital certificates that it has been
authorized by the home and visiting nation to read e-Passport Tags.
6. E-PASSPORT PROTOCOLS
The ICAO e-passport is a complex protocol suite that consists of three sub protocols namely,
BAC, PA and AA. Such a protocol suite is not only difficult to formalize, but also verification of
such systems more often leads to an exponential state-space explosions. Researcher model the
flow of e-passport protocol according to the following stages:
When an e-passport is presented at a border security checkpoint, the chip and the e-passport
reader execute the BAC protocol, in order to establish a secure (encrypted) communication
channel between them.
On successful completion of BAC, the e-passport reader performs PA.
The chip and the e-passport reader execute the AA protocol.
The e-passport authentication heavily relies on PKI. Researcher model only one level of
certification hierarchy, up to the document signer and researcher assume that document signer
public key is certified by its root (country signing authority) and, is valid and secure. This does
not weaken the verification process of the e-passport protocol suite, but only indicates that the
model assumes the “ideal” PKI implementation. Researcher also supposes that cryptographic
primitives and face, fingerprint, palmprint and iris biometric used in the system like hash
functions, MAC, and generation of keys are secure [8].
6.1. Initial Setup
All entities involved in the protocol share the public quantities p, q, g where:
p is the modulus, a prime number of the order 1024 bits or more.

40
q is a prime number in the range of 159 -160 bits.
g is a generator of order q, where Ai < q, gi
≠ 1 mod p.
Each entity has its own public key and private key pair (PKi,SKi) where PKi = g(SK
i
)
mod
p
Entity i’s public key (PKi) is certified by its root certification authority (j), and is
represented as CERTj(PKi, i).
The public parameters p, q, g used by an e-Passport are also certified by its root
certification authority.
6.2. Phase One – Inspection System (IS) Authentication
Step 1 (IS) When an e-Passport is presented to an IS, the IS reads the MRZ information on the e-
Passport using an MRZ reader and issues the command GET CHALLENGE to the e-
Passport chip.
Step 2 (P) The e-Passport chip then generates a random eP £ R 1 ≤ eP ≤ q - 1 and computes KeP =
geP
mod p, playing its part in the key agreement process to establish a session key. The e-
Passport replies to the GET CHALLENGE command by sending KeP and its domain
parameters p, q, g. eP → IS : KeP , p, q, g
Step 3 (IS) On receiving the response from the e-Passport, the IS generates a random IS £R 1 ≤ IS
≤ q - 1 and computes its part of the session key as KIS = gIS
mod p. The IS digitally signs
the message containing MRZ value of the e-Passport and KeP.
SIS = SIGNSKIS (MRZ || KeP)
It then contacts the nearest DV of the e-Passports issuing country and obtains its public
key. The IS encrypts and sends its signature SIS along with the e-Passport’s MRZ
information and KeP using the DV’s public key PKDV.
IS → DV: ENCPK DV (SIS, MRZ, KeP), CERTCVCA(PKIS, IS)
Step 4 (DV) The DV decrypts the message received from the IS and verifies the CERTCVCA (PKIS,
IS) and the signature SIS. If the verification holds, the DV knows that the IS is genuine,
and creates a digitally-signed message SDV to prove the IS’s authenticity to the e-
Passport.
SDV = SIGNSKDV (MRZ || KeP || PKIS), CERTCVCA (PKDV, DV)
The DV encrypts and sends the signature SDV using the public key PKIS of IS.
DV → IS: ENCPKIS (SDV, [PKeP])
The DV may choose to send the public key of the e-Passport if required. This has an
obvious advantage, because the IS system now trusts the DV to be genuine. It can obtain
a copy of e-Passport’s PK to verify during e-Passport authentication.

41
Step 5 (IS) After decrypting the message received, the IS computes the session key KePIS = (KIS)eP
and encrypts the signature received from the DV, the e-Passport MRZ information and
KeP using KePIS. It also digitally signs its part of the session key KIS.
IS → eP : KIS, SIGNSKIS (KIS, p, q, g), ENCKePIS (SDV,MRZ,KeP )
Step 6 C On receiving the message from the IS, the e-Passport computes the session key KePIS =
(KIS)eP
. It decrypts the message received using the session key and verifies the signature
SDV and VERIFYPKIS (SIGNSKIS (KIS, p, q, g)). On successful verification, the e-Passport
is convinced that the IS system is genuine and can proceed further in releasing its details.
All further communications between an e-Passport and IS are encrypted using the session
key KePIS.
5.2.3 Phase Two - e-Passport Authentication
Step 1 C The IS issues an INTERNAL AUTHENTICATE command to the e-Passport. The e-
Passport on receiving the command, the e-Passport creates a signature SeP = SIGNSKeP
(MRZ || KePIS) and sends its domain parameter certificate to the IS. The entire message is
encrypted using the session key KePIS.
eP → IS : ENCKePIS (SeP , CERTDV (PKeP), CERTDV (p, q, g))
Step 2 (IS) The IS decrypts the message and verifies CERTDV (p, q, g), CERTDV (PKeP) and SeP. If
all three verifications hold then the IS is convinced that the e-Passport is genuine and
authentic.
During the IS authentication phase, an IS sends the e-Passport’s MRZ information to the nearest
e-Passport’s DV, which could be an e-Passport country’s embassy. Embassies are DV’s because
they are allowed to issue e-Passports to their citizens and because most embassies are located
within an IS’s home country, any network connection issues will be minimal. Sending the MRZ
information is also advantageous, because the embassy now has a list of all its citizens that have
passed through a visiting country’s border security checkpoint. We do not see any privacy
implications, because, in most cases, countries require their citizens to register at embassies when
they are visiting a foreign country.
6. CONCLUSIONS
The work represents an attempt to acknowledge and account for the presence on e-passport
scheme using face, fingerprint, palmprint and iris recognition, towards their improved
identification. The application of biometric in passports requires high accuracy rates; secure data
storage, secure transfer of data and reliable generation of biometric data. The passport data is not
required to be encrypted, identity thief and terrorists can easily obtain the biometric information.
The discrepancy in privacy laws between different countries is a barrier for global
implementation and acceptance of biometric passports. A possible solution to un-encrypted
wireless access to passport data is to store a unique cryptographic key in printed form that is also
obtained upon validation. The key is then used to decrypt passport data and forces thieves to
physically obtain passports to steal personal information. More research into the technology,
additional access and auditing policies, and further security enhancements are required before
biometric recognition is considered as a viable solution to biometric security in passports. The
adversaries might exploit the passports with the lowest level of security. The inclusion of
biometric identification information into machine readable passports will improve their
robustness against identity theft if additional security measures are implemented in order to
compensate for the limitations of the biometric technologies.

42
REFERENCES
[1] A.K.Jian, “Biometrics personal identification in networked society” Technical report 1999.
[2] C.Hesher, “A novel technique for face recognition using range images” in the Proceedings of 7th
International Symposium on Signal Processing and Its Application, 2003.
[3] HOME AFFAIRS JUSTICE (2006), “EU standard specifications for security features and biometrics
in passports and travel documents”, Technical report, European Union.
[4] ICAO (2006), “Machine readable travel documents”, Technical report, ICAO.
[5] KLUGLER, D. (2005), “Advance security mechanisms for machine readable travel documents,
Technical report”, Federal Office for Information Security (BSI), Germany.
[6] ICAO, “Machine Readable Travel Documents”, Part 1 Machine Readable Passports, 5th Edition,
2003
[7] Riscure Security Lab, “E-passport privacy attack”, Cards Asia Singapore, April 2006.
[8] D. Wagner, “Security and privacy issues in e-passports”, Cryptology ePrint, Report 2005.
[9] ICAO, “Biometrics Deployment of Machine Readable Travel Documents”, Version 2.0, May 2004.
First Author Profile:
Mr. V.K. NARENDIRA KUMAR M.C.A., M.Phil., Assistant Professor, Department
of Information Technology, Gobi Arts & Science College (Autonomous),
Gobichettipalayam – 638 453, Erode District, Tamil Nadu, India. He received his
M.Phil. Degree in Computer Science from Bharathiar University in 2007. He has
authored or co-authored more than 30 technical papers and conference presentations. He
is a reviewer for several scientific journals. His research interests are focused on
advanced network, image processing, video processing, visual human-computer
interaction, and multimodal biometrics technologies.
Second Author Profile:
Dr. B. SRINIVASAN M.C.A., M.Phil., M.B.A., Ph.D., Associate Professor, PG &
Research Department of Computer Science, Gobi Arts & Science College (Autonomous),
Gobichettipalayam – 638 453, Erode District, Tamil Nadu, India. He received his Ph.D.
Degree in Computer Science from Vinayaka Missions University in 11.11.2010. He has
authored or co-authored more than 70 technical papers and conference presentations. He
is a reviewer for several scientific e-journals. His research interests include automated
biometrics, computer networking, Internet security, and performance evaluation.

DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION OF E-PASSPORT SCHEME USING CRYPTOGRAPHIC ALGORITHM ALONG WITH MULTIMODAL BIOMETRICS TECHNOLOGY

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