Strategy Paper final
- 1. FS MIDTERM 1 INTRODUCTION: GRAY SPACE If predictability is science and unpredictability is art, then you cannot have one without the other. Art is the gray space that science and probability cannot explain due to the nature of humanity and our imperfections. Strategy is hard, and gets more complicated as you wade into the works which have propagated from the original two greats, Jomini and Clausewitz. The complementary complexity originally scribed by these two men and the ensuing debates that have raged since serves to prove the limits of predictability all by itself. In this human fallible world, science and fortune telling can only take you so far. Art must fill in the rest of your thoughts just as faith is to religion. The unpredictability of man and human collective nature is the premise for using the social dimension of strategy coupled with cultural elements to best illustrate the limits of predictability in war. In that context, the strongest evidence of those limitations is most apparent as viewed through the lens of the Clausewitzian trinity, in the theory of International Relations, and in the form of Grand Strategy. This methodology allows us to build from (de)base human and societal characteristics of any nation through its perilous relationships in the global community and culminate in the challenges to developing grand strategy. These are the best constructs any society can attempt, but should be apparent that this journey is anything but predictable. Since war is by virtue and extension of this process then war strategy is no less predictable. SOCIAL AND CULTURAL PREDICTABILITY COMPLEXITY: There are three items that must be addressed before proceeding. First, is the definition of predictability: consistent repetition of a state, course of action, behavior, or the like, making it possible to know in advance what to expect: the quality of being regarded as likely to happen, as behavior or an event.i
- 2. FS MIDTERM 2 Second, throughout the paper, I will use the term Society with accompanying social and cultural factors interchangeably. The definition of Society is “a community, nation, or broad grouping of people having common traditions, institutions, and collective activities and interests”. ii Culture according to Potter is “an ambiguous repertoire of competing ides that can be selected, instrumentalized, and manipulated instead of a clear script for action.iii Social and cultural factors are numerous which is why it is nearly impossible to determine how individually or collectively they will affect a strategy. Therefore, although they need to be considered, I argue that it is hard to predict the outcomes they will produce. Most of the major elements of strategy are therefore factors such as institutions, history, and resources. Thus, economics must be considered a social element since monetary concerns are paramount to Maslow’s hierarchy of needsiv and a source of national power. By the very words used in the definitions above (likely to happen, ambiguous, competing, instrumentalized, and manipulated) it is apparent that they are not intrinsically predictable. Lastly, and of great importance is that my analysis is in no way discounting Jomini, Douhet, or Warden. I will completely concede that regardless of the enormous limitations of predictability, it is a necessary base line required for the academic study of war strategy and eventual application. “How else, there is no other alternative so we at least need to capture the “best practices” and lessons learnedv. The extremely complex world we live in is too complex for anyone to fully comprehend, so breaking it down into smaller linear predictable understandable pieces is necessary for comprehension. The stakes governments wage on humanities behalf are collected in blood. With so much on the line, the scientific process must be implemented in an attempt to gain as much information as possible in order to make better decisions. Even if you know the model or outcome will be imperfect, it will serve as a point of
- 3. FS MIDTERM 3 departure for further analysis. We can never completely remove uncertainty or risk, but we owe it to each other to attempt this noble feat to the best of our ability. Our ability to accomplish this task with any predictability is sabotaged by our very nature as shown in the trinity. THE TRINITY: Humans are social creatures by nature who chose to live under imperfect social contracts which are influenced by economic and cultural underpinnings. The Clausewitzian Trinityvi highlights the limitations of predictability when we view society and it's cultural lenses. We can attribute this to of our innate primordial hatred, the random elements of chance, and the errors of human self-interest which becomes policy. In the trinity, hatred represents the people and our base animalistic tendencies. “two different motives make men fight one another: Hostile feelings and hostile intentions.” vii. Hostile feelings cannot be quantified or predicted with any certainty. Our intentions are often clouded with irrationality. Our illogical actions often create a situation for probability levels to decrease. Chance is inseparable from all endeavors in life. “No other human activity is so continuously or universally bound up with chance as is war”viii Although Clausewitz was specifically referring to the commander and the army which must apply theory to reality, “commanders have to rely on judgment rooted in intuition, common sense, and experience. Statistical laws of probability alone will never suffice…it is possible for the results of any given action to defy the odds.ix By virtue of logic and mathematics, and the definition of probability, it is easy to say that chance is the largest contributor to the limits of predictability. Policy is a problematic construct by virtue of the developmental process. Theory and history lessons, neither of which are good predictors of the future, lead to doctrine and policy. A
- 4. FS MIDTERM 4 government by its very nature reflects the people it represents. If the people are imperfect, then so to must be the government and by extension its policy. Policy is a means of protecting selfish interests and providing for collective security. In a competitive internal and external environment, strategic application will not lend itself to accurate predictability. “One country may support another’s cause, but will never take it so seriously as its own.”x Again self-interest and base human nature takes precedent. Understanding one’s own imperfect society and national strategic culture is only a first step. HUMAN TRAITS EXPORTED TO NATIONAL IDENTITIES Investing time and resources to understand other societies and cultures a nation has to interact with is an even more daunting and less predictable endeavor than the quest for national self-awareness. The various societies and cultures of the world manifest the limits to predictability through the theory of International Relations because of the complexity of both their internal compositions juxtaposed against numerous and equally complex external relations. Every nation has to confront the fact that it is composed of many groups with various competing ideations. Realist believe that we are in a constant power strugglexi. This struggle is not always completely rational. While the classical realist will claim that states like humans have an innate desire to dominate each other. xii Conversely, Neo-Realists say that without a central system to govern us all, there can be no peace xiii. Meanwhile, Liberalism espouses economics interdependence discourages forces against each other however International institutions could overcome selfish behavior.xiv . Constuctivism is the best argument against predictability due to the fact that it is based on state behavior shaped by elite beliefs, collective norms and social identities…it is Agnostic because it cannot predict ideas.xv We can also add in more divisions in the forms of internationalists, nationalists, and progressives. The splitting is endless.
- 5. FS MIDTERM 5 If a single society is this schizophrenic, and other societies have similar compositions, then the predictability between the interactions is implausible. This argument is based on like forms of governments interacting. Predictability complexity rises when the forms of government are dissimilar. Neither of these systems are static, so predictability cannot account for changes over time. This makes development of an all-encompassing predictable grand strategy which is capable of fitting every situation over time impossible. GRAND STRATEGY AND BEYOND: If you can’t even decide or agree on a grand strategy, how do you predict the outcomes? An attempt at developing a grand strategy is no less important than trying to achieve predictability. However any attempt will lead to less predictability due to the inaccurate accounting of societal and cultural factors, indecision or changes in a nations strategic alignment and when considering coalitions, alliances and coercion. “A grand strategy is a political-military, means-ends chain, a state’s theory about how it can best ‘cause’ security for itself.” xvi There is still an inaccurate accounting of societal and cultural factors as is seen in the quote "Americans love Pepsi-Cola; we love death" xvii Although this is very simplistic evidence, it is recent history. If we are here today after all the history behind us, then the challenge is still immense. Strategic alignment decisions are highly dependent on changing societal and cultural factors. A nation must decide between disengagement, balance-of-power, or band-wagoning for example. It will be judged by others for the actions of the past which although unfair will affect the ability to predict actions and reactions of other nations in the future.
- 6. FS MIDTERM 6 As a system increases in complexity, there is a corresponding decrease in the probability of predicting outcomes. Based on that assumption, as we rise to grand strategy scale the limits of predictability are seen as an increase in fallibility. Through examination of coalitions, alliances and coercion as extensions of grand strategy the limits of predictability are truly manifested. “war is an instrument that can easily slip from the hands of those who wield it… individuals may be successful in solving certain problems but can create others where least expected”xviii. So what we have discovered is that the complexity in the theory is us. In conclusion, it should be evident to the military professional who spends the requisite time pondering war strategy that because of the sheer quantity and permutations of elements and dimensions predictability has its usefulness and its limitations. More succinctly, the unpredictability of man and human collective nature is the reason that the social dimension of strategy coupled with cultural elements best illustrates the limits of predictability in war. In that context, the strongest proof of those limitations is most readily apparent when viewed through the lens of the Clausewitzian trinity, as seen in the theory of International Relations, and manifests itself in the form of Grand Strategy. Once you accept the synergistic influence social variables have on each other resulting in an impossible to solve mathematical problem, then you will appreciate why predictability has its limits. You will comprehend why we describe the environment as Volatile, Uncertain, Complex, and Ambiguous.xix Finally, you will realize that although we have no choice but to use science, strategic art is required to make up for the limits of predictability. i (Dictionary.comhttp://dictionary.reference.com/browse/predictability) ii Merriam-Webster iii Potter militaryOrientalism:EasternWar throughWesterneyes. iv Maslow, A.H(1943).A theory ofHumanMotivation v IP 6404 vi FS 6405 slide18
- 7. FS MIDTERM 7 vii On war pg 76 viii On war 85 ix Alan Beyerchen,"Clausewitz,Nonlinearity andtheUnpredictability ofWar,"InternationalSecurity,17:3 (Winter,1992), pp. 59-90. ©Copyright1993by thePresident andFellows ofHarvardCollegeandthe Massachusetts InstituteofTechnology. On War:86, 112,136-140,respectively. x On war 603 xi Stephen Walt,internationalrelations:oneworldmany theories,” Foreignpolicy (Spring 1988), abstract pg2 xii Morgenthou xiii Waltz xiv Stephen Walt,internationalrelations:oneworldmany theories,” Foreignpolicy (Spring 1988), abstract pg5 chart xv Stephen Walt,internationalrelations:oneworldmany theories,” Foreignpolicy (Spring 1988), abstract pg5 chart xvi Barry Posen, TheSources ofMilitary Doctrine: xvii Taliban fighter,quoted in Patrick porter,MilitaryOrientalism(2009) xviii ThomasWaldman,“Politics andWar:Clausewitz’sParadoxicalEquation,”Parameters, (August2010),pp. 1- 13 xix Stiehm,JudithHicksandNicholasW. Townsend(2002). TheU.S.ArmyWar College: MilitaryEducation in a Democracy. TempleUniversityPress. p. 6.ISBN 1-56639-960-2. DHL