Internal Conspiracies JP (1).pptx security

Jay Precision Security Awareness
CTPAT & Internal Conspiracies
Training
Sunil Gaikwad
compliance@jayprecision.co
m
Cell 7575003918

Overview
 CTPAT
 Role within Customs and
Border
Protection (CBP)
 Authorized Economic
Operator (AEO) Cooperation
 Supply Chain Security
Challenges
 Internal Conspiracies
 Tracking & Monitoring
 Policy vs. Practice

 In a day in 2017, CBP processed:
 78,137 truck, rail, and sea containers
 1,088,300 incoming international passengers (air, sea,
land)
 282,350 incoming privately owned vehicles
 Confiscated:
 5,863 kilos of narcotics
 $3.3 million in illegal/prohibited goods
 $265,205 in illicit or undeclared currency
Why CTPAT is Vital for
CBP
Statistical perspective.

CTPAT Membership &
Updates  Current Membership:
11,186
Certified Partner Accounts
 Importers: 4,131
 Mexican Carriers &
Manufacturers: 2,815

AEO Cooperation
 Key Joint Benefits
 Coordinated joint outreach events,
(conferences, seminars, and workshops, etc.).
 Joint validations
 Efficient allocation of resources, man-hours,
and travel expenses.
 Cross training for Specialists in both
programs.

Supply Chain Security Challenges
 Internal Conspiracies
 Definition
 When individuals or
groups work in accord to
commit an illegal act.
 Exists when its participants
utilize legal or illegal methods
to commit an illegal act.
 Motivation
 When the end result is
substantial for relatively
easy work.

Motivating Factors
 The use of internal conspiracies is viewed as the
most cost effective and simplest method to
smuggle narcotics by Drug Trade Organizations
(DTOs).
 The loss of a certain amount of narcotics is
acceptable
and seen as part of the business.
 The risk of being caught is minimal due to:
 The amount of cargo coming from regions
identified
as being high risk.
 Law enforcement authorities’ lack of
sufficient resources.

Profits
 Users in the US spent approximately $100
billion
annually over the past decade.
 Average cost of most common narcotics (in
USD):
 Marijuana: $15 per gram ($15,000 per kilo)
 Cocaine: $100-$120 per gram ($120,000
per kilo)
 Heroin: $15-$20 per dose - 0.1 grams
($200K
per kilo)

Other Gains
 Illegal export of weapons and
ammunition to criminal elements or
other threats (assault weapons, grenade
launchers, etc.).
 Profit made from illegal activities can be
utilized to create legitimate businesses, which
subsequently serve the purpose of continued
smuggling.

Who Loses?
 Legitimate businesses:
 Commodity and conveyances are
contaminated after being utilized in the
movement of illicit product.
 Economic cost and risk of negative publicity.

External Recruiter Tools
 Bribes
 Employees may accept bribes
for information and/or
company property.
 Security personnel, shipping
& receiving personnel, and
drivers have the highest risk,
including management staff.
 Silver or Lead

How your Employees are Recruited
 Conspirators collect employee information;
names, addresses, family members, etc.
 Conspirators familiarize themselves with employee
habits at work and personal lives. They focus on
discovering which employees have an immediate
need for money.
 Conspirators concentrate on employees who may
have known criminal backgrounds or low ethics.

Surveillance
 Collecting facility and
operational information
via surveillance.
 Take photographs of
entrances, personnel,
and commercial traffic.
 Determine level of
perimeter security.
 Conspirators evaluate
site illumination,
camera positions, and
shifts.

Surveillance
 By evaluating vulnerabilities within the company,
conspirators
may create the opportunity for a violation.
 Obtaining shipping procedures and/or loading plans also
facilitates the introduction of illicit materials.
 Transit routes and scheduled stops are of particular
interest.

Conspirator Tools
 Company systems:
 Conspirators attempt to access company systems
without authorization in order to manipulate
manifests, shipping documents, invoices, loading
plans, etc.
 Conspirators may add erroneous information or alter
shipping data to facilitate the introduction of illicit
materials to legitimate cargo.
 Social Media Outlets:
 Facebook, Twitter, company web page, etc. to
obtain company and employee information.

Recruitment Success
 Once a Relationship is Established
 Conspirators show interest in job functions, make
unusual questions about cargo flow or shipping
methods.
 Ask about GPS systems, documentation processing,
etc.…to facilitate their motives.

Obtaining Company Property
 Uniforms
 Company Identification
 Electronic Access Badge
 Codes
 Seals (new or used)
 Company Packaging
Material

Testing Your Security Procedures
 Employees show up on days off.
 Enter restricted/unauthorized zones with or without
adequate identification.
 Drivers deviate from predetermined routes to test GPS.
 Attempt to enter shipping area with unauthorized
articles (backpacks, gym bags, etc.)
 Arrange shipping a package/bag not related to
cargo.

Testing Your Security Procedures
 Test documentation review process by entering
erroneous information in shipment data.
 Attempt to pick-up cargo without documentation or
proper identification.
 Activate alarms to determine response times.
 Place unique markings on boxes with legitimate
product.

Contributing Factors
 Collusion between shipping personnel and drivers.
 Collusion between security guards and shipping
personnel.
 Collusion between drivers and criminals, to transport
contraband in conveyances.
 Criminals impersonating law enforcement to
compromise shipments during a ‘routine’ stop.
 Corrupt law enforcement entities compromising
shipments
during routine stops.

Contributing Factors
 Lack of supervision and/or too much complacency.
 Not following policies and/or procedures.
 Lack of adequate physical access controls.
 Failure to segregate critical areas of operation from
other areas.
 Failure to adequately secure critical documents
and/or
electronic information.
 Inadequate business partner screening process,
particularly those not related to supply chains.

Preventing Internal Conspiracies
 Contracting unrelated security companies for
multiple functions to discourage collusion.
 Segregating employee/public parking from
shipping areas.
 Sufficient cameras in adequate locations.
 Inspect personnel at entrances/exits.
 Segregating critical areas – shipping, production,
etc.
 Follow conveyances randomly.
 Supervisor presence during loading and seal
application.

Preventing Internal Conspiracies
 Evaluate level of awareness/alertness for security guards
and employees through security scenarios.
 Adequate illumination in yards, facilities, etc.
 Video record conveyance inspections and seal application.
 Audit recordings and GPS reports to detect
suspicious behavior.

 Tracking & Monitoring
 Outdated GPS Technology
 Improper Use or Not Full
Potential
 Lack of Monitoring After
Normal Working Hours in
Required Areas
 Lack of Auditing Procedures

 Policy vs. Practice
 Policy not in place.
 Policy not updated.
 Policy does not match
practice.
 Policy not reviewed/approved
by corporate staff.

 Practice Not
Efficient
 Inadequate Training
 Lack of Oversight
 Inadequate/
Incorrect
Equipment

Proactive vs. Reactive
Approach

Discussion and Questions
• Sunil Gaikwad
Supply Chain Compliance Specialist
Customs-Trade Partnership Against
Terrorism

Internal Conspiracies JP (1).pptx security

More Related Content

Similar to Internal Conspiracies JP (1).pptx security (20)

More from surnil7785 (20)

Recently uploaded (20)

Internal Conspiracies JP (1).pptx security