Access To Training And Its Impact On Temporary Workers

66 HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT JOURNAL, VOL 15 NO 2, 2005
Access to training and its impact on
temporary workers
David Finegold, Keck Graduate Institute of Applied Life Sciences, USA
Alec Levenson, University of Southern California, USA
Mark Van Buren, Learning & Development Roundtable of the Corporate
Executive Board, USA
Human Resource Management Journal, Vol 15, no 2, 2005, pages 66-85
Does temporary work provide a way for individuals to improve their skill levels? Using
a sample of more than 4,000 employees of US temporary staffing agencies, we analyse
whether blue, white and pink-collar temps get access to company training, and the
impact of skill development on wages and employee retention. We find that less than 25
per cent of temps take part in training. Educated and experienced individuals are more
likely to be offered training, but lower-skilled individuals are more likely to take training
when it is offered and spend more hours on it. Office workers who took part in training
were more likely still to be with the agency a year later and experienced significant wage
growth, while training had no effect on wage growth for blue-collar workers. Skill
development that took place on the job was associated with greater wage growth for all
types of temps.
Contact: David Finegold, Keck Graduate Institute of Applied Life Sciences, 535
Watson Drive, Claremont, CA 91711, USA. Email: david_finegold@kgi.edu
T
emporary staffing agencies have been a rapidly growing segment of the service
sector across the advanced industrial countries over the past 15 years (Ward et al,
2001; Peck and Theodore, 1998; Koene et al, 2004). There are two opposing views
on the impact that this trend is having on skill development for service workers.
Conventional wisdom views temps as ‘contingent’ workers, implying that their jobs
are insecure, marginal and, hence, ones for which employers are unlikely to provide
training (Polivka, 1996; Economic Policy Institute, 1997). Human capital theory
reinforces this argument, predicting that firms will be unwilling to invest in general
skills training: the skills developed reside with the individual, not with the company,
and make their employees more attractive to other firms (Becker, 1964). This logic
would appear to apply particularly strongly to temp agencies given, as the name
suggests, that ‘temporary’ workers change firms very frequently. In contrast, Autor
(2001) and others argue that temporary agencies can help individuals develop a range
of transferable skills – for example typing, introductory office-skills and advanced
computer programming – in today’s relatively insecure, highly mobile labour market.
Similar to the medieval guilds, these agencies may provide a mechanism for
individuals to develop, and be paid for using, a specialised set of skills across a variety
of work settings without holding a traditional job at a single firm.
This article will attempt to shed light on the role of temporary agencies in skill
development using a unique data-set consisting of five years of payroll records from
US temporary agencies that employ hundreds of thousands of individuals. We match
these data with a survey of a nationally representative sample of more than 4,000

David Finegold, Alec Levenson and Mark Van Buren
67
HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT JOURNAL, VOL 15 NO 2, 2005
workers at these agencies that allows us to examine both the antecedents and the
outcomes of training. We use the data to answer a series of questions regarding skill
development of temporary workers:
● How much training do staffing agencies provide to temporary workers?
● What are the main antecedents that predict which temps will receive opportunities
for skill development? Are temps in higher-skilled positions (technical and
professional work) more likely to be offered training than those in clerical or
industrial positions? What types of temps are most likely to take part in
training if offered?
● Are temp workers’ career objectives – for example, wanting to move into a
permanent job as rapidly as possible versus a preference to work as a temp – related
to the likelihood that temps are offered, and participate in, training?
● Is there a relationship between temp workers’ attachment to their staffing agency – ie
their commitment to the agency and willingness to engage in extra-role behaviour –
and the likelihood that temps are offered, and participate in, training? Are temps
who receive training more likely to remain with the staffing agency?
● Does training or other forms of skill development enhance the labour-market
outcomes for temps, such as growth in the hourly wage level or total earnings?
GROWTH INTHE SERVICE SECTOR
The growth in temporary staffing agencies has contributed to the more general growth
in service work across the advanced industrial economies over the past century by
facilitating the separation of ‘core’ and ‘periphery’ workers (Purcell and Purcell, 1999:
163-81; Abraham and Taylor, 1996; Doeringer and Piore, 1985). When manufacturing
firms outsource jobs (ie support services or cyclical assembly-line positions) to temp
agencies, these positions are often reclassified as part of the service sector, even if the
work being performed hasn’t altered. While our sample of agency temps can thus all
be considered to be service workers, in our analysis we will distinguish between temps
in blue-collar (manual) work, white-collar (managerial, technical and professional)
occupations, and pink-collar (clerical and administrative) jobs to see if there are
differences among occupations in training participation and outcomes.
Temporary jobs traditionally have been concentrated in clerical and lower-skill,
low-wage industrial occupations. A significant shift occurred within temporary
employment between 1989 and 1994, with pink-collar positions dropping from 58 to 49
per cent of total US temporary jobs, while blue-collar occupations grew from 30 to 40
per cent: the largest growth occurred among labourers and electronic assemblers
(Bjurman, 1995). The concentration of temporary work in lower-skilled occupations
began to change in the 1990s, as firms moved away from traditional full-time, long-
term employment towards the use of more flexible staffing arrangements, including
part-time workers, job-sharing, consultants and independent contractors (Abraham
and Taylor, 1996; Houseman, 2001; Purcell and Purcell, 1999). Temporary agencies
expanded recruitment of more highly skilled technical, professional and managerial
workers in order to meet new demands (American Staffing Association, 2001; Peck and
Theodore, 1998). Europe has seen similar trends with a general growth in temporary

agency employment, including more outsourcing of knowledge work (Bergström and
Storrie, 2003; Koene et al, 2004; Mallon and Duberley, 2000) and the growth of exclusive
partnerships between temp agencies and client companies, where agencies may do all
the hiring for particular types of jobs and/or run whole parts of the client’s operations,
such as call centres (Purcell et al, 2004). The growth in temporary agency employment
has been most dramatic in Japan – increasing from just over 250,000 to more than 2
million between 1997 and 2003 – as the government removed restrictions on temporary
work and companies sought to increase labour flexibility by gradually replacing those
who were part of the old lifetime employment model with temporary and part-time
workers (Pilling, 2004).
PRIOR RESEARCH AND HYPOTHESES
Training participation
There is ample evidence that lower-skilled workers are less likely to receive training
from their employers (ie Frazis et al, 2000: 459; Brown, 1989). Most studies, however,
have not examined whether this is because companies are less likely to offer training to
lower-skilled workers or because lower-skilled individuals are more reluctant to
participate in training when offered. This gap in research is caused in part by the fact
that most national labour force or establishment databases record only training
incidence, failing to distinguish between access to training and individuals’ desire to
participate. It may also reflect the fact that many company training programmes are
either legally mandated for all employees (eg health and safety training) or required of
some or all employees as part of a corporate initiative. In contrast, the staffing agencies
we studied had free, computer-based training available, but not all temporary workers
were encouraged to participate. Thus, we distinguish between whether temporary
workers were offered training (by their temporary agency) and whether they
participated in that training.
Human capital theory and prior training research suggest that firms will be more
likely to offer training where they receive a higher return on their investment (Becker,
1964). The return to the firm from providing training is likely to be greater the more
‘trainable’ individuals are – ie those with higher levels of prior knowledge will be better
prepared to learn new skills (Wexley and Latham, 1981; Robertson and Downs, 1979;
Noe and Schmitt, 1986: 498). In addition, because training carries an up-front cost and
the returns come only after individuals have acquired new skills, and because
temporary workers typically spend only a limited time with the agency, firms are more
likely to offer training to the temps who they believe will produce the most immediate
return on training participation. Thus, we predict:
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Lower-skilled temps will be less likely to be offered training.
Once individuals have been offered training, the primary factor determining whether
they participate is their motivation to enhance their skills (Hicks and Klimoski, 1987;
Noe and Schmitt, 1986). The motivation to learn is likely to be particularly important
for the temps in our sample, since – in contrast to most employees receiving company-
provided training – they are not paid for the time they spend in training. Individuals
who join the firm with relatively low levels of education and training are likely to
perceive more personal benefit from a marginal increase in their skills through training
and have fewer options to acquire those skills than those who already have high levels
Access to training and its impact on temporary workers

69
of education or experience. Likewise, individuals who engage in career-planning, and
therefore have a sense of how training may help them attain desired career objectives
while temping, are more likely to take time to participate in self-development activities
(Gould, 1979; Super and Hall, 1978). Therefore. we predict:
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Lower-skilled temps will be more likely to take part in training if offered.
Hypothesis 3 (H3): Individuals who view temping as a longer-term career option will be more
likely to participate in training if offered.
OUTCOMES OFTRAINING
In today’s highly volatile and competitive labour markets it is difficult for employers to
offer job security. This is particularly true for temporary workers, who represent the
epitome of a ‘transactional’ psychological contract between individuals and the firm,
where neither side is committed to a long-term relationship (Koene et al, 2004;
Rousseau, 1995). In the absence of job security, firms may offer an implicit learning
contract in which the company seeks to retain and gain commitment from workers by
investing in the ongoing development of their skills and hence increasing their
employability (Finegold, 1998). Under this form of social exchange, training can be seen
by employees as a valuable benefit that firms offer to differentiate themselves from
competing employers (Frazis et al, 2000; Nordhaug, 1989; Maurer et al, 2002).
Employees can be expected to reciprocate by displaying greater attachment to the firm.
Thus, we predict:
Hypothesis 4 (H4): Individuals who receive training will be more likely to engage in extra-role
behaviour and display commitment to the agency.
Hypothesis 5 (H5): Training participation is positively related to greater subsequent work with
the agency.
Human capital theory treats general skills training as an investment that will enhance
individual productivity at a variety of firms (Becker, 1964). The greater output
individuals are capable of producing should in turn be reflected in higher wages.
While the evidence for temps is limited (Autor et al, 1999), a large body of empirical
research has found that training and other forms of on-the-job skill development are
associated with higher subsequent earnings (eg Arulampalam and Booth, 2001;
Lynch, 1992; Loewenstein and Spletzer, 1999; Parent, 1999). While we are unable to
assess the effects of training on earnings once individuals leave the agency, we can
predict that:
Hypothesis 6 (H6): Skill development is related to higher subsequent wage growth with the
staffing agency.
METHODS
We analysed matched survey and archival data from multiple temporary agencies in
the US that account for a small but significant fraction of all US temps for 1995-2001.
1
The agencies cover every state and all major metropolitan areas, ensuring a
geographically diverse picture of the industry.

The payroll data contain no information on temp demographics. To obtain this and
data on motivations, work experience and attitudes, we surveyed a sample of all
employees at these agencies. We surveyed people most likely to be affected by temping
– ie those who had temped for at least 80 hours in a six-month period. This excluded
about a third of temps at these agencies. This introduced a bias because people who
temp for longer durations are more likely to have had positive outcomes.
The surveys were posted two months after the end of the qualifying period – ie
when the period was August to January, the survey was posted at the end of March. A
total of 27,098 surveys were posted in 2000-01: 20,598 to industrial and clerical temps,
and 6,500 to professional/technical temps.
2
Included among the industrial and clerical
group was an oversample of 5,250 temps who almost certainly had rapid wage
increases during the qualification period.
3
The remainder of the industrial and clerical
sample was drawn from a random national sample (from among all temps working at
the agencies) and two-stage random sampling using a representative group of offices.
4
In order to induce as high a response rate as possible, all survey respondents were
entered in a draw for a bonus payment.
5
In all, 4,500 usable surveys were returned, for a 16.6 per cent response rate.
6
Among
those who returned surveys, more than 70 per cent worked for the agency at which
they were surveyed in the two months before the survey posting date: only about 55
per cent of those not responding worked for the agency during this period. Thus, the
transient nature of temp employment contributed to the low response rate. This
conclusion is bolstered by the results of follow-up phone calls made to a subset of the
industrial and clerical temp non-respondents. The calls were made about eight weeks
after the survey posting date. The results suggested an additional 22.5 per cent of the
survey non-respondents should be excluded from the total because they were not at the
address to which the survey had been posted. Doing so yields an adjusted response
rate of 21.4 per cent (4,500/21,001) for the entire sample (see Levenson and Finegold,
2001, for details).
Because the surveyed temps were sampled from archival wage records, we can use
those records to compare the respondents and non-respondents. During the preceding
four-and-a-half years, the respondents had greater numbers of hours worked (1,568
versus 1,137), higher total income ($21,540 versus $14,910), higher average hourly
wages ($12.32 versus $11.18), and greater growth in base pay (13.17 per cent versus
11.03 per cent).
7
Thus, respondents were better paid and temped more hours than non-
respondents.
The survey data were matched with archival payroll and job-assignment data to
construct a history of work at the agency for each temp. The archival data were also
used to classify each temp as blue, pink or white collar, based on the closest temporary
assignment to the survey.
Variables: temporary employee skills
The variables used in the analyses are summarised in Table 1. Our data contain three
ways of measuring temps’ skill levels prior to training: level of education, work
experience and wages. Each is a proxy for individuals’ general skills and abilities. The
first skill measure is based on formal educational qualifications, and compares those
with a high school diploma or less to those with some college education, and to those
with a BA or advanced degree. In our sample, almost a third have a high school
diploma or less, and about a quarter have at least a four-year college degree. In
addition, 18 per cent were students at the time of the survey.

71
Variable name in table Variable description Mean (SD) Minimum-
Maximum
Offered training Have you been given the 0.4 (.49) 0-1
opportunity to take any training
offered by (the agency)?
Training participation Have you taken any training 0.5 (.50) 0-1
offered by [the agency]?
(missing if not offered)
Training taken Respondents who took training 0.2 (.42) 0-1
(no missing values)
Commitment to agency Six-item scale: (a) I would be very 3.1 (.89) 1-5
(1 = strongly disagree; happy to spend the rest of my
3 = neither agree nor disagree; career with this organisation;
5 = strongly agree) (b) This organisation has a great
deal of personal meaning for me;
(c) I do not feel like ‘part of the
family’ in this organisation
(reverse coded); (d) I really feel
as if this organisation’s problems
are my own; (e) I do not feel a
strong sense of belonging to this
organisation (reversed); (f) I do not
feel ‘emotionally attached’ to this
organisation (reversed). Alpha = .78.
Extra-role behaviour – Four-item scale: (a) I volunteer to do 3.6 (.95) 1-5
agency things for this organisation;
(1 = strongly disagree; (b) I help others at this organisation
3 = neither agree nor disagree; with their responsibilities;
5 = strongly agree) (c) I assist others working for this
organisation to the firm’s benefit;
(d) I get involved to benefit this
organisation. Alpha = .84.
On-the-job development 4-item scale: (a) Extent to which 3.7 (.95) 1-5
(1 = strongly disagree; temping provided opportunity to
3 = neither agree nor disagree; learn new things through training;
5 = strongly agree) (b) Opportunity to learn from other
people at the workplace;
(c) Opportunity to learn new things
on the job; (d) Work that is closely
matched to my skills and abilities.
Alpha = .82.
Computer experience Respondent’s level of prior computer 3.3 (1.25) 1-5
experience (ranging from no experience
to advanced experience)
Age Age of respondent 37.9 (13.14) 17-82
Female Female respondents 0.6 (.50) 0-1
Long term Reason for joining temp agency was 0.62 (.48) 0-1
to find long-term temporary work
or the right permanent job
Wage growth Growth in hourly wage as a temp: 4.4 (10.3) -50.9 – 94.7
post-survey average wage relative
to pre-survey average wage
Hours per week post-survey Average hours worked per week 13.5 (16.6) 0-60
as a temp in the three quarters
following the survey
Hours per week pre-survey Average hours worked per week 32.4 (8.2) 3.5 – 62.3
as a temp in the four quarters
preceding the survey
Retention Positive hours worked as a temp .27 (.45) 0-1
one year after the survey
% time working in three years % time respondent was in paid 77.1 (29.21) 0-100
prior to joining agency work in the three years prior to
joining the agency
HS education High school graduate, no high .31 (.46) 0-1
school education, or trade school
Some college education Some college education .42 (.49) 0-1
Bachelor’s degree or higher Bachelor’s, Master’s, Ph.D. .26 ( 44) 0-1
TABLE 1 Regression variable descriptions and summary statistics

The second measure of individuals’ competencies is the amount of work
experience the temps had prior to joining the agency. We use two measures: the
fraction of time the person worked in the three years prior to joining the agency (self-
report, ranging from zero to 100), and the extent of computer experience the person
had before joining the agency (self-report, ranging from 1 = ‘no experience’ to 5 =
‘advanced experience’).
The third way of operationalising skills is based on wages. We use the archival wage
data and construct a measure of the average hourly wage received as a temp while
working at the agency in the year prior to the survey. Note that many of the temps
worked with the agency for less than the full year before the survey. The average
hourly wage provides a proxy measure of skills that allows us to compare people with
very different amounts of work experience.
Employment objectives
We classify the respondents’ motivations for temping based on whether their outlook
when joining the agency was immediate (‘short term’) or more open-ended (‘long
term/selective’). The long-term group includes both those who say their original
motivation was to find good temp assignments on an ongoing basis, and those who
were looking for the right permanent positions to meet their needs. It is important to
recognise that, while individuals’ goals in entering temporary work vary, their ability
to satisfy their goals will be heavily influenced by what types of temporary positions
are available and their often weak position in the labour market. Because the survey
asked retrospectively about the person’s reason for becoming a temp, there is a
potential for bias due to ex-post updating. This is a concern for those who signed up
looking to temp for only a short time yet who ended up temping for longer than they
expected. We address this by controlling for the total number of hours worked prior to
the survey in the analyses.
RESULTS:TRAINING PROVISION
The agencies in our sample, in common with others in the sector (Autor, 2001), provide
free training in a range of transferable skills – typing, introductory office skills,
advanced computer-programming etc. One reason they do so is that the returns to the
firm from such training appear to be high, the costs are low (the training is all
computer- or video-based, and individuals are not paid while training) and the
payback is rapid (the firm can charge a higher margin on more qualified individuals).
Agencies also offer free training to prepare people for positions where there is a
shortage of qualified individuals, including the specific skills requested by an employer
(eg Microsoft Office 2000), and to provide an inducement for individuals to sign on
with their agency. In our study, however, only 4 per cent of temps indicated that
training was their ‘main reason’ for signing on.
Only about a quarter of the sample took part in training, roughly comparable to the
21 per cent of the US workforce who report receiving training from their employer in a
given year (National Center for Education Statistics, 1995). The level of participation
can be explained in two stages (Table 2): less than half report that they were offered free
training, and only just over half of those offered training elected to take it. Less-
educated individuals were less likely to be offered training, but were more likely to
take it when offered; they also took significantly more training per year. A similar
pattern holds for lower-wage workers. Individuals in industrial positions also were
much less likely to be offered training and were less likely to participate when it was

David
Finegold,
Alec
Levenson
and
Mark
Van
Buren
73
HUMAN
RESOURCE
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VOL
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NO
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2005
EDUCATION OCCUPATION WAGE
Total Some HS Trade Bachelor’s Industrial Clerical Professional $8/hour $8/hour
sample or HS certification, degree or or technical or less or more
diploma some college higher
or associate
degree
Number of respondents 4,171 1,006 2,042 1,093 1,105 1,870 1,169 1,277 2,867
Offered training (%) 42.9 37.1 45.0 44.1 30.9 50.0 42.6 38.1 44.9
Took training (%) 53.7 54.0 55.6 50.6 52.3 59.2 44.4 55.6 53.0
Mean hours
of training 21.0 25.7 20.7 18.5 30.4 17.3 21.3 29.6 17.1
TABLE 2 Training participation

offered. Yet industrial temps who received training spent significantly more hours in
training than either office or professional temps. Within specific occupations we found
that the more advanced workers – whether data entry, secretaries or computer
operators – were more likely to be offered training and recorded significantly more
hours of training.
The regression results are presented in Tables 3, 4 and 5. Tables 3A and 3B examine
the factors that are related to whether temps are offered and participate in training. The
relationships between training and our three measures of skills are explored in Table 3A
(education and experience) and Table 3B (wages). Table 3B also shows the relationship
between training and motivation for temping, controlling for prior hours worked as a
temp (columns three and six). The regression results confirm support for H1: lower-skill
temps are less likely to be offered training, although the relationship is modest and the
R
2
is low. Less educated temps were less likely to be offered training (Table 3A, columns
one to three). Those with greater work experience and those with greater computer
OFFERED TRAINING PARTICIPATED IN TRAINING
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Education
High school degree .04 .03 .01 .045 .044 .078
Trade certification .05 .04 .01 .038 .033 .082
Some college .11*** .10** .07 .062 .063 .115*
Associate degree .16*** .15*** .11** .039 .034 .094
College/ .12*** .11** .06 .029 .022 .087
university degree
Graduate/ .07 .05 .01 -.081 -.078 -.012
professional degree
% time working in .001* .0001
the three years
before joining
the agency
Extent of computer .03*** -.030***
experience before
joining the agency
Female .09*** .10*** .09*** .079*** .075*** .082***
Pseudo R2 .012 .013 .014 .008 .007 .011
N 4,141 4,058 4,124 1,762 1,732 1,754
The offered training and training participation results are from binary probits; the values are changes in the
probability of the dependent variable from a one-unit change in the independent variable. The participation
regressions are conditional on being offered training.
* p < .10
** p < .05
*** p < .01
TABLE 3A Relationship between temps’ education, experience and training

75
experience were more likely to be offered training (Table 3A, columns two and three).
The relationship between wages and temps being offered training has an inverted-U
shape: highest for those in the middle of the hourly wage distribution (Table 3B, second
column). The tipping point is around $18.50/hour. This is above the mean for the pink-
collar sample, and below the mean for the white-collar sample.
The results on participation in training when offered are in the fourth to sixth
columns of Tables 3A and 3B. Neither education nor work experience differentiate
participation (Table 3A). Those with greater computer experience were less likely to
take the training, conditional on it being offered. The relationship between training
participation and wages is negative. While there appears to be an inverted U shape,
based on the results in the fifth column of Table 3B, the tipping point for that quadratic
is approximately $10.50/hour, towards the lower end of the wage distribution.
Moreover, when estimating the relationship separately by occupation (results not
reported), there is no relationship between wages and training participation among the
blue-collar sample – those at the lowest end of the hourly wage distribution. We
conclude that training participation is highest for those with low wages, and declines
for those at the middle and upper ends of the hourly wage distribution. The results
provide partial support for H2: lower-skill temps, on some measures, are more likely to
participate in training, conditional on it being offered.
The results in Table 3B for training participation and the motivation for temping are
consistent with H3: those who want to temp for longer periods get more training.
This may partly be an access, not a screening, issue: given the barriers to using the free
training erected by the agency, even if training were randomly made available to all
temps in a given period working longer would increase the probability of gaining
access. Yet the positive correlation between temping motivation and training
OFFERED TRAINING PARTICIPATED IN TRAINING
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Log average wage .062*** .824*** -.078*** .634***
prior to survey
Log average wage -.141*** -.134***
squared
Long-term .069*** .080***
Log total hours .027*** .024**
temped at agency
prior to survey
Female .106*** .099*** .096*** .069*** .063** .091***
Pseudo R2 .009 .015 .014 .009 .013 .013
N 4,115 4,115 3,950 1,746 1,746 1,684
The offered training and training participation results are from binary probits; the values are changes in the
probability of the dependent variable from a one-unit change in the independent variable. The participation
regressions are conditional on being offered training.
* p < .10
** p < .05
*** p < .01
Table 3B Relationship between temps’ wages, motivation for temping, and training

participation holds even when controlling for total numbers of hours worked at the
agency. We interpret this as showing a link between motivation for longer-term
temping and the use of training. We found in subsequent analysis (results not reported
in Table 3B) that this link applies exclusively to pink-collar temps.
The evidence for the relationship between training and the temps’ attitudes to the
agency is shown in Table 4. Providing partial support for H4, there is a positive
correlation between being offered training and commitment, but no relationship
between taking training and commitment (first column). The relationship for each of
the three occupation groups is essentially the same. In addition, both being offered
training and taking training are positively correlated with individuals’ willingness to
engage in extra-role behaviour (second column), with each having about the same level
of correlation. (Note that for those taking the training, the total relationship with extra-
role behaviour is equal to the sum of the relationships for being offered training and for
taking training.) The relationship differs substantially, though, for the occupation
groups. Both the blue- and pink-collar groups exhibit a positive correlation for being
offered training, but not for taking training. The opposite is true for the white-collar
group: taking training is positively correlated with extra-role behaviour, whereas being
offered training is not correlated.
The labour market outcomes of training are reported in the top half of Table 5, again
providing mixed support for the hypothesis that training enhances employee retention.
In the overall sample, taking training increases the probability that a temp will still be
working with the agency one year later by 8.7 per cent. This average, however, masks
very different relationships for the different occupation groups. There is no impact on
retention for blue-collar temps. Pink-collar temps are more likely to keep working for
the agency if they take the training. White-collar temps are less likely to remain with
the agency after taking training. Table 5 (first and second columns) shows that there is
no relationship between training and subsequent average hours worked, conditional
on continuing to work as temp.
Commitment Extra-role behaviour
Entire Entire Blue-collar Pink-collar White-collar
sample sample subsample subsample subsample
Offered training .291 *** .157*** .286*** .180*** .080
Took training .030 .153*** .067 .066 .298***
Education controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Gender control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 .064 .052 .033 .031 .061
N 4,118 4,105 1,107 1,850 1,148
* p < .10
** p < .05
*** p < .01
TABLE 4 Training and temps’ relationship with the agency:
commitment and extra-role behaviour

David
Finegold,
Alec
Levenson
and
Mark
Van
Buren
77
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RESOURCE
MANAGEMENT
JOURNAL,
VOL
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NO
2,
2005
OUTCOME: OUTCOME:
HOURS WORKED PER QUARTER RETENTION
Entire sample Entire Blue-collar Pink-collar White-collar
sample subsample subsample subsample
Offered training .535 -.013
Took training .176 -.223 .087** .040 .129*** -.154*
Hours worked .817*** .816
per quarter prior
to the survey
Education controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Gender control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 .457 .457 .006 .006 .014 .019
(columns 1-2)
Pseudo R2
(columns 3-6)
N 1,806 1,806 1,832 541 1,024 267
OUTCOME: WAGE GROWTH
Entire Blue-collar Pink-collar White-collar
sample subsample subsample subsample
Offered training 1.03 ** 1.07*
Took training .73 -.07 -1.41 1.39 ** -1.34
On-the-job development 1.12 ** .30 1.40 **
Education controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Gender control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 .001 .000 .000 .019 .000 .000
N 1,806 1,806 1,806 515 1,021 266
TABLE 5 Labour market outcomes of training

Finally, our results provide partial support for H6: that training enhances
subsequent wage growth. In the overall sample there is a positive correlation between
being offered training and subsequent wage growth, but not for taking training (Table
5, bottom panel). This suggests that training is targeted towards those who are more
likely to progress, but that the limited amount of training most temps undertake does
not aid that progression. For the different occupational groups (columns four to six of
Table 5) we find that taking training provided by the agency helps the pink-collar
temps – the group for whom the training on offer was most appropriate – but not the
others. This suggests a complementarity between the skills a person might already
have and the economic return on enhancing those skills through training. For the blue-
collar and white-collar temps, in contrast, the free computer-based training has no
impact on subsequent wage growth, but on-the-job development plays a significant
role in boosting wages, whereas it has no impact on subsequent wage growth for the
pink-collar temps.
DISCUSSION
The results of our analysis of a survey of more than 4,000 temporary workers in the
United States paint the clearest picture to date of the opportunities for skill
development as well as the benefits of such opportunities to this growing segment of
the service sector. We now return to the questions guiding this inquiry into skill
development for temporary workers.
How much training do agencies provide?
With pressure growing on staffing agencies to deliver an adequate supply of qualified
temporary workers, many agencies offer some type of formal skill development. Such
opportunities are intended not only to recruit more higher-quality temporary
employees, but to provide existing temporary employees with the possibility of
enhancing their current skills. Our analyses reveal, however, that despite the low
marginal costs of delivering training these skill development opportunities have been
limited. Of all the temporary employees in this study, only slightly more than four out
of 10 indicated that they had been offered training at any point during their tenure
with their agency. Even among the group who were offered training, only just over half
chose to participate. As a result, only about a quarter of all temporary employees
received training through their staffing agency. We suggest that several factors in how
training was structured in the agencies may have contributed to the relatively low
participation rate in free training:
● Temps had to train in their own time, in contrast with most permanent employees
who train in company time. As Forde (2001) notes, this is part of a broader trend in
which firms are using staffing agencies to pass the costs and risks of employment on
to individuals.
● Some offices had an unwritten policy that temps had to work at least 40 hours before
being eligible for training.
● Access was often limited because smaller offices typically had only one computer
available for training. That computer was also used for skill assessments and other
office tasks. Internet-based training could have expanded access, but it was only just
being introduced by one agency at the time of the study.

79
● Much of the CBT (computer-based training) curriculum was not modularised,
requiring individuals to complete a full or half day of training in order to be certified
as having passed the course.
● Many lower-skilled individuals may not have been able to afford the travel costs of
getting to the training and the opportunity cost of spending full days in training
without pay, although the slightly higher training take-up by those earning under
$8/hour suggests this is not a principal barrier.
What are the main antecedents that predict which temps will receive opportunities for skill
development? What types of temps are most likely to take part in training if offered?
At first glance, we observe a fair amount of similarity between the skill development
patterns of temporary employees and those found in previous research on company
training for permanent employees (Frazis et al, 2000). There is strong evidence, for
instance, that lower-skilled temporary employees are significantly less likely to be
offered training by their staffing agency. This conclusion was supported across all of the
proxies for skill that we examined: education, amount of experience and wage levels.
More detailed analyses, by major occupational group, demonstrated that this
relationship held only for blue-collar and pink-collar temps. None of the skill measures
predicted whether professional/technical temps would be offered training.
Temporary firms may be less willing to provide skill development to lower-skilled
temps because they believe the potential return on this investment is smaller, both for
them and for the employee. Elsewhere, we have shown that lower-skilled individuals,
for instance, are less likely to experience high wage growth while temping (Finegold et
al, 2003: 317-367). However, our current results also suggest that temporary agencies
may underestimate the value of the training they provide to lower-skilled employees.
We find evidence that lower-skilled employees, when measured by amount of
computer experience and previous wage levels, are actually more likely to engage in
the training offered by their staffing agency than higher-skilled ones. In fact, those
earning the lowest wages were the most likely group to take this training when it was
offered to them, despite the fact they were not paid during the training. We believe that
these temps see training as an important means of increasing their wages. Further
analysis showed that when lower-skilled temps take training offered by their staffing
agencies, it offsets their customary wage growth disadvantage vis-à-vis higher-skilled
employees (ibid).
Are temp workers’ career objectives – ie wanting to move into a permanent job as rapidly as
possible versus a willingness or preference to remain as a temp for the long term – related to the
likelihood that temps are offered, and participate in, training?
Temporary workers are often treated as an undifferentiated group of contingent
workers who would prefer to move into permanent jobs as quickly as possible. Our
research indicates, however, that a substantial portion of temporary workers (38 per
cent) are interested in either remaining temps for the long term or using agencies to
screen employers until they find the right permanent job. We find that temps’ career
orientation is significantly related to their training activity: people who view temping
as a longer-term career option tend to participate in training to a greater degree than
short-term temps, regardless of how long they have been with their staffing agency.
Yet our occupation-specific findings indicate that this relationship between long-term
temping and training participation did not apply to blue-collar or professional/

technical temps. This comes as little surprise because much of the training that the
staffing agencies provide is largely oriented to pink-collar (ie clerical) temps.
Is there a relationship between temp workers’ attachment to their staffing agency – ie their
commitment to the agency and willingness to engage in extra-role behaviour – and the
likelihood that temps are offered, and participate in, training? Are temps who receive training
more likely to remain with the staffing agency?
Although more likely to be a short-term, transactional employment relationship,
temporary work still entails some form of psychological contract between the
employee and the staffing agency (Koene et al, 2004; Rousseau, 1995). In this context,
training may be viewed as either a payment/reward to temps who display an
attachment to their agency or as an incentive to encourage temps to lengthen their
relationship with the agency. Our results reveal that regardless of whether temps
have long- or short-term temporary career aspirations, those who engage in more
extra-role behaviour are not only more likely to be offered training, but also more
likely to participate in the training when offered. We also find evidence that the offer
of training is positively linked with temp workers’ commitment to the agency,
regardless of an individual’s career aspirations.
The fact that in some cases the link was observed only with the offer of training, but
not with participation in training, suggests that the symbolic power of the training offer
– rather than the actual training – can, on its own, elicit greater commitment from
temporary employees. We suspect that temps perceive this offer to be an important
signal of their agency’s commitment to them, and thus reciprocate with their
commitment and extra-role behaviour.
The association between agency-provided training and the attachment of temps to
their agencies apparently translates into longer-term relationships. On the whole,
temps who participated in training exhibited longer subsequent tenure with their
staffing agency. Yet, this conclusion was tempered by the occupation-specific results.
While pink-collar temps experienced longer tenure with their agencies as a result of
taking agency-provided training, training participation had no influence on the tenure
of blue-collar temps. In contrast, we discovered that the tenure of professional/
technical temps actually decreased when they participated in training. We believe that,
due to the high demand for their skills at the time of the study, professional and
technical workers may have used the training from their agency as a springboard for
jobs as independent contractors (freelancers). These results vividly illustrate how
variations in the nature of occupational labour markets can translate into very
dissimilar labour market outcomes for different types of temporary workers.
Does training or other forms of skill development enhance the labour market outcomes for
temps, such as growth in the hourly wage level or total earnings?
The returns to individuals who engage in employer-sponsored training are well
documented (Parent, 1999). The present study extends this finding to skill
development provided to temporary workers by their staffing agency. The results
provide evidence that staffing agencies target the training they offer to temps who will
benefit from it most, but in general the formal training that temps take has no impact
on their subsequent wages. Given the relatively limited amount of training – an
average of 21 hours/trainee – the lack of an overall effect on wages across all
occupation types is not too surprising. When we examined the types of skill
development that different types of temps received, however, we found some clear
exceptions and distinctions to this pattern. In contrast to other temps, pink-collar

81
workers experienced significant levels of wage growth after taking their agency’s
formal training. Blue-collar and professional/ technical workers, on the other hand,
experienced wage gains as a result of on-the-job development opportunities.
Elsewhere, we have published detailed case studies of temporary service employees in
three companies that extensively use temps which illustrate how the skills temporary
workers acquire through their job assignments at their work site also influence their
wage growth patterns (Finegold et al, 2003).
STUDY LIMITATIONS AND AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
While our quantitative analyses are based on data from a very large sample of US
temps, they are drawn from only a small number of agencies. Although we believe
these agencies are typical of most US temporary staffing agencies, caution is needed in
generalising our results within the US or more globally. It would be useful to replicate
the research in Europe and Asia to see if the same relationships hold.
Our survey results are also applicable only to understanding the experiences of
individuals who spent a significant time (two weeks or more) temping. This group is
far more likely to have wage growth or be trained than the third (approximately) of
individuals who signed on with an agency but then temped with that agency for less
than two weeks. Because those who had positive outcomes were more likely to return
the questionnaire, this introduced additional positive bias in our survey results. Finally,
we believe that finer-grained measures of skill development, both formal and informal,
than the ones at our disposal in this study would yield an even more precise
understanding of the breadth and variability of its impact on temporary workers’
labour market outcomes.
Some of our findings also suggest fruitful areas for further research. The
differences among temporary workers in career objectives and expected timeframes
for temping, along with the relatively large proportion of highly educated temps in
technical, professional or managerial occupations, suggest the need to rethink
stereotypical images of temporary work as undesirable, and to explore in more depth
individuals’ motivations for entering temporary work. Furthermore, the greater role
of on-the-job skill development for blue-collar temps suggests the need for research
that provides a more thorough assessment of the nature of their assignments and
opportunities for skill development inherent in the work itself. If temporary agencies
were to structure the sequence of blue-collar temporary assignments appropriately,
these temps could experience substantial skill development over time, as well as
sizeable labour market returns.
CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS FOR PRACTITIONERS
Temporary employment presents a unique opportunity to identify how training and
skill development function in today’s service-driven, highly uncertain economy.
Temporary employment has become a ‘big business’ in many countries; and, as
competition among agencies for higher-quality workers has grown, temporary workers
are increasingly being presented with opportunities to develop their skills. Yet, key
questions remain about the evenness of these opportunities and the extent to which
they result in meaningful, practical returns to temporary employees in service work.
The conclusions of the research closely parallel the broader research on the
opportunities for, and benefits of, skill development in permanent jobs or
manufacturing employment with one important exception: we were able to

differentiate between the company providing opportunities for skill development and
individuals’ decision to participate in these training opportunities, a distinction
typically not found in most research on training. This distinction is vital because we
find that a majority of temporary employees are not offered training by their agency,
and, like employees in other types of work, those who could benefit most from the
training – lower-skilled, lower-wage workers – are the least likely to receive the chance
to train. Yet, these employees are the very workers who most readily engage in this
training when it is offered. Despite bright spots for certain occupational groups, such as
pink-collar employees, the demand for skill development from a considerable portion
of the temporary workforce remains largely unmet. Thus, while the growth in
temporary employment has the potential to provide significant amounts of skill
development to service-sector employees, the current state of skill development falls
far short of this potential.
Our research suggests a number of ways in which the skill development
opportunities for temporary workers could be enhanced, some of which were already
under way at the agencies. These include developing:
● more modular training options that allow workers to take courses in shorter intervals
● web-based training that will allow individuals to train without having to travel to the
agency office
● a greater range of skill development opportunities – both formal training and on-the-
job – for blue- and white-collar employees
● opportunities for temps to train during paid working hours
A key to convincing agencies and their client firms to broaden skill development
opportunities for temps is showing them that there is an economic return on this
investment. Forde (2001: 635) identifies three strategies that temporary staffing
agencies have been using in the UK to build closer, higher-value-added relationships
with customers: individualising service, providing repeat workers, and offering temp-
to-perm options. Our findings suggest that providing workers with ongoing
opportunities for skill development may be a useful addition to agency strategies. As
with other research on training outcomes, we find that temps and the agencies who
employ them stand to gain much from developing their skills when training is
targeted to their needs (Purcell et al, 2004; Brinkerhoff, 1987). This includes lower-
skilled temps whose wage trajectories benefit more from the training than other
temps. Skill development, when tailored to the type of work (as in the case of pink-
collar jobs) or embedded into the actual work of the employee, results in significant
wage growth for temporary employees – and, with it, more revenue to the agencies
that sell their labour. The wage benefits from skill development are only one part of
the business case for further investment in training: training can also facilitate
matching individuals to client skill needs, particularly if targeted at skills that are in
short supply in the local labour market. And general skill development, in contrast to
the predictions of human capital theory (Becker, 1964), appears to foster greater
attachment by lower-skilled temporary employees to their staffing agency. Thus, not
only do these employees become more skilled but, by remaining in the temporary
employment pool longer, they can serve as a proven and tested source of revenue to
their agency for a longer period. The relationship between work-related skill

83
development and employee satisfaction and retention, which has been observed for
employer-provided training (Van Buren, 2002: 105-130), are the critical links in a value
chain leading to real financial returns for employers who invest in employee
development. We believe that, ultimately, a similar value chain – with skill
development at its root – may be established for staffing agencies. This study is an
initial step in demonstrating the value of skill development for temporary workers
and the firms that employ them.
Notes
1 Unfortunately, we cannot report the precise percentage for confidentiality reasons.
2 The proportion of professional/technical versus industrial/clerical temps is not
necessarily indicative of their proportions among the population of temps at these
agencies. The 6,500 sample for the technical/professional group was chosen to ensure a
sufficiently large enough set of returned surveys to facilitate statistical analysis.
3 For technical reasons, we could only construct the difference between the maximum
and minimum wage. We included all those with at least a 5 per cent difference in
wages. This includes both those whose wages fell by at least 5 per cent and those whose
wages rose by at least 5 per cent.
4 First, a representative sample of 100 offices specialising in industrial and clerical
assignments was selected. Arandom sample of 7,500 temps from within those offices was
then drawn. The total number of temps sampled from these offices totalled 8,441 (national
plus over-sample). The response rate for the two samples was virtually identical.
5 The amount of the payment varied across agencies. The results from two different
pilot tests of the survey at one agency suggested that the bonus alone probably
increased the response rate by three to four percentage points.
6 We excluded 329 respondents whom we were unable to match with payroll records,
dropping the N to 4,171.
7 These are all averages conditional on working (ie hours greater than zero).
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