SlideShare a Scribd company logo
Common Types of DDoS Attacks | MazeBolt Technologies
2
©MazeBolt Technologies. All Rights Reserved.
Table of Contents
Executive Summary.............................................................................................3
ICMP (Internet Control Message Protocol Type 8) Flood .................................................4
IP Fragmented Flood.......................................................................................................4
Malformed IP Flood.........................................................................................................4
SYN Flood .......................................................................................................................5
UDP Fragmentation or UDP Garbage Flood......................................................................5
Reflection Attack ............................................................................................................6
ACK Flood .......................................................................................................................6
Empty Connection Flood .................................................................................................6
FIN Flood.........................................................................................................................6
FIN+ACK Flag Flood ........................................................................................................7
URG Flag Flood................................................................................................................7
ALL TCP Flags Flood .......................................................................................................7
PSH+ACK Flag Flood.......................................................................................................7
RST Flood .......................................................................................................................7
Brobot Flood ...................................................................................................................8
SlowLoris ........................................................................................................................8
DNS Request Flood/DNS (Domain Name System) Flood ..................................................9
HTTP/s Flood with Browser Enumeration ........................................................................9
HTTP GET Flood/HTTP Flooders.....................................................................................9
HTTPS Flood...................................................................................................................9
Dynamic HTTP Flood.....................................................................................................10
SSL Negotiation Flood...................................................................................................10
THC-SSL Flood..............................................................................................................10
3
©MazeBolt Technologies. All Rights Reserved.
Executive Summary
While the individual DDoS attack code varies by dark web vendor, developer, and attacker, the
attacks themselves are based on a finite number of underlying principles. The DDoS attacks in
this report were chosen on the basis of public sources and MazeBolt’s rich testing experience
and constitute the main attacks companies should validate their mitigation against.
As with most cyberattacks, DDoS attacks are a ‘when’, not an ‘if’. DDoS attacks generally target
all three levels of your website infrastructure:
● Layer 3 (Volumetric IP level), which generate massive amounts of traffic, clogging the
bandwidth, slowing the web or service performance and ultimately preventing website
access or the ability to access services
● Layer 4 (Volumetric IP level and Protocol Transport level), which use up all the
processing capacity by saturating an end server’s CPU or connection table using a
connection-oriented attack
● Layer 7 (Lower volume, higher connections, low and slow, application attacks) exploit
weaknesses in the application layer, overwhelming the database or server powering the
application directly
4
©MazeBolt Technologies. All Rights Reserved.
Layer 3 Attacks
ICMP (Internet Control Message Protocol Type 8) Flood
These consume computing power, bring down perimeter devices, and saturate bandwidth, where
the packets overload the pipe and servers until the system fails. They are generally spoofed
attacks and come at a very high rate. These are effectively echo requests, which may elicit echo
responses (ICMP Type 0). If they are not dropped by the DDoS mitigation devices on the
perimeter, they may overwhelm the internal network architecture; this flood may also generate
outgoing traffic due to answers for the echo request.
IP Fragmented Flood
IP Fragmented Floods are aimed at consuming computing power and saturating bandwidth; they
may also crash devices in rare cases because of buggy packet parsing. Fragmented IP Floods
are generally spoofed attacks and normally come at a very high rate. They generally have no
identifiable Layer4 protocol, just garbage, and the packets have to be reassembled by various
devices along the way. Generally, this flood is used as a basic but effective flood to bring down
perimeter devices or saturate bandwidth.
Malformed IP Flood
Malformed IP Floods are aimed at consuming computing power and saturating bandwidth. They
may also crash devices in rare cases because of buggy packet parsing. Malformed IP Floods are
generally spoofed attacks and normally come at a very high rate. They have no identifiable Layer
4 protocol, just garbage. Generally, this flood is used as a basic but effective flood to bring down
perimeter devices or saturate bandwidth. Many ISP’s today stop this type of attack from
occurring since the routers at ISP’s will not forward such packets.
5
©MazeBolt Technologies. All Rights Reserved.
Layer 4 Attacks
SYN Flood
A SYN flood, generally caused by botnets, is another attack targeting server resources via the
firewall or perimeter defenses. They are aimed at consuming connection resources on the
backend servers themselves and on stateful elements, like firewalls and load balancers by
sending numerous TCP-SYN requests toward targeted services while spoofing the attack packets
source IP. This leaves the TCP backlog saturated and the server and/or daemon attacked will not
be able to receive any new connections.
It begins with the attacker sending a message to the targeted server, which responds with an
“SYN ACK” (synchronize acknowledgement) message signaling receipt and awaiting the
connection to be closed by the requesting machine (the attacker). Instead, the connection says
open until it times out, ultimately exhausting resources and causing the server to go offline.
UDP Fragmentation or UDP Garbage Flood
In a UDP garbage flood, attackers try to saturate bandwidth to bring about a DDoS state to the
network. The attack generally occurs by sending a rapid succession of UDP datagrams with
spoofed IPs to a server within the network via various different ports, forcing the server to
respond with ICMP traffic. This is normally done by sending a rapid succession of UDP
datagrams with spoofed IPs to a server within the network via various different ports, forcing the
server to respond with ICMP traffic. The saturation of bandwidth happens both on the ingress
and the egress direction. This flood also has some garbage in the data section of the datagram.
Large, forged packets of more than 1,500 bytes are sent, requiring fragmentation to “fit” through
the pipes, saturating bandwidth to shut down the network to outside, legitimate requests.
Because these packets are not legitimate, they cannot be reassembled. While the network firewall
is busy trying to put them back together, the network itself can be unprotected for hours. While
an “official” DDoS attack, it gives coverage for more nefarious activities to occur in other parts of
the network.
See here for a full technical explanation of the UDP Flood/UDP Garbage Flood.
6
©MazeBolt Technologies. All Rights Reserved.
Reflection Attack
A reflection attack passes the threat around to many computers, which then sends them back to
the targeted computer, using spoofed sources. The initial (attacking) computers receive the
packets (all with the same spoofed source IP – the victims IP – and respond to the spoofed
address that routes to the target (the victim). This attack is only possible with connectionless
protocols In rare cases, out-of-state TCP packets may also be used if the attacking nodes support
the response to out-of- state packets, e.g. UDP.
ACK Flood
An ACK flood is designed to disrupt network activity by saturating bandwidth and resources on
stateful devices in its path. By continuously sending ACK packets towards a target, stateful
defenses can go down (in some cases into a fail-open mode). This flood could be used as a
smoke screen for more advanced attacks. This is true for other out-of-state floods too.
See here for a full technical explanation of an ACK flood.
Empty Connection Flood
Empty connection floods are designed to saturate the targeted open port’s sockets. The idea is
that as connections increase, you are saturating the TCP stack to finally bring about a situation
whereby the particular daemon/service is unable to accept any new connections. An Empty
Connection Flood may also saturate other stateful devices in its path such as firewalls or IPS
systems. An Empty connection flood generally won’t have a high Mbps throughput.
FIN Flood
A FIN Flood is designed to disrupt network activity by saturating bandwidth and resources on
stateful devices in its path. By continuously sending FIN packets toward a target, stateful
defenses can go down (in some cases - into a fail open mode). This flood could be used as a
smoke screen for more advanced attacks. This is true for other out-of-state floods, too.
7
©MazeBolt Technologies. All Rights Reserved.
FIN+ACK Flag Flood
FIN+ACK Floods are aimed at consuming computing power and saturating bandwidth. FIN+ACK
Floods are generally spoofed attacks and normally come at a very high rate. FIN+ACK floods, if
not dropped by stateful devices on the perimeter, may overwhelm the internal network
architecture. Generally, this flood is used as a basic but effective flood to bring down perimeter
devices or saturate bandwidth.
URG Flag Flood
URG Floods are aimed at consuming computing power and saturating bandwidth. URG Floods
are generally spoofed attacks and normally come at a very high rate. URG Floods, if not dropped
by stateful devices on the perimeter, may overwhelm the internal network architecture. Generally,
this flood is used as a basic but effective flood to bring down perimeter devices or saturate
bandwidth.
ALL TCP Flags Flood
ALL TCP Flags Floods are aimed at consuming computing power and saturating bandwidth. ALL
TCP Flags Floods are generally spoofed attacks and normally come at a very high rate. ALL TCP
Flags Floods, if not dropped by stateful devices on the perimeter, may overwhelm the internal
network architecture. Generally, this flood is used as a basic but effective flood to bring down
perimeter devices or saturate bandwidth. These packets should also be rejected on the basis that
they are non-RFC compliant, which means they do not follow standard TCP protocols.
PSH+ACK Flag Flood
PSH+ACK Floods are aimed at consuming computing power and saturating bandwidth.
PSH+ACK Floods are generally spoofed attacks and normally come at a very high rate. PSH+ACK
floods, if not dropped by stateful devices on the perimeter, may overwhelm the internal network
architecture. Generally, this flood is used as a basic but effective flood to bring down perimeter
devices or saturate bandwidth.
RST Flood
RST Floods are aimed at consuming computing power and saturating bandwidth. RST Floods are
generally spoofed attacks and normally come at a very high rate. RST Floods, if not dropped by
stateful devices on the perimeter, may overwhelm the internal network architecture. Generally,
this flood is used as a basic but effective flood to bring down perimeter devices or saturate
bandwidth.
8
©MazeBolt Technologies. All Rights Reserved.
Layer 7 Attacks
Brobot Flood
Brobot is similar to an HTTP flood and is designed to overwhelm web servers’ resources by
continuously requesting single or multiple URLs from many source attacking machines. Brobot
dynamically changes its user agent and can change HTTP method type (GET/POST). Brobot can
also add a suffix to the end of URLs, which will enable the request to bypass many CDN systems.
When the servers’ limits of concurrent connections are reached, the server can no longer respond
to legitimate requests from other users.
SlowLoris
A “low-and-slow” attack vector, it has the goal of saturating the entire TCP stack for the HTTP/S
daemon. These attacks are harder to detect because they do not need the volume of resources
required for other types of attack. They enable a single attacker to take down a web server without
affecting other ports or services on the targeted network. SlowLoris sends HTTP headers at
certain intervals combined with partial requests, which opens connections to the target machine
and keeps them open, eventually overflowing the maximum concurrent connection volume,
preventing legitimate clients from accessing the server.
Image of a Slow Loris in the wild. A primate originating in South East Asia with a rare toxic
bite after which the DDoS Attack is named
9
©MazeBolt Technologies. All Rights Reserved.
DNS Request Flood/DNS (Domain Name System) Flood
Like many other types of flood attacks, the attackers send spoofed requests at a high packet rate
from a wide range of IP addresses; the difference is that the targets are the DNS servers and
cache mechanisms. The DNS Request Floods send DNS request packets to a DNS server in an
attempt to overwhelm the server’s ability to respond to legitimate DNS requests. If the DNS is
unavailable to legitimate users, this can completely cripple most modern networks since fully
qualified domain names or absolute domain names (a domain name that specifies its exact
location within the DNS hierarchy) are used to provide most services. The Amplified DNS flood
sends small requests with spoofed IP addresses across the Internet to open DNS resolvers. They
reply with responses larger than request, which flood the victim’s DNS (Or other) servers, taking
them offline.
HTTP/s Flood with Browser Enumeration
HTTP Floods with Browser Enumeration are designed to overwhelm web servers’ resources by
continuously requesting single or multiple URLs from many source attacking machines, unlike
with a normal HTTP Flood (without browser enumeration). When you have browser enumeration,
JavaScript can be interpreted, where simple JavaScript challenges are bypassed. When the
servers’ limits of concurrent connections are reached, the server can no longer respond to
legitimate requests from other users.
HTTP GET Flood/HTTP Flooders
Attacks are based on seemingly legitimate HTTP GET or POST requests, forcing the server or
applications to respond to every request. These are designed to overwhelm web servers’
resources by continuously requesting single or multiple URLs from many source attacking
machines. A GET request is used to download a page or image from the server, while a POST
request is used to pass data to the server, like a form, uploading a file, etc. It uses less bandwidth
but because it requires a more complex response, it still maxes out the server capabilities. HTTP
Floods are referred to as application or connection-oriented floods. The number or source IPs
and the total amount of connections will be a deciding factor affecting service outage.
HTTPS Flood
Similar to an HTTP Flood, HTTPS Floods are designed to overwhelm web servers’ resources by
continuously requesting single or multiple URLs from many source attacking machines. When
the servers’ limits of concurrent connections are reached, the server can no longer respond to
legitimate requests from other users. However, an HTTPS flood can also saturate an SSL daemon
due to the high amount of computing resources required to perform the asymmetric encryption
for a single user.
10
©MazeBolt Technologies. All Rights Reserved.
Dynamic HTTP Flood
Similar to regular HTTP Floods, a Dynamic HTTP Flood continuously changes the suffix of the
HTTP request; this forces services like CDNs to request from the originating web server. Dynamic
HTTP Floods are designed to overwhelm web servers’ resources by continuously requesting
single or multiple URLs from many source attacking machines. When the servers’ limits of
concurrent connections are reached, the server can no longer respond to legitimate requests
from other users.
SSL Negotiation Flood
SSL Negotiation Floods attempt to establish many new SSL handshakes with the targeted server.
Each handshake in this attack is a new TCP connection and affects the target server. Opening
and closing many such connections, SSL/TLS handshakes are up to fifteen times more CPU
intensive on the server than on the client. While the server may not be completely down under
such an attack, it may be unable to establish any new SSL connections, effectively leaving that
SSL service unavailable.
See here for a full technical explanation of an SSL Negotiation Flood.
THC-SSL Flood
This attack uses a single TCP connection to continuously renegotiate new encryption keys. The
important thing with this attack is that in one single connection the server “allows” the client to
request a new SSL handshake within the same TCP connection. This attack will work effectively
on the server, which allows its clients to initiate a new handshake at the time of their choosing,
leaving such behavior in the server increases its vulnerability to DDoS attacks.
11
©MazeBolt Technologies. All Rights Reserved.
Conclusion
No matter the size of your network, one of these attacks is highly likely to get through. Malicious
actors will do whatever they can to bring your system down. You need to take proactive measures
to ensure that your DDoS protection system is as robust and hardened as possible. Speak with
your network vendors, your MSSSPs, your cloud providers, and any other entity, such as MazeBolt,
that can have an impact on ensuring your DDoS protection is up to the highest possible
standards.
About RADAR ™
RADAR™, MazeBolt’s new patented technology solution is part of the MazeBolt security platform.
RADAR™, simulates DDoS attacks continuously and non-disruptively. Delivering advanced
intelligence, through straightforward reports on how to remediate the DDoS vulnerabilities
found. With RADAR™ organizations achieve, maintain, and verify the continuous closing of their
DDoS vulnerability gaps. Reducing and maintaining the vulnerability level of a damaging DDoS
attack from an average of 48% to under 2% ongoing.
About MazeBolt
MazeBolt is an innovation leader in cybersecurity and part of the DDoS mitigation space. Offering
full DDoS risk detection and elimination and working with any mitigation system to provide end
to end full coverage. Supporting organizations in avoiding downtime
and closing DDoS vulnerabilities before an attack happens.
References
1. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Denial-of-service_attack#Attack_techniques
2. https://securitytoday.com/articles/2018/02/26/top-ddos-attack-types-exposed.aspx
3. https://www.itbusinessedge.com/slideshows/5-types-of-ddos-attacks-to-defend-against-in-
2016-07.html
4. http://www.eweek.com/security/recognizing-the-most-common-ddos-attack-vectors-in-an-it-
system
5. https://www.esecurityplanet.com/network-security/types-of-ddos-attacks.html
6. https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/top-10-most-common-ddos-attacks-muhammad-shahbaz-
khan/
7. https://www.rivalhost.com/12-types-of-ddos-attacks-used-by-hackers
8. http://blog.fortinet.com/post/security-101-top-10-most-common-ddos-attacks
9. https://www.incapsula.com/ddos/ddos-attacks/

More Related Content

PDF
DDoS Defenses | DDoS Protection and Mitigation | MazeBolt
PDF
DDoS Mitigation Guide |DDoS Protection Cyber Security | MazeBolt
PDF
Why DDoS RADAR | MazeBolt Technologies
PDF
DDoS Mitigation Training | DDoS Mitigation Guide | Learn DDoS Mitigation Conc...
PDF
Automatic DDoS Attack Simulator | MazeBolt Technologies
PDF
Preventing Distributed Denial of Service Attacks in Cloud Environments
PDF
Review of Detection DDOS Attack Detection Using Naive Bayes Classifier for Ne...
PPT
DDoS Defenses | DDoS Protection and Mitigation | MazeBolt
DDoS Mitigation Guide |DDoS Protection Cyber Security | MazeBolt
Why DDoS RADAR | MazeBolt Technologies
DDoS Mitigation Training | DDoS Mitigation Guide | Learn DDoS Mitigation Conc...
Automatic DDoS Attack Simulator | MazeBolt Technologies
Preventing Distributed Denial of Service Attacks in Cloud Environments
Review of Detection DDOS Attack Detection Using Naive Bayes Classifier for Ne...

What's hot (20)

PDF
Cost of DDoS Attacks | DDoS Attacks Cost | MazeBolt Technologies
PPTX
Presentation1 shweta
DOCX
FIRECOL: A COLLABORATIVE PROTECTION NETWORK FOR THE DETECTION OF FLOODING DDO...
PDF
Mitigating Various Attacks in Mobile Ad-hoc Networks Using Trust Based Approach
PDF
Detection of ICMPv6-based DDoS attacks using anomaly based intrusion detectio...
PDF
The role of DDoS Providers
PPTX
DDoS Explained
PDF
Module 5-cloud computing-SECURITY IN THE CLOUD
PPTX
PDF
Improving routing security through concerted action
PDF
F5 networks the_expectation_of_ssl_everywhere
PDF
Final report
PDF
DDoS Defense for the Hosting Provider - Protection for you and your customers
PDF
Cryptographic Countermeasure Against Prevention Of Dos and Distributed DOS A...
PDF
IRJET- A Survey on DDOS Attack in Manet
PDF
IRJET- EEDE- Extenuating EDOS for DDOS and Eluding HTTP Web based Attacks in ...
DOCX
Security Risk Assessment for Quality Web Design
PDF
Scaling Mobile Network Security for LTE: A Multi-Layer Approach
PDF
PDF
Cloud Security, Standards and Applications
Cost of DDoS Attacks | DDoS Attacks Cost | MazeBolt Technologies
Presentation1 shweta
FIRECOL: A COLLABORATIVE PROTECTION NETWORK FOR THE DETECTION OF FLOODING DDO...
Mitigating Various Attacks in Mobile Ad-hoc Networks Using Trust Based Approach
Detection of ICMPv6-based DDoS attacks using anomaly based intrusion detectio...
The role of DDoS Providers
DDoS Explained
Module 5-cloud computing-SECURITY IN THE CLOUD
Improving routing security through concerted action
F5 networks the_expectation_of_ssl_everywhere
Final report
DDoS Defense for the Hosting Provider - Protection for you and your customers
Cryptographic Countermeasure Against Prevention Of Dos and Distributed DOS A...
IRJET- A Survey on DDOS Attack in Manet
IRJET- EEDE- Extenuating EDOS for DDOS and Eluding HTTP Web based Attacks in ...
Security Risk Assessment for Quality Web Design
Scaling Mobile Network Security for LTE: A Multi-Layer Approach
Cloud Security, Standards and Applications
Ad

Similar to Common Types of DDoS Attacks | MazeBolt Technologies (20)

PDF
12 types of DDoS attacks
PDF
Azure DDoS Protection Standard
PDF
Common Dos and DDoS
PDF
What is a TCP Flood Attack.pdf
PDF
DDoS Threat Landscape - Ron Winward CHINOG16
PDF
L1803046876
PDF
MS_ISAC__DDoS_Attacks_Guide__2023_05.pdf
PDF
Fortinet_FortiDDoS_Introduction
PPTX
Denial of-service (do s) attack
PDF
ECE560 Denial of Service Attacks Fall2020.pdf
PPT
透视消费者.ppt
PPTX
Destributed denial of service attack ppt
PPTX
UDP Flood Attack.pptx
PDF
DDoS Attack
PPTX
DDoS ATTACKS
PPTX
BADCamp 2017 - Anatomy of DDoS
PPT
DDoS.ppt
PPT
10 Most Common DDo S Attacks
12 types of DDoS attacks
Azure DDoS Protection Standard
Common Dos and DDoS
What is a TCP Flood Attack.pdf
DDoS Threat Landscape - Ron Winward CHINOG16
L1803046876
MS_ISAC__DDoS_Attacks_Guide__2023_05.pdf
Fortinet_FortiDDoS_Introduction
Denial of-service (do s) attack
ECE560 Denial of Service Attacks Fall2020.pdf
透视消费者.ppt
Destributed denial of service attack ppt
UDP Flood Attack.pptx
DDoS Attack
DDoS ATTACKS
BADCamp 2017 - Anatomy of DDoS
DDoS.ppt
10 Most Common DDo S Attacks
Ad

More from MazeBolt Technologies (6)

PDF
Eliminate DDoS Mitigation False Positive | DDoS Protection | Case Study
PDF
DDoS Protection For Top 4 Industries | MazeBolt Technologies
PDF
Mitigating Modern DDoS Attacks | Evaluate DDoS Protection | MazeBolt Technolo...
PDF
Eliminate DDoS Mitigation False Positive | DDoS Protection | Case Study
PDF
Top 10 DDoS Attacks 2019 | MazeBolt Technologies | Infographics on DDoS
PDF
DDoS Effects On Enterprises 2020 | Industries affected by DDoS Attacks in 2020
Eliminate DDoS Mitigation False Positive | DDoS Protection | Case Study
DDoS Protection For Top 4 Industries | MazeBolt Technologies
Mitigating Modern DDoS Attacks | Evaluate DDoS Protection | MazeBolt Technolo...
Eliminate DDoS Mitigation False Positive | DDoS Protection | Case Study
Top 10 DDoS Attacks 2019 | MazeBolt Technologies | Infographics on DDoS
DDoS Effects On Enterprises 2020 | Industries affected by DDoS Attacks in 2020

Recently uploaded (20)

PPTX
ACSFv1EN-58255 AWS Academy Cloud Security Foundations.pptx
PDF
Per capita expenditure prediction using model stacking based on satellite ima...
PDF
The Rise and Fall of 3GPP – Time for a Sabbatical?
PDF
Chapter 3 Spatial Domain Image Processing.pdf
PPT
“AI and Expert System Decision Support & Business Intelligence Systems”
PPTX
Understanding_Digital_Forensics_Presentation.pptx
PDF
Blue Purple Modern Animated Computer Science Presentation.pdf.pdf
PPTX
VMware vSphere Foundation How to Sell Presentation-Ver1.4-2-14-2024.pptx
PPTX
Detection-First SIEM: Rule Types, Dashboards, and Threat-Informed Strategy
PPTX
Big Data Technologies - Introduction.pptx
PDF
Build a system with the filesystem maintained by OSTree @ COSCUP 2025
PPTX
20250228 LYD VKU AI Blended-Learning.pptx
PDF
Approach and Philosophy of On baking technology
PDF
KodekX | Application Modernization Development
PDF
Profit Center Accounting in SAP S/4HANA, S4F28 Col11
PDF
Agricultural_Statistics_at_a_Glance_2022_0.pdf
PPTX
sap open course for s4hana steps from ECC to s4
PDF
MIND Revenue Release Quarter 2 2025 Press Release
PPTX
MYSQL Presentation for SQL database connectivity
PDF
Electronic commerce courselecture one. Pdf
ACSFv1EN-58255 AWS Academy Cloud Security Foundations.pptx
Per capita expenditure prediction using model stacking based on satellite ima...
The Rise and Fall of 3GPP – Time for a Sabbatical?
Chapter 3 Spatial Domain Image Processing.pdf
“AI and Expert System Decision Support & Business Intelligence Systems”
Understanding_Digital_Forensics_Presentation.pptx
Blue Purple Modern Animated Computer Science Presentation.pdf.pdf
VMware vSphere Foundation How to Sell Presentation-Ver1.4-2-14-2024.pptx
Detection-First SIEM: Rule Types, Dashboards, and Threat-Informed Strategy
Big Data Technologies - Introduction.pptx
Build a system with the filesystem maintained by OSTree @ COSCUP 2025
20250228 LYD VKU AI Blended-Learning.pptx
Approach and Philosophy of On baking technology
KodekX | Application Modernization Development
Profit Center Accounting in SAP S/4HANA, S4F28 Col11
Agricultural_Statistics_at_a_Glance_2022_0.pdf
sap open course for s4hana steps from ECC to s4
MIND Revenue Release Quarter 2 2025 Press Release
MYSQL Presentation for SQL database connectivity
Electronic commerce courselecture one. Pdf

Common Types of DDoS Attacks | MazeBolt Technologies

  • 2. 2 ©MazeBolt Technologies. All Rights Reserved. Table of Contents Executive Summary.............................................................................................3 ICMP (Internet Control Message Protocol Type 8) Flood .................................................4 IP Fragmented Flood.......................................................................................................4 Malformed IP Flood.........................................................................................................4 SYN Flood .......................................................................................................................5 UDP Fragmentation or UDP Garbage Flood......................................................................5 Reflection Attack ............................................................................................................6 ACK Flood .......................................................................................................................6 Empty Connection Flood .................................................................................................6 FIN Flood.........................................................................................................................6 FIN+ACK Flag Flood ........................................................................................................7 URG Flag Flood................................................................................................................7 ALL TCP Flags Flood .......................................................................................................7 PSH+ACK Flag Flood.......................................................................................................7 RST Flood .......................................................................................................................7 Brobot Flood ...................................................................................................................8 SlowLoris ........................................................................................................................8 DNS Request Flood/DNS (Domain Name System) Flood ..................................................9 HTTP/s Flood with Browser Enumeration ........................................................................9 HTTP GET Flood/HTTP Flooders.....................................................................................9 HTTPS Flood...................................................................................................................9 Dynamic HTTP Flood.....................................................................................................10 SSL Negotiation Flood...................................................................................................10 THC-SSL Flood..............................................................................................................10
  • 3. 3 ©MazeBolt Technologies. All Rights Reserved. Executive Summary While the individual DDoS attack code varies by dark web vendor, developer, and attacker, the attacks themselves are based on a finite number of underlying principles. The DDoS attacks in this report were chosen on the basis of public sources and MazeBolt’s rich testing experience and constitute the main attacks companies should validate their mitigation against. As with most cyberattacks, DDoS attacks are a ‘when’, not an ‘if’. DDoS attacks generally target all three levels of your website infrastructure: ● Layer 3 (Volumetric IP level), which generate massive amounts of traffic, clogging the bandwidth, slowing the web or service performance and ultimately preventing website access or the ability to access services ● Layer 4 (Volumetric IP level and Protocol Transport level), which use up all the processing capacity by saturating an end server’s CPU or connection table using a connection-oriented attack ● Layer 7 (Lower volume, higher connections, low and slow, application attacks) exploit weaknesses in the application layer, overwhelming the database or server powering the application directly
  • 4. 4 ©MazeBolt Technologies. All Rights Reserved. Layer 3 Attacks ICMP (Internet Control Message Protocol Type 8) Flood These consume computing power, bring down perimeter devices, and saturate bandwidth, where the packets overload the pipe and servers until the system fails. They are generally spoofed attacks and come at a very high rate. These are effectively echo requests, which may elicit echo responses (ICMP Type 0). If they are not dropped by the DDoS mitigation devices on the perimeter, they may overwhelm the internal network architecture; this flood may also generate outgoing traffic due to answers for the echo request. IP Fragmented Flood IP Fragmented Floods are aimed at consuming computing power and saturating bandwidth; they may also crash devices in rare cases because of buggy packet parsing. Fragmented IP Floods are generally spoofed attacks and normally come at a very high rate. They generally have no identifiable Layer4 protocol, just garbage, and the packets have to be reassembled by various devices along the way. Generally, this flood is used as a basic but effective flood to bring down perimeter devices or saturate bandwidth. Malformed IP Flood Malformed IP Floods are aimed at consuming computing power and saturating bandwidth. They may also crash devices in rare cases because of buggy packet parsing. Malformed IP Floods are generally spoofed attacks and normally come at a very high rate. They have no identifiable Layer 4 protocol, just garbage. Generally, this flood is used as a basic but effective flood to bring down perimeter devices or saturate bandwidth. Many ISP’s today stop this type of attack from occurring since the routers at ISP’s will not forward such packets.
  • 5. 5 ©MazeBolt Technologies. All Rights Reserved. Layer 4 Attacks SYN Flood A SYN flood, generally caused by botnets, is another attack targeting server resources via the firewall or perimeter defenses. They are aimed at consuming connection resources on the backend servers themselves and on stateful elements, like firewalls and load balancers by sending numerous TCP-SYN requests toward targeted services while spoofing the attack packets source IP. This leaves the TCP backlog saturated and the server and/or daemon attacked will not be able to receive any new connections. It begins with the attacker sending a message to the targeted server, which responds with an “SYN ACK” (synchronize acknowledgement) message signaling receipt and awaiting the connection to be closed by the requesting machine (the attacker). Instead, the connection says open until it times out, ultimately exhausting resources and causing the server to go offline. UDP Fragmentation or UDP Garbage Flood In a UDP garbage flood, attackers try to saturate bandwidth to bring about a DDoS state to the network. The attack generally occurs by sending a rapid succession of UDP datagrams with spoofed IPs to a server within the network via various different ports, forcing the server to respond with ICMP traffic. This is normally done by sending a rapid succession of UDP datagrams with spoofed IPs to a server within the network via various different ports, forcing the server to respond with ICMP traffic. The saturation of bandwidth happens both on the ingress and the egress direction. This flood also has some garbage in the data section of the datagram. Large, forged packets of more than 1,500 bytes are sent, requiring fragmentation to “fit” through the pipes, saturating bandwidth to shut down the network to outside, legitimate requests. Because these packets are not legitimate, they cannot be reassembled. While the network firewall is busy trying to put them back together, the network itself can be unprotected for hours. While an “official” DDoS attack, it gives coverage for more nefarious activities to occur in other parts of the network. See here for a full technical explanation of the UDP Flood/UDP Garbage Flood.
  • 6. 6 ©MazeBolt Technologies. All Rights Reserved. Reflection Attack A reflection attack passes the threat around to many computers, which then sends them back to the targeted computer, using spoofed sources. The initial (attacking) computers receive the packets (all with the same spoofed source IP – the victims IP – and respond to the spoofed address that routes to the target (the victim). This attack is only possible with connectionless protocols In rare cases, out-of-state TCP packets may also be used if the attacking nodes support the response to out-of- state packets, e.g. UDP. ACK Flood An ACK flood is designed to disrupt network activity by saturating bandwidth and resources on stateful devices in its path. By continuously sending ACK packets towards a target, stateful defenses can go down (in some cases into a fail-open mode). This flood could be used as a smoke screen for more advanced attacks. This is true for other out-of-state floods too. See here for a full technical explanation of an ACK flood. Empty Connection Flood Empty connection floods are designed to saturate the targeted open port’s sockets. The idea is that as connections increase, you are saturating the TCP stack to finally bring about a situation whereby the particular daemon/service is unable to accept any new connections. An Empty Connection Flood may also saturate other stateful devices in its path such as firewalls or IPS systems. An Empty connection flood generally won’t have a high Mbps throughput. FIN Flood A FIN Flood is designed to disrupt network activity by saturating bandwidth and resources on stateful devices in its path. By continuously sending FIN packets toward a target, stateful defenses can go down (in some cases - into a fail open mode). This flood could be used as a smoke screen for more advanced attacks. This is true for other out-of-state floods, too.
  • 7. 7 ©MazeBolt Technologies. All Rights Reserved. FIN+ACK Flag Flood FIN+ACK Floods are aimed at consuming computing power and saturating bandwidth. FIN+ACK Floods are generally spoofed attacks and normally come at a very high rate. FIN+ACK floods, if not dropped by stateful devices on the perimeter, may overwhelm the internal network architecture. Generally, this flood is used as a basic but effective flood to bring down perimeter devices or saturate bandwidth. URG Flag Flood URG Floods are aimed at consuming computing power and saturating bandwidth. URG Floods are generally spoofed attacks and normally come at a very high rate. URG Floods, if not dropped by stateful devices on the perimeter, may overwhelm the internal network architecture. Generally, this flood is used as a basic but effective flood to bring down perimeter devices or saturate bandwidth. ALL TCP Flags Flood ALL TCP Flags Floods are aimed at consuming computing power and saturating bandwidth. ALL TCP Flags Floods are generally spoofed attacks and normally come at a very high rate. ALL TCP Flags Floods, if not dropped by stateful devices on the perimeter, may overwhelm the internal network architecture. Generally, this flood is used as a basic but effective flood to bring down perimeter devices or saturate bandwidth. These packets should also be rejected on the basis that they are non-RFC compliant, which means they do not follow standard TCP protocols. PSH+ACK Flag Flood PSH+ACK Floods are aimed at consuming computing power and saturating bandwidth. PSH+ACK Floods are generally spoofed attacks and normally come at a very high rate. PSH+ACK floods, if not dropped by stateful devices on the perimeter, may overwhelm the internal network architecture. Generally, this flood is used as a basic but effective flood to bring down perimeter devices or saturate bandwidth. RST Flood RST Floods are aimed at consuming computing power and saturating bandwidth. RST Floods are generally spoofed attacks and normally come at a very high rate. RST Floods, if not dropped by stateful devices on the perimeter, may overwhelm the internal network architecture. Generally, this flood is used as a basic but effective flood to bring down perimeter devices or saturate bandwidth.
  • 8. 8 ©MazeBolt Technologies. All Rights Reserved. Layer 7 Attacks Brobot Flood Brobot is similar to an HTTP flood and is designed to overwhelm web servers’ resources by continuously requesting single or multiple URLs from many source attacking machines. Brobot dynamically changes its user agent and can change HTTP method type (GET/POST). Brobot can also add a suffix to the end of URLs, which will enable the request to bypass many CDN systems. When the servers’ limits of concurrent connections are reached, the server can no longer respond to legitimate requests from other users. SlowLoris A “low-and-slow” attack vector, it has the goal of saturating the entire TCP stack for the HTTP/S daemon. These attacks are harder to detect because they do not need the volume of resources required for other types of attack. They enable a single attacker to take down a web server without affecting other ports or services on the targeted network. SlowLoris sends HTTP headers at certain intervals combined with partial requests, which opens connections to the target machine and keeps them open, eventually overflowing the maximum concurrent connection volume, preventing legitimate clients from accessing the server. Image of a Slow Loris in the wild. A primate originating in South East Asia with a rare toxic bite after which the DDoS Attack is named
  • 9. 9 ©MazeBolt Technologies. All Rights Reserved. DNS Request Flood/DNS (Domain Name System) Flood Like many other types of flood attacks, the attackers send spoofed requests at a high packet rate from a wide range of IP addresses; the difference is that the targets are the DNS servers and cache mechanisms. The DNS Request Floods send DNS request packets to a DNS server in an attempt to overwhelm the server’s ability to respond to legitimate DNS requests. If the DNS is unavailable to legitimate users, this can completely cripple most modern networks since fully qualified domain names or absolute domain names (a domain name that specifies its exact location within the DNS hierarchy) are used to provide most services. The Amplified DNS flood sends small requests with spoofed IP addresses across the Internet to open DNS resolvers. They reply with responses larger than request, which flood the victim’s DNS (Or other) servers, taking them offline. HTTP/s Flood with Browser Enumeration HTTP Floods with Browser Enumeration are designed to overwhelm web servers’ resources by continuously requesting single or multiple URLs from many source attacking machines, unlike with a normal HTTP Flood (without browser enumeration). When you have browser enumeration, JavaScript can be interpreted, where simple JavaScript challenges are bypassed. When the servers’ limits of concurrent connections are reached, the server can no longer respond to legitimate requests from other users. HTTP GET Flood/HTTP Flooders Attacks are based on seemingly legitimate HTTP GET or POST requests, forcing the server or applications to respond to every request. These are designed to overwhelm web servers’ resources by continuously requesting single or multiple URLs from many source attacking machines. A GET request is used to download a page or image from the server, while a POST request is used to pass data to the server, like a form, uploading a file, etc. It uses less bandwidth but because it requires a more complex response, it still maxes out the server capabilities. HTTP Floods are referred to as application or connection-oriented floods. The number or source IPs and the total amount of connections will be a deciding factor affecting service outage. HTTPS Flood Similar to an HTTP Flood, HTTPS Floods are designed to overwhelm web servers’ resources by continuously requesting single or multiple URLs from many source attacking machines. When the servers’ limits of concurrent connections are reached, the server can no longer respond to legitimate requests from other users. However, an HTTPS flood can also saturate an SSL daemon due to the high amount of computing resources required to perform the asymmetric encryption for a single user.
  • 10. 10 ©MazeBolt Technologies. All Rights Reserved. Dynamic HTTP Flood Similar to regular HTTP Floods, a Dynamic HTTP Flood continuously changes the suffix of the HTTP request; this forces services like CDNs to request from the originating web server. Dynamic HTTP Floods are designed to overwhelm web servers’ resources by continuously requesting single or multiple URLs from many source attacking machines. When the servers’ limits of concurrent connections are reached, the server can no longer respond to legitimate requests from other users. SSL Negotiation Flood SSL Negotiation Floods attempt to establish many new SSL handshakes with the targeted server. Each handshake in this attack is a new TCP connection and affects the target server. Opening and closing many such connections, SSL/TLS handshakes are up to fifteen times more CPU intensive on the server than on the client. While the server may not be completely down under such an attack, it may be unable to establish any new SSL connections, effectively leaving that SSL service unavailable. See here for a full technical explanation of an SSL Negotiation Flood. THC-SSL Flood This attack uses a single TCP connection to continuously renegotiate new encryption keys. The important thing with this attack is that in one single connection the server “allows” the client to request a new SSL handshake within the same TCP connection. This attack will work effectively on the server, which allows its clients to initiate a new handshake at the time of their choosing, leaving such behavior in the server increases its vulnerability to DDoS attacks.
  • 11. 11 ©MazeBolt Technologies. All Rights Reserved. Conclusion No matter the size of your network, one of these attacks is highly likely to get through. Malicious actors will do whatever they can to bring your system down. You need to take proactive measures to ensure that your DDoS protection system is as robust and hardened as possible. Speak with your network vendors, your MSSSPs, your cloud providers, and any other entity, such as MazeBolt, that can have an impact on ensuring your DDoS protection is up to the highest possible standards. About RADAR ™ RADAR™, MazeBolt’s new patented technology solution is part of the MazeBolt security platform. RADAR™, simulates DDoS attacks continuously and non-disruptively. Delivering advanced intelligence, through straightforward reports on how to remediate the DDoS vulnerabilities found. With RADAR™ organizations achieve, maintain, and verify the continuous closing of their DDoS vulnerability gaps. Reducing and maintaining the vulnerability level of a damaging DDoS attack from an average of 48% to under 2% ongoing. About MazeBolt MazeBolt is an innovation leader in cybersecurity and part of the DDoS mitigation space. Offering full DDoS risk detection and elimination and working with any mitigation system to provide end to end full coverage. Supporting organizations in avoiding downtime and closing DDoS vulnerabilities before an attack happens. References 1. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Denial-of-service_attack#Attack_techniques 2. https://securitytoday.com/articles/2018/02/26/top-ddos-attack-types-exposed.aspx 3. https://www.itbusinessedge.com/slideshows/5-types-of-ddos-attacks-to-defend-against-in- 2016-07.html 4. http://www.eweek.com/security/recognizing-the-most-common-ddos-attack-vectors-in-an-it- system 5. https://www.esecurityplanet.com/network-security/types-of-ddos-attacks.html 6. https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/top-10-most-common-ddos-attacks-muhammad-shahbaz- khan/ 7. https://www.rivalhost.com/12-types-of-ddos-attacks-used-by-hackers 8. http://blog.fortinet.com/post/security-101-top-10-most-common-ddos-attacks 9. https://www.incapsula.com/ddos/ddos-attacks/