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Mediating Between Concepts and Grammar Holden
Hartl Digital Instant Download
Author(s): Holden Hartl, Heike Tappe
ISBN(s): 9783110179026, 3110179024
Edition: Reprint 2011 ed.
File Details: PDF, 14.59 MB
Year: 2003
Language: english

Mediating between Concepts and Grammar
W
DE
G

Trends in Linguistics
Studies and Monographs 152
Editors
Walter Bisang
(main editor for this volume)
Hans Henrich Hock
Werner Winter
Mouton de Gruyter
Berlin · New York

Mediating between
Concepts and Grammar
Edited by
Holden Härtl
Heike Tappe
Mouton de Gruyter
Berlin · New York

Mouton de Gruyter (formerly Mouton, The Hague)
is a Division of Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, Berlin.
© Printed on acid-free paper which falls within the guidelines
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ISBN 3-11-017902-4
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Die Deutsche Bibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie;
detailed bibliographic data is available in the Internet at <http://dnb.ddb.de>.
© Copyright 2003 by Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, D-10785 Berlin
All rights reserved, including those of translation into foreign languages. No part of this
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out permission in writing from the publisher.
Cover design: Christopher Schneider, Berlin.
Printed in Germany.

Contents
Mediating between concepts and language -
Processing structures 1
Heike Tappe and Holden Härtl
Mediating between
non-linguistic and linguistic structures
Coordination of eye gaze and speech in sentence
production 39
Femke F. van der Meulen
Time patterns in visual reception and written phrase
production 65
Philip Cummins, Boris Gutbrod
and Rüdiger Weingarten
Animacy effects in language production: From mental
model to formulator 101
Kathy Y. van Nice and Rainer Dietrich
Incremental preverbal messages 119
Markus Guhe
Word order scrambling as a consequence of incremental
sentence production 141
Gerard Kempen and Karin Harbusch
The linearization of argument DPs and its semantic
reflection
Andreas Späth
165

vi Contents
Semantics as a gateway to language 197
Heike Wiese
Mediating between
event conceptualization and verbalization 223
Temporal relations between event concepts 225
Elke van der Meer, Reinhard Beyer, Herbert Hagendorf,
Dirk Strauch and Matthias Kolbe
Segmenting event sequences for speaking 255
Ralf Nüse
Events: Processing and neurological properties 277
Maria Mercedes Pinango
Aspectual (re-)interpretation: Structural representation
and processing 303
Johannes Dölling
Type coercion from a natural language generation point
of view 323
Markus Egg and Kristina Striegnitz
The mediating function of the lexicon 349
The thematic interpretation of plural nominalizations 351
Veronika Ehrich
Competing principles in the lexicon
Andrea Schalley
379

Concepts of motion and their linguistic encoding
LadinaB. Tschander
Too abstract for agents? The syntax and semantics of
agentivity in abstracts of English research articles
Heidrun Dorgeloh and Anja Wanner
Index of names
Index of subjects

Mediating between concepts and language -
Processing structures*
Heike Tappe and Holden Härtl
1. Modules and interfaces
One of the main functions of language is to abstract over complex
non-verbal message structures. The language system generates
highly compact linguistic material which, however, must still enable
the recipient of the corresponding linear grammatical sequence to
fully infer the intended message. To guarantee this a device is re-
quired which links concepts and grammar in a systematic fashion by
negotiating the requirements of both the generalized linguistic struc-
tures and the underlying conceptual complexes. Typically, this me-
diating function is instantiated by an interface. Any interface device
has to satisfy procedural requirements because linguistic structure
building must accommodate the fact that different types of informa-
tion are available at different points in time.
Regarding aspects of design, an interface is a virtual or an actual
surface forming a common boundary between independent func-
tional units. It can be defined as a point of information transition and
communication. In a technical sense, an interface definition encom-
passes rules for information transfer and calls for a characterization
of the kind of data that can be handed over from one unit to the
other. This also entails the specification of structure-sensitive opera-
tions over those representations that are the output structures of one
functional component and serve at the same time as input structures
for the subsequent component. The diction independent functional
unit is akin to the term module, in that both notions imply a more or
less autonomous and specialized computational system to solve a
very restricted class of problems and uses information - which are its
proprietary - to solve them (cf. Fodor 1998).

2 Heike Tappe and Holden Härtl
In cognitive science it is widely held, that at least some human
cognitive mechanisms are organized in modules.1
Fodor (1983) de-
fines them as cognitive systems characterized by nine criteria, some
of which concern module-internal information processing with im-
plications for how the interface between such modules is to be de-
fined. The most prominent of these criteria are informational
encapsulation and domain specificity, meaning that; first, the inner
workings of a module cannot be directly influenced from the outside.
Second, that each module computes information of one distinct type,
which, however, has to be of tremendous significance to the species.
Further characteristic features are the following: Unconsciousness,
i.e. module-internal processing is opaque to introspection. Speed and
shallow output, which characterize modules as extremely fast cogni-
tive sub-systems producing a particular output, albeit without provid-
ing information about the mediating stages preceding it.
Additionally, modules are processing pre-determined inputs, which
in turn result in pre-determined outputs devoid any contextual influ-
ence (obligatory firing)} Since it was advanced Fodor's notion of
modularity has stimulated a vivid controversy and an enormous body
of research. In particular the idea of information encapsulation has
become fundamental to computer science. Many standard technolo-
gies of programming are based on this feature. Modularity also plays
a key role in artificial intelligence and computational linguistics: To-
day even systems within sub-symbolic intelligence such as neural
network systems depart from their traditional homogenous architec-
tures and use somewhat modular approaches especially so to natural
language processing (cf. McShane and Zacharski 2001). While it is
thus largely agreed upon that the human mind/brain is organized into
domain specific components (except in rigorous connectionist ap-
proaches), it can be witnessed that the current interpretation of the
term module varies immensely depending on the underlying general
framework (cognitivist, neuro-psychological, evolutionary connec-
tionist, etc.). Generally, it seems that Fodor's modularity assump-
tions are only partly shared in existing models of the human
mind/brain, i.e. the proposed modules are not usually held to possess
all nine Fodorian criteria.

Mediating between concepts and language - Processing structures 3
The related question whether the human language system is
carved up into functional units and - more strongly - whether these
or some of these are full-fledged modules in Fodor's sense has been
a hotly debated question in linguistics, philosophy and psychology
over the last two decades. Because of space limitation we cannot
reiterate this intricate discussion (but cf. e.g. Karmiloff-Smith 1992,
Marshall 1984, Frazier 1987a, Smolensky 1988 and Müller 1996 for
varying viewpoints on modularity). Generally, this thematic complex
is closely connected with a persistent delimitation effort in linguis-
tics. It is broadly held indispensable for both the definition of the
discipline and for scientific distinctness to accomplish an analysis of
language as a formal system. This endeavor dating back to de Saus-
sure (1916) has had its reflex in syntactic and semantic theory alike.
Consequently, the predominant position subsumes under the term
syntax language specific competencies of how symbols of some lan-
guage may be combined independent of meaning, of other cognitive
computations, and of socio-cultural requirements (cf. e.g. Chomsky
1986). Likewise, formal semantics strives to explicitly identify those
aspects of meaning that are genuinely linguistic, i.e. abstract-able
from general world knowledge, and at the same time persistent in all
syntactic alternation contexts (cf. Cresswell 1978, Montague 1970,
for an overview Bäuerle 1985). In the consequence formal ap-
proaches in linguistics have to date been primarily engaged in con-
sistently explicating language internal structures.
Starting in the 70ies, research in cognitive science, anthropology,
and psychology inspired approaches that deny the autonomy of syn-
tax - and of linguistic subsystems in general - in relation to concep-
tual structure. They interpret grammatical phenomena in terms of
more general cognitive principles with applications outside lan-
guage. These have been subsumed under the terms of cognitive
grammar and functional grammar (e.g. Bates and MacWhinney
1984, Deane 1992, Lakoff 1991, Langacker 1987, 1990, 1991,
Gärdenfors 2000, and Tomasello 2000a, 2000b). Without the as-
sumption of functional units that are engaged in some kind of divi-
sion of labor, the notion of a restrictive mapping device becomes
superfluous as the different parts of the language faculty are concep-

tualized as being highly interactive and having access to basically
the same information and knowledge sources.
The epistemological question, whether a formalist or a functional-
ist conception is preferable, gains in relevance when we take into
consideration language processing. The overarching endeavor to de-
velop models for language production and comprehension systems
calls for a specification the relevant sub-components and carries in
itself the need to describe and to explain the interaction of informa-
tional sources. This objective is characteristic for approaches that
attempt to preserve some of theoretically sound and the empirically
founded assumptions of theoretical linguistics and to incorporate
them into a language processing framework (cf. e.g. Levelt 1989,
Bierwisch and Schreuder 1992). Language production and language
comprehension processes are based on representations, on which
they operate. The computation of the linguistic meaning and thus the
communication of information are impossible without an accessibil-
ity of both general and linguistic knowledge. From this follows the
prime question: Which kinds of information interact in what fashion
and at what points in time during language processing? What we are
addressing here is the processing criterion, i.e. are the representa-
tions a given linguistic theory proposes computable by a language
processing system (Marcus 1982, Fodor 1983, Frazier 1987b, Fra-
zier, Clifton and Randall 1983, Berwick and Weinberg 1983). This
means that if we assume that grammars are theories of abstract lin-
guistic competence (e.g., Chomsky 1986), we have to ask whether
they may or may not provide an appropriate framework for under-
standing the mental processing of language (Stillings et al. 1998:
435).
Unfortunately, the discussion between different schools in lan-
guage research remains - as Newmeyer (1998) points out - to date
largely unsatisfactory. They tend to avoid direct confrontation and
thus they generally are unaware of the compatibility of their results.
For the most part this observation also characterizes the interdisci-
plinary communication on matters of modularity and in the conse-
quence on the structures and processes, which play a role at the
interfaces in question. While the understanding of how the linguistic

and the non-linguistic system interact, constitutes one of the most
interesting and central questions in language research, both an intra-
disciplinary and interdisciplinary convergence seems to be a long
way off. The respective definitions of the interface between grammar
and concepts - as well as its allocated character and scope - vary
substantially subject to the vigorousness of the underlying modular-
ity assumption. In the well-established Levelt model (1989) - that
has provided the reference architecture for the majority of research
in language production - the most intensively discussed interface
representation is the so-called preverbal message. In the rigorous
interpretation it links non-linguistic and linguistic structures. How-
ever, the question whether the preverbal message itself is to be inter-
preted as purely non-linguistic is to date still hotly debated. And, in
the consequence there exist profound controversial assumptions
about its general character and content. From this follows that the
impact of features in the preverbal message on the subsequent repre-
sentations remains under discussion especially regarding the realiza-
tion of this information by the sub-components of the linguistic
system. This concerns e.g., the question whether the linguistic reali-
zation of a preverbal message such as the word order of the utterance
is determined by the order in which concepts are selected, or, is the
outcome of purely grammatical operations.
In order to enhance both intra- and interdisciplinary exchange
about these issues, the current volume brings together researchers
both from theoretical linguistics and from language processing as
well as researchers from adjacent disciplines such as computer-
science and psychology. While all contributors acknowledge some
division of labor between lexical(-semantic), morphological, syntac-
tic, and phonological structuring, it is not surprising that they do not
define the respective sub-components and their substance in the
same way. Especially the term semantics receives different interpre-
tations as notions relating to meaning have long and often controver-
sial histories within the disciplines that contribute to this volume,
which are related to foundational and methodological differences. As
a consequence, the current volume comprises contributions that a
traditional perspective on the interface function in question would

not integrate. Although findings from language comprehension stud-
ies are also discussed, the main body of contributions center around
aspects of language production. In this field available definitions of
the concrete interaction between the conceptual/semantic and the
grammatical level are to date still of a tentative nature. The dispute
in the book will shed light on this issue by exploring the several
stages of processing ranging from the conceptual knowledge, its re-
cruitment, and preverbal preparation for linguistic computation, to
finally its grammatical realization.
In the following paragraphs we give an overview of prominent -
and in the interest of space selected - interface conceptions from the
perspectives of both the grammatical and the conceptual systems and
relate those to questions of language processing. Subsequently, we
introduce the contributions to this volume, which demonstrate vari-
ous parallels and common attitudes in spite of differences in focus,
research background, and modeling.
1.1. Linking to syntax
The assumption that a linguistic capacity of the human mind/brain
enables speakers to competently master their native language is
tightly intertwined with the influential work of Fodor (1983) and
Chomsky (1986). Both assert the existence of a specialized language
faculty, which is conceived as a mental organ3
and as being internal-
ly organized into several functional subsystems. Especially Chom-
sky's arguments in favor for a linguistic module are based on pheno-
mena which are hard to explain on other but syntax-internal
grounds.4
Further compelling evidence for genuine linguistic syntac-
tic principles are found in language acquisition (e.g. Meisel 1990,
Stromswold 1992, Tappe 1999) and Creole language data (e.g. Bick-
erton 1990).5
The division of the cognitive system into functional
sub-components implies the existence of specific principles organiz-
ing the representations within each component. More importantly in
the present context, it follows from this conception that mapping
mechanisms between the components be specified.

It is generally acknowledged that for a successful coupling be-
tween (lexical) semantics and syntax predicates have to provide such
lexical information as the number of arguments and the syntactic
structure into which these arguments are to be integrated. In spite of
this broad consensus, the proposals about how such an interrelation
between syntactic and semantic structures may be realized vary sub-
stantially.
Recent syntactic theories characterize syntactic operations by mi-
nimalist principles, which are subject to directives of economy and
explicitness. In the minimalist framework (cf. e.g. Chomsky 1995)
lexical items enter the syntactic building process fully equipped with
their grammatically relevant features including categorial, semantic
argument structure, and thematic features. The relevant operation
select maps lexical items from a set of elements activated from the
lexicon onto the computational process. This process makes use of
two basic mechanisms, i.e. merge and move. Furthermore, procrasti-
nate regulates that syntactic movement has to take place as late as
possible in the derivation, if there is a choice, which differs from
language to language thus creating language-specific word order
variations. The underlying idea is that covert movement is 'less
costly', because it does not have to pied-pipe phonological features
(cf. e.g. Chomsky 1995, Wilder and Cavar 1994). In this fashion the
syntactic component produces structures that are compatible and
legible to the linguistic levels adjoining the syntactic level and also
to the levels adjacent to the linguistic system itself. The language
faculty has to meet specific interface conditions to allow for interac-
tion with the adjoining nonlinguistic components. This requirement
has led Chomsky (2000) to the conclusion that "language is an op-
tional solution to legibility conditions". These legibility conditions
have to involve principles of how syntactic material is to be mapped
onto phonological representations of the articulatory-perceptual sys-
tem on the one hand, and the semantic representations of the concep-
tual-intentional system on the other.
Developing a somewhat different approach to modeling the lexi-
con-syntax interface within the feature-checking framework of the
minimalist program (Chomsky 1995), van Hout (1996) proposes a

CHecking Event-Semantic Structure model (CHESS). She assumes
that the event structure of a predicate must be syntactically identified
(cf. Grimshaw 1990; Grimshaw and Vikner 1993) and defines the
mapping relation in terms of checking event-semantic features in
functional configurations. There are two structural argument posi-
tions: the specifier positions of AgrS and AgrO. An argument in ei-
ther of these positions identifies an event or subevent by referring to
an event participant that is involved in that (sub)event. Telic event
type features must be checked in AgrOP. Van Hout argues that the
CHESS model accounts for the event-semantic mapping generaliza-
tions in a natural way, explaining the phenomenon of lexical-
syntactic flexibility as a derivative of event-type shifting.
These current developments within syntactic theory are compati-
ble with semantically oriented approaches that assume specific link-
ing mechanisms operational between semantic and syntactic
structure. Here it is held that specific configurational constellations
in the semantic representation determine the syntactic realization of a
language. In Bierwisch (1986) and Wunderlich (1997) the mapping
of arguments onto syntactic structure is organized through the em-
bedding of the arguments in the semantic form representation, i.e. a
predicate-argument structure. Jackendoff (1990) advances a similar
approach with the difference that he assumes correspondence rules
to negotiate between syntactic and semantic-conceptual structure.
Moreover, he also claims that lexical syntactic representation of a
predicate can always be reduced to its lexical semantic representa-
tion. In the consequence he treats the semantic and syntactic infor-
mation of the lexicon as part of conceptual structure whereby
arguments correspond to ontological categories of conceptual struc-
ture.
This latter claim differentiates Jackendoff s account considerably
from most linking theories. Based on the observation that some pairs
of predicates like, e.g. ask and inquire have different syntactic subca-
tegorizations albeit their semantics are identical, Grimshaw (1979)
proposes that predicates select both syntactic objects (nouns phrases,
sentences and semantic objects (propositions, questions, exclama-
tions) with no correlation between the two. The linking between the

two distinct types of information is handled by thematic hierarchies
where semantic argument features like AGENT, BENEFACTIVE or
THEME organize the order of arguments to be realized in syntax (cf.
Baker 1997, Grimshaw 1990, Jackendoff 1972 among many others).
AGENTS, for example, surface in a hierarchically higher position (as
subject) than THEMES (as direct object in transitive verb complexes).
The very nature of argument structure is less than clear.6
'Linking
theoreticians' assume that argument structure not only contains the-
matic information but that it is also closely tied up with event struc-
ture, which contains aspectual information (cf. Grimshaw 1990).7
Tenny (1992, 1994) assumes that only aspectually relevant informa-
tion is mapped onto syntax {Aspectual Interface Hypothesis). In the
other extreme, researchers like Rappaport and Levin (1988) encode
no more than syntactically relevant information into argument struc-
ture, which thus does not contain any thematic role specifications.
As becomes evident from this discussion, most of the various exem-
plary conceptions of the mapping between syntax and semantics are
joined by the consistent assumption that there is an independent
level, where lexical properties such as predicate-argument structures
are calculated. However, the question of what kind of information
influences and/or is to be integrated into this structure during lan-
guage processing has not yet received a widely accepted mutual an-
swer. This is partly due to the fact that syntactic theories tend to
center around the outcome of the computation rather than a real time
piecemeal construction of syntactic strings. In this context, the ques-
tion of how information is weighted such that the salience of the
constituents has its reflexes in an incremental syntactic realization
gains central importance.
1.2. Semantics
As was already hinted at in the first paragraph, formal model-
theoretic approaches towards meaning assume a modular organiza-
tion of linguistic processes: A morpho-syntactic component generat-
ing overt linguistic sequences and a semantic component, which re-
lates the grammatical material to extra-linguistic structures. General-

ly the focus of investigation the pairing of syntactic categories and
semantic types and the subsequent model-theoretical interpretation
of the analyses (e.g. in the framework of categorial grammar,
Ajdukiewicz 1935). The prime target is to specify how linguistic
expressions fit the world. Therefore investigations center, first,
around referring expressions, (syntactically encoded in noun
phrases) and, second, around truth-conditions of propositions, in-
cluding the exploration of which inferences follow from a linguistic
expression (cf. e.g. Lewis 1972, Tarsky 1977). Under this perspec-
tive the linking between syntax and semantics the need to further
explicate the linking between syntax and semantics does not arise
because here syntactic structures are considered categorical com-
plexes, whose interpretation is derived compositionally from either
the syntactic parts or their fixed meaning, respectively.
Syntactic constellations are deemed relevant only if the modifica-
tion of a linguistic string results in different entailments such that the
truth conditions underlying the expression in question are altered.
Correlations between certain linguistic expressions are taken to be of
a logical rather than a grammatical nature (cf. Montague 1973, Par-
tee 1975, Dowty 1979). Grammatically different but logically identi-
cal sentences inducing parallel entailments like the three examples in
(1) are generally treated in a homogenous fashion. The differences
between them are ascribed to information structure and focus pack-
aging routines.
(1) a. Somebody killed the fly.
b. The fly was killed.
c. The fly, somebody killed.
Somebody did something.
Decompositional approaches strive to grasp further entailments that
cannot be explicitly derived from overt form, but need to be inferred
from inherent meaning features. To this aim they employ the concept
of basic meaning components (cf. Katz and Fodor 1963, McCawley
1971 and many others). Under the assumption that complex mean-
ings are built up from smaller units such as CAUSE or NOT ALIVE,

more specific entailments can be logically derived from the sen-
tences in (1), cf. examples in (2).
(2) a. Somebody killed
thefly.
b. The fly was killed.
c. The fly, somebody
killed.
CAUSE[somebody,[BECOME[-iALiVE fly]]]
Somebody did something
Somebody caused something to
happen
Something became not alive
Although purely logically oriented, decompositional approaches can
thus capture implicit entailments, they cannot address the issue of
contextually driven truth evaluations. Under the assumption that - in
order to adequately convey a message structure - such information
structural values determining an expression are to be defined as re-
flexes of the speaker's intention, a broader notion of what is meant
by the term propositional content is needed. Consequently, the truth
conditions underlying the example in (2c) have to imply that this
sentence can have been uttered only in a specific contextual (i.e. a
contrastive) situation: The respective discourse set needs to contain
at least one more object such that the contrastive function of the ex-
pression can be evaluated as true.
A further shortcoming of purely logically oriented semantic theo-
ries is that they have to define truth conditions that must hold in
every possible situation the corresponding expression occurs in. For
example, a semantic analysis for short passives - cf. examples in (3)
- has to explain the fact that passives can be accompanied by pur-
pose clauses, which imply that there is an implicit agent denoted in
the matrix clause. This leads to the conclusion that the truth condi-
tions underlying passives have to signify an (existentially bound)
individual (cf. Brody and Manzini 1988, Roeper 1987, Koenig and
Mauner 1999, for discussion).
(3) a. The letter was written in order to impress the duchess.
b. The letter was written but it never reached its addressee.

In (3a) the implicit agent of the purpose clause (the one who im-
presses) and the demoted entity in the matrix clause (the one who
wrote the letter) are co-referential. Although this can surely be taken
as evidence for the conceptual existence of an implicit agent in short
passives, nothing prevents us from rejecting this assumption in cases
like (3b) where no purpose clause is added. However, the latter hy-
pothesis can merely be upheld if we assume a level of language
processing where only those pieces of information are provided
which are relevant for a successful realization of the communicative
act. Consequently, for a message like (3b) an implicit agent - as it
does not gain any referential salience - might not be present in the
semantic-conceptual structure underlying the message. Only in cases
where a conceptual activation of a corresponding entity becomes
relevant (as in (3a)) this knowledge has to be retrieved. Yet, in order
to cover cases where contextual constellations indeed require the
conceptualization of an entity, truth-theoretic analyses over-generate
and represent both sentences alike. Obviously, this problem concerns
the notion of conceptual activeness and here empirical and proce-
dural evidence may provide a solution by indicating the concrete
conceptual constellations holding during actual language processing
in real time. Against this background, it is apparent that experimental
results can not only help to reveal stages of language processing and
to define an adequate processing model, but also to indicate how
linguistic expressions be analyzed and to determine corresponding
representations.
Generally, semantic theories are, of course, not oblivious of the
importance of context- and situation-dependent aspects of meaning
construction, as is emphasized, e.g. in situation semantics (cf. Bar-
wise and Perry 1983, among others). Here, sentence meanings are
built up compositionally as functions from reference situations to
described situations. Thereby contextual factors reflecting specific
speech situations are incorporated into the study of meaning such
that expressions like I, this, and yesterday in I saw this plate on the
table yesterday are evaluated against the context of the actual speech
event. In this way, adequate means to determine corresponding truth-
values are provided. In a similar fashion, Kaplan (1977) distin-

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Carter thought a moment and replied that he thought there was.
Then Bartley said he wished Carter and I to go into the church and to
reach the balcony. He and Ranville would join us in a short while. If
we succeeded in getting into the balcony without being heard, we
were to simply watch the person playing the organ and wait until
Bartley joined us. We started to ask him what he expected would be
discovered. He made no reply to the question; instead he said he
thought he would be able to pick the lock of the front door of the
church.
Wondering just why he wished us to go into the church and,
above all, puzzled as to where he and Ranville might be going, we
followed him to the church entrance. For a second the flame from his
flash light played upon the great door. Then as we screened him,
Bartley fumbled for a moment or so with the lock, using a thin piece
of steel, and before we knew it the door was open.
With a whisper that we might close the door, as he could open it
again, Bartley slipped away in the darkness. Silently, Carter and I
stole softly into the church. As we closed the door behind us, we
stopped a moment to listen. There came to our ears the muffled
sound of the organ, telling us the man was still playing. With a
whisper that we did not have to be very careful as the organ would
drown out any noise we made, Carter turned on his flash light.

The flame lasted but a moment, but long enough to allow us to
get our bearings. We were in the vestibule of the church. On each
side of the hallway stairs ran to the other floor, no doubt to a balcony.
In the front near the stairs were two doors leading into the church.
They were glass doors, but the glass was covered with some sort of
cloth.
There was not much necessity to be over quiet. The organ
prevented any sound we might make from being heard. We went to
the stairs, and with our hands on the wall climbed to the next floor.
We crept carefully through several rows of chairs and managed to
reach the front railing of the balcony without any noise. There we
sank back in the nearest chairs and peered over the rail.
Before us the church stretched away to the organ loft, which was
above the pulpit. Below us lay a great pit of darkness, while almost
on a level with us we could see the tiny splotch of light—a light which
flickered and twisted as the flame of a candle will. It was set
somewhere upon the organ, for we could catch the reflection of
several of the golden pipes. But the man at the keys we could not
distinguish. There was but the black outline of his figure as, with
head bent low, he played to the silent church.
As we sat there in the darkness, it dawned upon me that perhaps
never again would I hear such music—that is, if one could call the
wild strains which came from the organ music. It was unlike anything
I have ever heard, wild, fantastic and even devilish in its suggestion.
For the first time I began to understand what some people had in
mind when they called certain music immoral. Now the tones would
swell, swell until the echo reverberated from the wall. Next it would
die down to a soft, sobbing croon to last but a moment, and then
suddenly burst forth in a wild satanic laugh. It was the eeriest music I
have ever heard, and as time passed on, it seemed to frighten me.
Then came a moment when the organ died down to a strain so
low we could barely hear it. In that second, suddenly there was a
terrific flash of lightning—one which threw the rich glass of the
windows in high relief and caused the interior of the church to flare
for a moment into sight. Then followed a heavy crash of thunder,
which seemed to roll down the roof of the church. The next instant
there came the heavy dashing of rain upon the roof above our

heads. And all at once, as the sound of the thunder died away, the
organ seemed to falter, and the music stopped with a sudden crash.
At the same time the light in the organ loft went out.
As the light vanished, Carter gripped my arm. Bending over the
railing, I tried to figure out what had happened as if the very
tenseness of my gaze could pierce the blackness. A sound behind
caused me to jump, but the next instant there came Bartley's low
whisper:
“It's all right, Pelt. Keep still.”
There came another flash of lightning more vivid than before,
which seemed to play across the window above the organ, a window
which was blood-red in the second I was able to see it. The clap of
thunder which followed appeared to shake the church to its very
foundation. And then in that second of silence which seems to follow
a thunderclap, there came ringing through the black church a voice
—a voice unlike anything I have ever heard. The tone exultant,
triumphant, ringing above the sound of the rain upon the roof and the
sweep of the wind around the building. A voice chanting a
disconnected series of words.
“A sign, O Lord. A sign to thy servant. The Lord will deliver his
enemies into my hands. A sign, O Lord. A sign I cried for. And it
came, it came.”
The shrill voice rose higher and higher until the broken phrases
were almost a shriek. I felt Carter's hand sink into my arm. In his
intensity he did not know that his grip was painful. None of us
moved, but I heard a short gasp come from some one. And I knew
that the eyes of the three were trying, like my own, to pierce the
darkness.
The voice died away to a sobbing whisper, then all became still.
Above our heads the rain was dashing in sheets against the roof.
Somewhere outside I heard the shrill wail of an automobile as the
driver blew the horn. But within the church was only darkness and
silence. Again there came a vivid flash of lightning, followed by the
rumble of the thunder. As it died away the voice rose again—rose in
a wailing cry:
“A sign to thy servant. A sacrifice to thy power.”

Silence again, in which I tried to figure out just where the man
might be. That he was somewhere in the front of the church I knew,
somewhere near the altar. But why the candle had been
extinguished, and above all why he should stay in the darkness I
could not tell. Of one thing I was certain. No sane man had been
playing the organ. And the voice we had heard had tones and
inflections which I had never heard in any normal person.
Again came the voice. This time it was not so shrill, but far more
serious—speaking with the tone of one who was lifted above the
world by some mystical vision within them, and yet the tone and the
words made me shudder.
“Blood—will wipe away all sins. Blood—” the voice wailed.
I heard a muttered “God” in a horrified voice from Carter. He half
started to rise, only to fall back in his seat at Bartley's whispered
command.
The voice came again above the sound of the rain and the noise
of the wind—the words came ringing down to us through the
darkness:
“Blood will wipe away all sins,” were the words chanted in a
singsong voice. “Blood. A sacrifice upon the altar.”
The voice died away. There came a muttering, the words so low
that we could not hear a single one. For several moments it went on.
Suddenly it ceased, and we heard the sound of some one stumbling
down some steps—stumbling and half falling. Then came the sound
of feet half running—running down the aisle of the church—running,
yet stumbling and falling against the pews. At the sound Bartley
whispered:
“Down the stairs! Let the man get out on the lawn, and then
follow him. Do not let him see us.”
We groped our way up the short aisle, then down the stairs which
led to the vestibule. Just as we reached the turn in the steps, we
heard the man fumbling with the front door—heard him fling it open,
and then followed the loud bang as the wind slammed it shut. With
that we leaped down the remaining steps, across the hallway to the
door. In a second some one had flung it open.
As we piled out on the lawn, the rain swept across our faces.
Coming from the dense darkness of the church, we found we could

see but a few feet ahead of us. Though we looked on all sides, we
saw nothing of the man. Suddenly there came a flash of lightning,
and in the glare I saw far down the lawn a running figure—a figure
headed for the lake.
We started on a run, Bartley a little in the lead. The lake was
several hundred yards away, and above the wind I could hear the
water as it dashed against the shore. By the aid of another flash of
lightning, we glimpsed for a second the dark figure. This time he was
almost by a small building which faced the water.
As we reached Bartley's side, Carter gasped:
“I think I know where the man is going. There is a stone boat
house down there.”
I wondered later why it was we were not observed, for as the
man reached the boat house, we heard him fumble with the lock,
and the door was slammed almost in our faces. We stood for a
second by the door of the building. It was a small stone affair built of
heavy granite blocks. It stood directly upon the shore of the lake, and
the water was but a few feet away. As we gazed at the building,
suddenly far above our heads came the reflection of a light from
within. I gave a start, for the light was directly above us. There came
Carter's quick voice:
“John, this place has no windows at all. It was once a studio, and
there is a large skylight in the roof. When I was a kid, I often climbed
on the roof and watched the artists working inside.”
“Can you get up there now?” questioned Bartley.
“Without any trouble at all,” Carter retorted. “On the other side of
the building there is a big tree. You can climb the tree, then go out on
a branch and drop on the roof. It's easy.”
Without a word Bartley rushed around the side of the building, we
after him. There we found it was as Carter had said. There was a
large tree several yards from the building, and I could see from the
light reflected above the roof an overhanging branch. As the limbs
hung low, Bartley had no difficulty in climbing, and I saw him drop
upon the roof. In rapid succession we followed him. For a moment as
the branch swayed with the wind I felt a feeling of suspense, but in a
second I dropped lightly on the roof of the building.

A large skylight formed the larger part of the roof. From it a light
was streaming out into the night. Bending over the skylight, their
eyes intent on something in the room below, were Carter and
Bartley. Ranville and myself reached the glass at the same moment
and bent forward to look into the room.
In the first glance I noticed nothing out of the way. There was
simply a large, unkempt room, littered with old chairs and odds and
ends. By the door which faced the lake there was a small rowboat.
Then my eyes fell upon a broken-down sofa, which was in one
corner of the room and then I gave a quick gasp of horror, for there
upon the broken-down piece of furniture lay a still figure—a person
whose eyes were closed and whose face was very white. Below us
upon the sofa lay the unconscious figure of the secretary.
My first startled thought was that she was dead. But I saw the
breast rise a little and knew that she was breathing. She did not
move, however, and her eyes were closed. The white dress was
stained with dirt, and half of the thin waist was torn away from her
shoulder. One could see the white curve of her arm and the ivory
whiteness of the half-exposed breast. Across the naked shoulder
was a long red mark, either a cut or a scratch. The dress was far
above her knees, and the rolled stockings exposed her legs, which
were covered with dirt.
The first startled thought had been one of surprise. Though
Bartley had told us that it was his opinion the girl was in danger, yet
for my part I had failed to believe him. But as I looked down upon the
unconscious figure, I realized he had been right. Some one started
to speak when in the rear of the room a door suddenly began to
open.
I watched the door as it swung slowly open, and then a man
came into the room. His face I could not see, for he entered in a
sideways position with the body bent far over. His hair was very
much disheveled, and the black suit which he wore was a mass of
wrinkles. Slowly, with his head bent low, he shambled over to the
sofa and, with the hands hanging down, stood looking at the girl. The
face I could not see, but as I looked at the uncouth figure, it began to
dawn upon me that I knew who the man was.

Suddenly he raised the long thin arms above his head and waved
them in a threatening manner over the unconscious girl. For a few
seconds he stood silent, then shuffled to the corner of the room and
fumbled under a bit of sail cloth. He straightened, his face still hidden
from my sight, and then to my consternation I saw he held in his
hand—a knife. As he raised it above his head, the long thin steel
caught the reflection from the electric light and glittered in a strange
fashion. As if testing the force of his blow, he swept the knife
downward through the air and then turned to gaze in a reflective
manner at the form on the sofa. At the same second I saw Ranville,
who was next to me, pull his revolver from his pocket.
For some reason the man remained quiet a moment, then went
very slowly to the opposite corner of the room. From where we were
on the roof we were unable to see what he was doing. As I bent my
face closer to the glass, Bartley suddenly spoke in a low voice:
“Carter, I am going to take Pelt and go down and break in the
door. You remember what I said. If it is necessary, do not be afraid to
shoot—and shoot to kill. There may come just a second when it will
be a question of taking the life of that insane person below or saving
the girl. There is only one choice.”
With a touch on my shoulder to follow him he went over to the
branch of the tree and pulled himself along to the trunk, when he slid
to the ground. I followed him, reaching the foot of the tree at almost
the same moment. Without a word he hurried around the side of the
building to the front door, I after him. There, adjusting his flash light
so the flame would remain fixed, he turned it on the door.
There is a certain instrument by which any door may be opened.
It is, in fact, a very powerful lever which simply forces the lock out of
position and crushes the door open. The door before us was of
heavy wood, and though he fumbled a moment at the lock with a bit
of steel, he had no success. Taking the lever from his pocket, he
applied it in the proper manner and then began to use his strength.
There came the sound of creaking wood, a splintering crash as the
door gave way. And then, just as he started to push it open, there
came a voice from a figure running over the lawn.
“Mr. Bartley,” cried the voice.

We turned quickly as Patton came in the range of the flash light.
He rushed to our side, much out of breath, and his questioning eyes
swept over the two of us. Telling him to keep a little behind us,
Bartley turned again to the door. He gave it a push, then a shove,
and it swung open, ripped half off the hinges.
We found ourselves in a small entryway littered with rubbish of all
kinds. In front of us was a partly opened door, and from the light
which came through it I knew it led into the room which we had
looked down upon. We took one step in the direction of the door and
then paused suddenly as a voice came ringing out upon the silence:
“A sacrifice to the Most High,” pealed the voice. And the tones
were those of one carried away by some stern purpose. They
contained not only a note of cruelty, but also one of high resolution—
the voice of one from whom sanity had long since departed.
“Blood—will—wash away all sin,” chanted the voice. The tone
rose higher and higher until it was almost a shriek. “Blood—a
sacrifice to the Most High—” Then as the voice sank, there came a
silence and the half-sobbing refrain:
“The Lord chooses his servants to punish his enemies—Blood—”
With a leap Bartley reached the half-open door and flung it wide. I
was in the room at almost the same moment, and there for a second
we stood. Before us, the girl lay upon the sofa, and in the first quick
glance I gave I saw that she still did not move. Before her stood the
unkempt figure, his suit drenched by the rain, holding in the right
hand the long knife.
As we burst into the room, the man's voice died away in his
throat; he whirled around and glared at us. His face was working
convulsively, and the mouth was partly open, showing the long
narrow teeth. The eyes glared at us in an unearthly manner, and his
left hand opened and closed. He gave us one startled look—a look
which contained nothing of recognition—and half gathered himself
for a spring. And then suddenly there came a change in the
expression of his face.
The eyes which had swept over Bartley and myself shifted their
gaze to something which was behind us. As we looked, the wild
expression which had glared at us began to fade away; instead there
came a half-bewildered look, the faint dawning of remembrance.

Slowly I saw a look of astonishment give place to the greatest horror.
He gave one step in our direction and pointed a wavering hand at
the object behind us. I gave a quick look to see what it might be. But
only Patton stood behind us in the doorway.
Advancing very slowly, one foot in front of the other, with the
outstretched hands wavering, yet ever pointing, the man took two
steps in our direction. He tried to speak, and I saw the lips move in a
vain effort. Then as his face worked strangely, there burst forth the
words in a half shriek:
“You—you. You were killed.”
Bartley's voice broke in upon the silence, cool and sharp:
“No! You killed the wrong man.”
The uncouth figure half stumbled, and there came a despairing
moan from the trembling lips. The hand dropped limply to his side.
He gave one wild, appealing look around the room, then his eyes
came back to Patton. I saw the veins in his forehead swell, and his
face flush a vivid red. He half started to gather himself for a leap in
our direction—started, only to partly turn. There came a half groan
from his lips—a despairing cry, and then suddenly he fell with a
crash to the floor. Fell, to move his hands convulsively for a moment,
and then become very still. Carter's next-door neighbor—the minister
—lay dead at our feet.

Chapter XVII.
The Case Is Ended
Several hours later found us gathered in Carter's living room. It
had been a very active two hours. Our first attention had been given
to the secretary, for it needed but a glance to tell that the minister
was beyond any aid of ours. We carried her to Carter's house, where
his housekeeper placed her in bed, while we called the doctor. We
had reached both the coroner and the chief of police, and when their
duties had been completed, they had all gathered in Carter's house.
We were a somber-looking group of men. The horror and
nervous tension of the last few hours was still with us. No one felt
very much at ease, and my eyes still saw the amazing scene in the
boat house. The heavy face of the chief wore the most bewildered
look I have ever seen, and it seemed as if he still found it impossible
to believe all that had taken place. Only Ranville and Bartley
appeared to be unmoved, and the Englishman's face wore an
admiring look whenever he glanced at Bartley.
It was the chief who voiced the thought which was in all our
minds. He turned to Bartley, and his heavy voice asked the question
we all wished answered.
“Mr. Bartley,” he asked, “for God's sake, tell us how you doped
out this thing. I can't believe yet the minister killed those two men. To
save my life I can't see it.”
Bartley started to speak, only to be interrupted by Carter's rising
from his chair. Telling us he thought the chief would pardon us if we
took a little drink, he left the room, returning in a moment. Under his
arm was a three-sided bottle, and glasses clinked in his pockets. No
one spoke while he poured out the Scotch, and very soberly we each
took our drink. Then Carter turned to his friend.
“Now, John,” was all he said.

Fumbling in his pocket, Bartley found his cigar case and slowly
lighted one of the long thin cigars he loved so well. Then, leaning far
back in his chair, he turned to the chief.
“As you know, Chief,” were his words, “the solving of any crime is
oftentimes a matter of luck. It is not often we find clews scattered
about which lead us directly to the criminal. Most murders are solved
by very careful detail work by the police. Others are solved by sheer
good fortune, and a few by what we might call a bit of psychology.”
I saw Ranville nod his head in agreement, but the chief's face
was a study. He started to say something, only to check himself as
Bartley continued:
“When I first read in the papers regarding the murder of Warren,
my first thought was, the whole thing seemed incredible. Then I
began to wonder what the motive might be. There must always be
some kind of a motive for a murder. The crime is committed, of
course, for many reasons. In the main, there are but three—robbery,
revenge or sudden, frenzied passion. When I read the accounts of
Warren's death, every one of these reasons seemed to be
eliminated. In fact, the more I thought it over the less there seemed
to be of any kind of motive.”
He paused to relight his cigar; then went on:
“Of course, the murder of a man of Warren's prominence was
startling enough in itself. As a rule, men of his type are not
murdered. Then I began to wonder. There seemed on the face of it
but one logical explanation. Could he have been killed because of
something he might have done in China, by some enemies he might
have made while there? When Carter told me of the visit made by
the Chinaman, I began to wonder if he might be the killer. In the end
I decided that he could not have been.”
“I don't see how you have decided that,” broke in the chief.
“Two things formed my opinion. The cross upon the forehead was
the first one. A Chinaman might have killed him, but if he did, he
would not have marked the body after death with a cross. Then
came the story of the box. We found there was a box of opium in the
library. Patton's information regarding the boxes given Warren in
China checked up with the story the Chinaman told. But one box of
opium was not enough for a crime of that type. The Chinaman could

have secured the box at the time he was first in the library; that is, if
he had not been forced to leave.”
“To leave?” questioned Carter.
Bartley turned to his friend. “Carter, did you not think it rather
queer that the Chinaman left the library as quickly as he did? He had
discovered Warren was dead. To him that was of little account. But it
seems that either he must have seen some one returning to the
building or else heard some one near the room. One thing he could
not afford to have happen: that was take any chance he would be
accused of the murder. That's why he left.”
I saw Ranville nod, and Bartley continued:
“Patton told us that Mr. Warren never had the time to examine the
gift of three boxes which had been given him at the last moment.
The Chinaman told the truth. He was but an odd coincident in the
case, but it was sufficient for a short while to throw us all away from
the real motive. Then when I heard your stories, I began to have a
faint suspicion—”
“You did,” interrupted Carter. “Of what?”
Bartley laughed. “A faint suspicion that perhaps you had not told
me every single detail. As the affair stood, we were up against a
stone wall. Warren had been killed—but there was no motive for the
crime. Of course, that was absurd. I began to wonder if you had
overlooked anything. And then I decided there was but one way I
could see any light in this crime. It was to apply some modern
psychology—try and discover the type of a man who would commit
such an absurd murder. That is—it was to us, but to the murderer it
was not. And then, all at once, you told me very clearly what type of
a man I must look for.”
“We did not,” was Carter's quick comment.
“Do you remember that bit of paper you found near the body?
That paper with the letters ‘Anani’?”
We nodded.
“For some reason none of you tried to figure out what those
letters might mean. They did mean something, though the word was
not completed. Did you ever hear of ‘Ananias’?”
As the chief wrinkled up his brow in thought, Ranville brought his
hand down on his knee and laughed. It was Carter who spoke, his

voice impatient as he said:
“Of course I did. He is in the Bible. Some sort of a liar who was
struck dead.”
“He is in the Bible, Carter,” was Bartley's smiling reply. “But I am
a little surprised you knew it. The gentleman, as you remember, was
struck dead—by God—for telling a lie. You carry those letters to their
logical conclusion, and the word would have spelled out ‘Ananias.’
Our psychology will tell us the murderer used that name instead of
writing out another word, ‘Liar.’”
“But, Mr. Bartley,” broke in the chief, “of all damned foolishness
that's the worst. No one could call Mr. Warren that sort of a name.
He was one of the big men of the country. You are all wrong there.”
“Wait a moment, Chief,” was the calm reply. “You have made the
reply the average man would make. And even if an ordinary man
killed Mr. Warren and thought he lied, he would not have used the
word ‘Ananias’ to express that fact. It gave me my first clew to the
type of man I wished to find. And there is something else you must
remember—”
As we bent forward in our chairs, his eyes swept slowly over us.
His voice was very grave when he spoke.
“Mr. Warren was one of the great men of our land—one of our
greatest men of science. But you must remember that there are
many millions of people in this country who would say that he was a
‘liar.’ Remember his statement when he came out of China? I have
found the solution of the origin of man. The last proof of evolution
has been discovered.”
His eyes swept over us, and as no one spoke, he went on:
“In every college in this world evolution is taught as the only
logical explanation of the origin of man. Every intelligent person
accepts it. You know, however, that in America to-day there is a great
campaign against the subject. In fact, there is a campaign against
science as being ‘ungodly.’ Take a rabid, bigoted man who is
uneducated—one who sees in science an attack upon religion and
the Bible—and you will find a man who would say Warren was what
that word implied—a ‘liar.’”
Ranville's face was very grave as his eyes rested upon Bartley.
Without waiting for a reply, Bartley said very gravely:

“I have often wondered just how far you could carry on a
campaign of hatred and untruths without reaping a fearful penalty.
We have been breeding intolerance in America for years. All over
our country, in the south and in the west, men are at the present time
carrying on a campaign against the teaching of science. They are
inflaming the minds of simple people in what they call a great
crusade. In the end you cannot breed intolerance and hatred without
some time having to reap the full penalty. Warren paid the price of
that campaign of misrepresentation. It has happened before.
Intolerance—breeding hatred—and then in an unbalanced mind
flaming out in violence.
“I began to wonder if perhaps I had not found the type who would
commit such a crime, and also the motive. When you told me of the
faint cross cut into the head of the dead man, I knew that we were
dealing with an unbalanced mind.”
He paused and lighted a fresh cigar; then added:
“And the night the minister came here I began to wonder if he
might be the man. This afternoon I was sure of it.”
At our questioning glances he informed us as to what had made
him suspicious. He reminded us that the minister had broken out in a
rather wild attack upon what he said was the fact that evolution was
responsible for people not going to church. Then he added that when
the clergyman had expressed his opinion that Warren's discoveries
could not be given to the world, he had been corrected by Carter's
statement that Mr. Warren's assistant was coming to finish the book.
He remarked that only the fact he was suspicious of the man,
perhaps caused him to notice the look which passed over his face
when he made his statement regarding Patton. It was a look of
consternation and of hatred. From that moment he had begun to
have his suspicions regarding the minister. One other thing
convinced him they were true.
The chief had been following Bartley's story with the closest
attention. In part, I believed that he was not sure Bartley's reasoning
was correct. I could see the puzzled look sweep across his face, and
once or twice he shook his head as if he did not agree. It was his
voice which asked:
“What was the other thing?”

“Pelt and I were in the minister's study this afternoon. I made my
call at a time I knew he was out. I had seen him go down the lake in
his boat. There was nothing very much out of the way in his study—
that is, on first glance. His books were mostly controversial
theological works, and a good many of them were attacks upon
evolution. But in a bookcase which had a glass door covered by
cloth I found something else. To start with, the books in the case
were a weird mixture. There were a great many books upon
flagellation—the worst sort of books. Then there were a number
dealing with the celebrated Girard case. That was a famous case of
sadism under the guise of religion. Also there were the five
pamphlets which covered the Lepworth school matter.”
There came a short expression from Ranville. As the rest of us
looked blankly at the two men, Bartley enlightened us.
“The Lepworth school affair is a very celebrated case in the realm
of sexual psychology. The schoolmaster, a young man named
Woods, aroused England over sixty years ago by the brutal and
cruel punishments he inflicted upon his pupils. He managed to
escape to America. There is no doubt the man was sexually
unbalanced. To-day we would call it a pathological condition. But
standing on that shelf was a genealogy of the Woods family—that
branch of it. And that schoolmaster, who had to flee England, was
the grandfather of the minister.
“Now I do not know much about Woods. He was forced out of
England and came to this country. He made money, we do know. But
the fact he built this church tells a good deal. It was, no doubt, his
gesture to the Almighty—his attempt to win forgiveness for the sins
of the flesh. To-day we know another thing. Any textbook upon
heredity will tell you that children inherit their qualities more from
their grandparents than their parents. And here was the minister, and
in his blood was that unbalanced make-up of the English
schoolmaster. In his case it made him a bigot without friends and
also whipped him into queer reform movements. It also explains the
horrible books I found in his case. And I might add that I found the
missing volumes of the De Sade.
“The genealogy told more. The minister's father married a woman
named Wright. After the minister was born she was placed in an

insane asylum, where she died. You can see from the standpoint of
heredity what took place. The sadistic strain in the blood of the
grandfather mixed in the unbalanced blood of the woman—and the
minister was the result. From such a type you look for your odd
reforms—your fantastic crimes.”
In the silence which followed there came the plaintive voice of the
chief:
“But still I don't understand why he killed Warren.”
“Well,” came Bartley's voice, “let us start at the beginning. Here
you have the minister. His heredity is very bad. His entire life, that is,
the things he did, showed that he was a sad neurotic. He hated
pleasure; he hated all things which normal people enjoy. In fact most
of the wild, rabid fanatics are the same type. But with him there was
a double danger.
“We know to-day that there is not much difference between the
person who reacts violently in a sexual manner and the one who
goes to a wild extreme in religious matters. Our psychology has
proven they are alike, from hundreds of cases. You had here an
unbalanced man. The anti-evolution group, of which he was a
member, had read Warren's statement—the last proof of evolution
had been found. Now to him that would be absurd; and, at the same
time, he would look upon Warren as an enemy of God.
“Let us suppose he brooded over the matter day after day. He
might have even prayed that Warren would be found wrong. Then to
add flame to his unbalanced thoughts came the news that Warren
was to write his book in the very place where the minister lived. That
did not improve matters. So one day he went to see Warren. I think I
can picture what happened.”
“What?” came the chief's eager voice.
“I think the minister went into Warren's library with the purpose of
begging that he would not publish his book. In his unbalanced mind
he would see nothing out of the way in such a request. You can
picture what Warren must have said. It was like oil to a flame. As the
minister looked at the scientist he would see him as the very enemy
of society. Then, without a doubt, something snapped in his brain.
He rose to say ‘good-by’ and suddenly stabbed him. In his first wild
frenzy he thought of himself as doing the work of God. The cross

was a symbol of that. And when he wrote the word ‘Ananias,’ the
same thought was in his mind.
“Just what happened after that we do not know. His frenzy would
not last long. Remember he was not technically insane—only
unbalanced upon several things, with a warped mind. It is my opinion
he went away and then returned later. Perhaps he remembered the
door was open. Perhaps when he came to his right mind, he realized
what he had done and went back to see if he left a clew. And then it
was he who must have broken the bookcase to take those books—
books he must have often heard of, but was unable to secure.”
At that moment there came a voice from the doorway:
“May I come in?”
We turned to see the secretary. She was wearing a gay-colored
dressing gown which must have belonged to Carter. Her face was
rather pale, but otherwise she showed little signs of the experience
she had been through. We rose to our feet, and Ranville found her a
chair. She dropped into it and smiled faintly as she turned to Carter:
“Did you telephone my aunt?” she asked anxiously.
Carter rose with a jump and said sheepishly that he had never
thought of it. As he started for the door the girl stopped him, saying
that no doubt the chief would be willing to take her home in a few
moments. The chief agreed to this, but said he wanted to hear what
had happened to her.
Her story was a very brief one. She had gone home to her supper
and, when it was over, returned to the library. As she came up the
steps of the building, to her great surprise, she heard a shot within.
She rushed to the door and went a few feet within the room. To her
consternation, the minister was near the desk and in his hand was a
gun. He turned at her cry.
She gave a shudder at the recollection. His face was a vivid red,
and his eyes blazed as he looked at her. She said that she thought
he was crazy. With a weird cry, as she turned to run from the room,
he made a dash after her. Just as his hand was about to fall upon
her, she must have fainted, for she remembered no more until she
came to in the boat house—alone.
Though she tried to open the two doors of the room, she
discovered they were locked on the outside. She yelled as loud as

she could, but the approaching storm and the high wind drowned her
voice. And then when she thought it would be useless to cry out
again, she heard the door open. A moment later the door leading
into the room was swung aside, and the lights flashed on. Just what
happened after that she did not know. There was a short moment
when, to her horror, she again saw the minister—saw him creep over
the floor in her direction—and then she said she must have fainted
again.
We said nothing, and then with an appealing look, which took us
all in, the girl asked:
“I have just one faint recollection. As I fainted the last time, the
minister was saying something about a sacrifice. What did he
mean?”
It was Bartley who spoke, and his words were, of course, untrue:
“I think you must have been mistaken,” was his short reply.
The girl shook her head as if in doubt, but settled back in her
chair. In the silence there came the voice of the chief:
“How about the murder of the gardener?”
“That's more simple,” was the answer. “You must, of course,
understand, Chief, that when the minister realized what he had done,
he was torn between two conflicting emotions. First, of course, was
the thought that he had done a good deed—he had saved his God
from blasphemy. That idea grew upon him. It did not, however, do
away with the other feeling. After all, he had committed a murder,
and he knew it. In the few days after the crime he must have been
fast approaching actual insanity.
“Then there came a startling fact. He was told that Patton would
complete the book—the book which would give the world Warren's
discovery. He had killed a man to prevent that book being written,
and his crime was in vain. The world collapsed for him at the
moment he realized that his crime had been useless.”
“But he did not know Patton,” barked out the chief.
“Yes, he did,” replied Carter. “I introduced them this morning.”
Bartley took up the thought. “Yes, he had met him. That's why he
made his mistake. He knew the suit Patton was wearing. When he
saw the back of the gardener as he turned to escape from the room,

he thought it was Patton and shot him. In build, height and general
appearance they were about the same.”
“No doubt it's all so,” retorted the chief, “but what I can't
understand is this: What did the gardener see, what was it made him
turn, as you say, to leave the library?”
“He must have seen the minister destroying the manuscript on
the desk. He tried to get out of the room without being heard in order
to tell Patton. And he was shot. As Miss Harlan screamed, the
minister rushed at her. Her fainting no doubt saved her life. He took
her down to the boat, then to the boat house. The rest you know. In
that startled moment when the eyes of the murderer fell upon Patton,
and he saw his victim standing before him, he realized he had killed
the wrong man. His heart could not stand the strain.”
“That was lucky for him,” was the chief's dry comment. “But, at
that, he was crazy.”
“Yes—and—no,” was Bartley's reply. “In the beginning he simply
was a neurotic—unbalanced, not insane. In the end the conflict
between his two selves drove him insane. If you mean he was
insane the last few hours of his life, I agree with you.”
Silence fell, which the chief broke to say that he thought he better
return to town. The secretary went up to her room to dress, returning
in a few moments. At the door she turned to thank us, and then said
good night. We stood for a moment in the open door and watched
the car leave the drive; then went back into the house. As we moved
rather nervously about the room, Carter paused and asked:
“John, what would that man have done to that girl if we had not
reached the boat house?”
“Killed her. You remember his repeated cry—a sacrifice—a
sacrifice. His mind was gone then. Upon his conscience, if he had
any, were two murders. Dimly he wished to make his peace with
God, and he remembered the idea which runs through so much
theology—the sacrifice of blood. He would have killed her as an
offering—the offering which his unbalanced mind thought was
demanded.”
The thought was a horrible one, and I gave a little shiver. As the
men sank down into their chairs, there came a silence which no one
broke. In it again I heard the weird tones of the organ as my mind

went back to the moments I had spent in the church balcony. I
shuddered as I thought of the frenzied voice of the minister with his
wild cry for a sacrifice. And then my eyes fell upon Ranville.
He was sitting in a chair by the table. His face was very
thoughtful, and once or twice I saw him knit his brows. As he lifted
his head, our eyes met for a second. Then his glance strayed over to
the table. On its surface was the bottle of Scotch. His hand went
forth, and he poured out a small drink. Holding the glass in his hand,
he turned to Bartley:
“Well, Mr. Bartley, you pulled it off. But there is one thing I wish to
tell you.”
We turned to look at the Englishman's face. There was a little
twinkle in his eyes, and a smile played over his face. He raised his
glass to his lips after a gesture in Bartley's direction. Then, as he
drained it, he said, and there was a laughing note in his voice:
“You pulled it off. But do you know I think the Yard could have
done the same thing?”
THE END

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