Presentation on medication errors in clinicalpharmacy.ppt
1. Medication Errors
• A medication error is an episode associated with the use of a
medicine that should be preventable through effective control
systems.
• Pharmacists have had a long-standing interest in improving
medication safety and have studied ways to reduce medication
errors.
• The definition used in medication error studies conducted by
pharmacists was a more restricted one of error.
• In these studies, a medication error was defined as any
deviation from the prescriber’s order.
• This definition does not consider the clinical outcome of the
error.
2. • The American Society of Health- System Pharmacists’ (ASHP)
definition of medication errors includes prescribing, dispensing,
medication administration and patient compliance errors.
• They define the following categories of medication errors:
• Prescribing errors
• Omission errors
• Wrong time errors
• Unauthorised drug errors
• Improper dose errors (administration of a dose that is greater or
less than the amount prescribed)
• Wrong dosage form errors (administration of a drug product in a
different dosage form from that prescribed)
• Wrong drug preparation errors (drug product incorrectly
formulated or manipulated before administration)
3. • Wrong administration or technique errors (inappropriate
procedure or improper technique in the administration of the
drug)
• Deteriorated drug errors (administration of a drug that has
expired or whose physical or chemical dosage form integrity
has been compromised
• Monitoring errors (failure to review a prescribed regimen for
appropriateness or failure to assess response to prescribed
therapy)
• Compliance errors (failure of the patient to adhere to the
prescribed medication regimen) Other medication errors (any
error that does not fall into one of the above categories)
4. • The National Coordinating Committee on Medication Error
Reporting and Prevention (NCCMERP) in the United States is
an interdisciplinary healthcare group consisting of
representatives of fourteen healthcare organizations.
• Their purpose is to promote the reporting, understanding and
prevention of medication errors and focus on ways to protect
patient safety through the coordinated efforts of associations and
agencies.
• NCCMERP defines medication errors as any preventable event
that may cause or lead to inappropriate medication use or patient
harm while the medicine is in the control of the healthcare
professional, patient or consumer.
5. • Such events may be related to professional practice,
healthcare products, procedures and systems, including
prescribing; order communication; product labelling,
packaging and nomenclature; compounding; dispensing;
distribution; administration; education; monitoring; and use.
• It has been shown that only a small percentage of medication
errors actually result in harm to the patient.
• The current definition of medication error focuses on breaks
in performing any step in the medication use system, not just
the drug administration step.
• As previously noted, the incidence of medication errors in
most hospitals is approximately 10%.
6. Adverse Drug Events
• The term adverse drug event (ADE) is a newer term that
emerged as studies of the epidemiology of adverse medical
events were published.
• The Harvard Medical Practice Study identified medications as
the most common cause of injury resulting from medical care.
• This represented a shift in focus to the preventable adverse
outcomes associated with drug therapy, and errors as one cause
of these adverse outcomes.
• Bates et al. defined an ADE as an injury resulting from
medical interventions related to a medicine.
• They noted that most ADEs are dosedependant and potentially
predictable and constitute the greatest percentage of errors that
result in clinical harm.
7. • They also noted that a smaller number of ADEs are
unpredictable, idiosyncratic or allergic reactions to medicines
(note that this resembles a category of events that could be
defined as adverse drug reactions).
• These authors introduced another term, ‘potential ADE’,
which is defined as a medication error with the potential for
injury, but in which no injury occurs (note the relationship
between medication errors and ADEs).
• ADEs may therefore result from medication errors or from
adverse drug reactions in which there was no error.
• The relationship between medication errors, adverse drug
events and potential adverse drug events is shown in Fig. 28.1.
9. • The terms adverse drug event and adverse drug reaction
(ADR) may be confused.
• Anadverse drug reactionis a ‘response to a drug which is
noxious and unintended and which occurs at doses normally
used in humans for prophylaxis, diagnosis or therapy of
disease or for the modification of physiologic function’.
• In other words, an ADR is harm directly caused by the drug at
normal doses, during normal use.
• An example of an ADR is nausea resulting from
chemotherapy.
• A death associated with a prescribed overdose of
chemotherapy that was not detected and corrected before a
fatal dose was administered to a patient is an ADE.
10. Epidemiology of Medication-related Problems
• Almost every patient receiving healthcare receives medicines as
part of their care.
• Literally, millions of doses per year are administered to patients in
the average hospital, and billions of doses are self- administered in
the outpatient setting.
• How often do medication-related problems actually occur? What is
the cause of such problems? How much unnecessary cost results
from adverse drug events, particularly those that are preventable?
• Most medication error studies have been based on an observation-
based methodology where a statistically valid number of drug
administration events were observed and the activity compared to
the prescriber’s order.
11. • Because wrong administration time errors are
common, and often do not result in an adverse
event, some studies exclude them in the
reported error rate.
12. • The lowest medication error rate ever reported (0.6%) was in
hospitals with pharmacy-coordinated unit dose and drug
administration programmes.
• Despite safety considerations, the unit dose drug distribution
system makes it difficult for nurses to respond to rapidly
changing drug therapy orders.
• In a review of medication error rates using observation-based
studies, it was noted that error rates in hospitals ranged from
4.4% to 59.1% if wrong time errors were included and from
0.4% to 24.7% if wrong time errors were excluded.
• It was further noted that lower error rates were consistently noted
(typically 50% lower) in hospitals using unit dose drug
distribution systems compared to those using floor stock systems.
•
13. • As a result, automated dispensing cabinets (ADCs) that enable
secure storage of medications in the patient care area have been
developed.
• In fact, hospitals in the US are increasingly changing from
centralised unit dose drug distribution systems to decentralised
systems using ADCs.
• A large majority of US hospitals (83%) now use ADCs as part of
their medication distribution systems.
• Studies have confirmed that if access to medications is possible
before the pharmacist reviews the medication order, ADCs are
error-prone.
• Barker and Allen compared error rates in a system where
medications were available for administration from a unit-based
ADC that was not integrated with a computerised medication
profile to a traditional unit dose system.
14. • The error rate in the unit-based, ADC was 16.3% compared to
5.4% with the unit dose system.
• Borel and Rascati compared medication error rates before and
after implementing a medication profile- linked version of an
ADC.
• The error rate with the unit dose system used before the ADC
system was implemented was 16.9%.
• The error rate for the profile-linked, unit-based system was
10.4%. Therefore, an important safe medication use practice is
to require a pharmacist review of orders for medicines before
they can be obtained from any supply and the dose is
administered to a patient.
15. • It would appear therefore that medication errors are relatively
common, and error rates are influenced by the drug
distribution system.
• Unit dose systems are still considered safer than floor stock
systems.
• ADCs that place medicines in the patient care area can be less
safe if not properly configured with links to computerised
medication profiles that include a pharmacist review.
• The safest system is an integrated unit dose, drug
administration programme with a high level of procedural
standardisation and double checks, such as reviewing
transcription accuracy, rescheduling missed doses, and regular
review of the medication administration record to verify that
medications have been administered as scheduled.
16. Causes of Medication Errors
• In an analysis of the systems failures associated with ADEs and
potential ADEs, errors were classified according to proximal cause
by a multidisciplinary team of physicians, nurses and pharmacists.
• In the review, 334 errors were detected as the cause of 264
preventable ADEs and potential ADEs.
• Sixteen major systems failures were identified as the underlying
cause of the errors.
• The most common systems failure (29%) was in the dissemination
of drug knowledge, particularly to prescribers. The next most
common system failure was inadequate availability of patient
information (18%) such as laboratory tests.
• Seven systems failures accounted for 78% of all errors, all of
which the authors state could be improved by better information
systems.
17. • The stage of the medication use process associated with these
ADEs was also determined.
• Problems at the prescribing stage were most common (39%),
followed by drug administration (38%) and dispensing (11%).
The most common error type was wrong dose (28%) followed
by wrong drug (9%), known allergy (8%), missed dose (7%)
and wrong time (7%). Lesar et al. have studied medication
prescribing errors in a teaching hospital.
• From a total of 289,411 medication orders written during a
one-year period, 905 prescribing errors were detected and
averted by pharmacists.
• The overall detected error rate was 3.13 errors for every 1000
orders written and a rate of 1.81 significant errors per 1000
orders. The most common medication classes involving errors
were anti- microbials (28.5%), cardiovascular (10.7%),
gastrointestinal (8.8%) and benzodiazepines (7.7%). The types
of medication errors detected included:
18. • Overdose – 28.7%
• Missing information – 22.3%
• Underdosing – 17.8%
• Wrong dose form ordered – 7.3%
• Allergy to ordered drug – 6.7%
• Duplicate therapies – 5.5%
• Wrong drug ordered – 5.5%
• Wrong route ordered – 3.4%
• Wrong patient – 1.1%
19. • A subsequent study by Lesar found the prescribing error rate to be
3.99 errors per 1000 orders.
• The most common specific factors associated with errors included:
decline in renal or hepatic function requiring alteration of drug
therapy (13.9%), patient history of allergy to the same medication
class (12.1%), using the wrong drug name, dosage form or
abbreviation (11.4%), incorrect dose calculations (11.1%), and
atypical or unusual and critical dosage frequency considerations
(10.8%).
• The most common groups of factors associated with errors were
those related to the knowledge and application of knowledge
regarding drug therapy (30%) or patient factors that affect drug
therapy (29.2%), use of calculations, decimal points or unit and rate
expression factors (17.5%), and nomenclature factors (13.4%).
• These data highlight the importance and need for a review of drug
orders by pharmacists to detect and prevent errors before a dose is
obtained and administered to the patient.
20. Cost of these Problems
• Schneider et al. studied the cost of medication-related
problems at a university hospital.
• The charts of patients who had experienced an ADE were
reviewed and the cost of treating the events was tabulated.
Mean cost incurred for the management of ADEs included:
additional laboratory tests ($95), non-invasive procedures
($184), additional medication treatment ($227), invasive
monitoring or procedures ($2,505), increases in length of stay
($2,596), and transfer to an intensive care unit ($2,640).
• It was estimated that the annualised total cost of ADEs was
$1.5 million.
21. • Classen et al. used a matched, case control model to compare
the length of stay, added costs and attributable mortality
associated with ADEs.
• They found that mortality in cases where there was an ADE
was 3.5% compared to 1.05% in matched control cases that
did not.
• Mean length of hospital stay was 7.69 days compared to 4.46
days in control patients.
• The mean cost of hospitalisation was $10,010 in patients who
experienced an ADE compared to $5,355 in case controls who
did not. The extra length of stay attributable to an ADE was
1.74 days, resulting in added costs of $2,013.
• They noted that based on the number of ADEs detected in one
year, the direct hospital costs were $1,099,413.
22. • Bates et al. assessed the additional resource utilisation
associated with ADEs.
• They also used a case control method and compared the cost
of care for patients who experienced an ADE to matched
control cases with the same diagnosis who were on the same
service, but did not experience an ADE.
• They too found an increase in length of stay, with patients
who experienced an ADE being in the hospital for 2.2
additional days.
• The increase in cost associated with an ADE was found to be
$3,244. For preventable ADEs, the increase in length of stay
was longer (4.6 days), and increase in costs was higher
($5,857). They estimate the cost of ADEs and preventable
ADEs in their 700-bed teaching hospital to be $5.6 million
and $2.8 million, respectively
23. Tools to Measure the Performance of the Medication Use
• Process How do we detect medication errors so that safety
improvement goals can be established and the changes made
to improve medication safety be evaluated?
• Errors occur at all steps in the medication use process, and
measurement systems should be designed to evaluate each
step.
• Voluntary medication error reports often focus only on the
drug administration step, making the assumption that there are
no errors at the prescribing step.
• Nurses can be very sensitive that medication error reporting
programmes focus only on what they do when they administer
a medicine, and ignore errors at other steps. In reality, errors
can occur at all steps in the medication use system.
24. • Voluntary, self-reporting systems also often miss medication errors.
Investigators have evaluated other ways to detect medication errors and
ADEs, including chart reviews, computer screening and combinations of
methods that can improve detection.
• Even the best combinations of reporting systems miss many errors and
events. As long as problems with the use of medicines are discovered and
opportunities to improve the medication use system can be identified, it is
a method that has value.
• In spite of the limitation of under- reporting, a voluntary reporting system
can still be a very good method to monitor performance because it is not
time consuming and it engages the staff.
• When healthcare professionals report errors or adverse events, there is
recognition that a mistake has happened and a willingness to improve the
process.
• Observation-based studies are often perceived as ‘catching people doing
things wrong’. It can be difficult to motivate the staff to admit that they
have made an error because of the fear of punishment.
25. • In contrast to voluntary reporting programmes, observation-based
studies are much more quantitative – they detect all errors that occur
during an observation period.
• They do not, however, detect rare events. If really serious events only
happen five or six times a year, these errors are not likely to be
detected from a small statistical sample when activities are observed.
• On the other hand, if the impact of a change made to reduce
medication errors is being studied, a more quantitative measurement
method than voluntary reporting is needed.
• A way to do this is a ‘before and after’ evaluation of the impact of
the change to see if there are fewer medication errors.
• An example of a medication safety goal might be to reduce the
number of intravenous antibiotics administered at the wrong time
(‘late doses’). A voluntary reporting system would be much less
likely to be able to show that improvement resulted from change(s)
compared to an observation-based study of the administration of
intravenous antibiotics.
26. • Criteria-based audits, also known as medication use
evaluation studies, are a third way to find opportunities for
improvement.
• When a problem is suspected, a study using chart review to
collect data can provide a quantitative assessment of the
problem.
• An example is a warfarin medication use evaluation study. It
might be found for example through chart review that many
physicians use the wrong laboratory test to monitor warfarin
therapy (for example, partial thromboplastin time or PTT
instead of prothrombin time (PT) or International Normalised
Ratio (INR)) or that patients with high INR values are treated
too often with fresh frozen plasma instead of safer and less
expensive vitamin K.
• These types of findings would provide excellent examples of
medication safety problems that need to be solved.
27. • Computerised detection programmes have emerged as an effective way
to detect medication errors and ADEs.
• Classen et al. have described a computer ADE monitor that integrates
clinical and drug information in a way that allows physicians and
pharmacists to detect errors more quickly.
• Alerts are built into their rules base that identifies medication errors.
Examples include orders for naloxone, vitamin K, fresh frozen plasma
and potassium exchange resins.
• These orders are very likely to be associated with medication errors.
This method is sometimes called the ‘trigger tool’ because certain
laboratory tests or drug orders ‘trigger’ an alert that an ADE might have
occurred.
• It is also important to note that computer ADE monitoring systems only
detect events that result in abnormal laboratory values or the use of
antidotes.
• Not all ADEs result in this and are therefore not detected by computer
detection systems. These are all good ways to identify errors without
waiting for an incident report, but build on a voluntary reporting system.
28. • Jha et al. compared the rate and type of ADEs identified using a
computerbased monitor to those discovered by chart review and by
asking physicians, pharmacists and nurses for voluntary reports of
ADEs.
• The computer-based monitoring programme identified alerts, which
were situations suggesting that an ADE might be present–for example,
an order for an antidote such as naloxone.
• A trained reviewer examined the chart to determine whether an ADE
had actually occurred.
• The number and types of ADEs discovered with this system was
compared to those discovered by chart review alone and by voluntary
reports by nurses and pharmacists.
• The computer monitoring programme identified 2,620 alerts in eight
months for patients on nine medical and surgical wards in a tertiary
care hospital. Chart review alone found 398 ADEs and there were 23
voluntarily reported.
29. • Of the 617 ADEs detected by at least one method, only 76
were detected by both computer and chart review methods.
• The types of events detected by chart review were different
from those detected by computer monitoring.
• Chart review was more effective in detecting symptomatic
events, such as a change in mental status, nausea and
vomiting, and hypotension.
• The computer monitor was more reliable in identifying events
associated with changes in laboratory monitoring or events
that required treatment with medications.
• Using a combination of these techniques, the incidence of
ADEs was found to be 17.8 per 1000 patient days.
30. What Can Pharmacists Do to Improve Medication Use
Safety?
Traditional methods
• Unit dose drug distribution systems: The first study to demonstrate
that medication errors were a relatively common occurrence was
published in 1962.
• The error rate in this study was found to be 16.2%. Subsequently, these
investigators and others studied the impact of providing medicines that
were packaged, labelled and distributed to the point of care for
administration within 24 hours or less (the unit dose drug distribution
system).
• It was shown that significant improvement could be achieved by a unit
dose system, if fully implemented.
• Studies cited in this review have shown that error rates can be
paradoxicallyhigherwhen compromises such as dispensing multi dose
containers, increasing cart exchange rates and increasing floor stock
were made.
31. • With the increased interest in ADCs, the unit dose drug
distribution system has been challenged as the standard of
practice in hospitals.
• Improperly configured, these dispensing cabinets can be less
safe than unit dose drug distribution systems (see below). Until
the safety of properly configured systems can be demonstrated,
unit dose drug distribution systems remain a fundamentally
safer system than floor stocked medications.
• Intravenous admixture systems: Concerns about the safety
of medicines administered by the intravenous route also began
to be expressed in the 1960s.
• Patterson and Nordstrom reported that 60% of IV solutions
being infused to hospitalised patients contained more than one
medicine – some as many as five drugs. More than half the
medicines were prepared more than an hour before
administration.
32. • A pharmacy-based, intravenous admixture programme was
proposed.
• Thur et al. reported an error rate of 21% in a system where nurses
prepared and administered IV medicines.
• An error rate of 7.24% in a pharmacy-based IV admixture service
has been described. It has also been shown that physicians and
nurses make more errors in dosage calculations compared to
pharmacists.
• The uniformity of mixing when IV solutions are prepared at the
bedside is lower than that when they are prepared in the pharmacy.
Schneider has reviewed the safety of intravenous drug delivery
using the following systems:
• IV push (nurses prepare and administer the dose directly using a
syringe)
• Volume control chambers (a container between an IV solution and
the IV tubing into which medicines can be added for infusion)
33. • Pharmacy prepared minibags/glass bottles (medicines are added to a
small volume of IV fluid under sterile conditions in the pharmacy)
• Spring-loaded syringe-based system (a device that uses a spring to put
pressure on the plunger of a syringe to facilitate delivery of a dose)
• Point-of-care activated system (ADD- VantageR, Minibag PlusR) (a
plastic bag containing IV fluid and a special port for directly attaching a
vial of medicine for mixing at the bedside)
• Outsourced piggyback systems (a central pharmacy prepares IV
containers containing medicines and delivers these to the hospital for
use)
• Manufacturer’s container (a glass vial that allows for reconstitution of
the dose and direct administration to the patient from the vial using an
IV set)
• Premixed and frozen minibags (pre- made IV solutions containing the
medicines, some of which are frozen because of limited stability)
34. • Using a decision analysis model derived from the consensus
development method used by the US National Institutes of Health,
these systems were compared by an independent, interdisciplinary
panel of experts.
• Their recommendations were based on comparing these systems using
four criteria: safety, cost, simplicity and training. Three systems were
ranked as being safer – manufacturer prepared (premixed and frozen
minibags), point-of-care activated and pharmacy-based IV admixture
systems.
• Systems ranked less safe included IV push, syringe pumps and
volume control chambers. It was noted that clinical circumstances
may require a less safe system (for example, during a medical
emergency).
• In those cases, increased vigilance is needed to assure safety. The
results of a summit on preventing patient harm and death from IV
medication errors was recently published.
35. • It lists priority IV medication safety practices along with barriers
to implementation and actions to overcome these barriers.
• Some examples of priority practices according to steps in the
medication use system include:
• Formulary management and medication use policy
• Implement standardised infusion concentrations based on local
and national practices that are appropriate for most practice
settings
• Establish comprehensive IV medication administration policies
with standardised administration times, upper and lower dosage
limits, and administration rates
• Prescribing and ordering
• Use standardised orders (paper or electronic) for IV medicines
• Prescribe standardized infusion diluents, concentrations and units
(preferably commercially available products)
36. • Storage
• Differentiate look-alike medicines, including separate storage
locations Prohibit or impose tight security precautions on
stocking concentrated injectable products and more than one
concentration of an IV medicine on patient care units
• Preparation and dispensing
• Dispense IV medicines in a ready-to- administer form that
does not require manipulation before administration to the
patient
• Standardise the process for compounding sterile preparations,
with procedures to minimise unnecessary interruptions and
distractions, trace and verify the accuracy of compounding,
and provide for pharmacist checking of accuracy
• Administering
37. • Require independent double-checks and documentation of
administration of selected high-alert medicines, including IV
pump settings Standardise IV medication administration with
provisions to minimise unnecessary interruptions, focus on
one patient at a time, refer to an accurate medication
administration record, engage the patient or family member in
the medication administration process, and use two patient
identifiers before administering the medicine
• Monitoring medication use
• Have antidotes, supportive medicines, dosing and
administration information and resuscitation equipment
immediately available in patient care areas
• Establish standard operating procedures for communication at
the time of patient transition from one care setting to another
to provide for continuity of care and medication reconciliation
38. Clinical Pharmacy Programmes
• The positive impact of pharmacist participation on medical
rounds in an intensive care unit on the rate of preventable
ADEs caused by ordering errors has been reported.
• In this study, a pharmacist made rounds with the ICU team
and remained in the ICU for consultation in the morning and
on call throughout the day.
• The rate of prescribing errors decreased by 66% from 10.4 per
1000 patient days before the intervention to 3.5 per 1000
patient days after the intervention.
• In a control unit, the incidence of ADEs did not change. In
eight months, 366 recommendations were made by the
pharmacist, of which 362 (99%) were accepted by the
prescribers.
39. • There is also evidence of improved patient safety by clinical
pharmacists practicing in the outpatient setting.
• Lee and Schommer documented a fivefold decrease in
bleeding complications and re-admission to the hospital
associated with anti-coagulation management, comparing a
pharmacist- run anti-coagulation management service to
regular medical care.
• Pharmacists have also been able to reduce the number of
errors of omission (improve adherence to medication
treatment regimens) to improve the outcomes of patients
taking medications to lower cholesterol and treat diabetes in
the outpatient setting.
40. Application of Technology
• The emergence of new technology offers great potential to improve both
the efficiency and the accuracy of care, resulting in improved patient
safety.
• Technology and automation also have the potential to worsen patient
safety or simply change the type of patient safety problems if not
properly used.
• Computer prescription order entry (CPOE) system: This is a computer
application that accepts the prescriber’s orders for diagnostic and
treatment services electronically rather than recording them in writing on
an order sheet or prescription pad.
• This includes orders for medications. The computer can compare the
orders against standards for dosing, check for allergies or interactions
with other medications and warn the prescriber about potential problems.
Thus, CPOE systems address two of the most common systems failures
causing errors: lack of information about the medicine and lack of
information about the patient.
41. • CPOE has been widely recommended as a way to improve
patient safety. A medication safety expert panel assembled by
ASHP recommended this as the top-priority action to prevent
ADEs in hospitals.
• There are several advantages of CPOE that have the potential to
improve medication use safety. Handwriting problems are
solved, resulting in fewer transcription errors.
• The prescription can be quickly transferred to providers,
reducing delays in dispensing and initiating therapy.
• Decision support logic and integration with other relevant
clinical information can be built into a computer order entry
system to assist physicians in avoiding errors.
42. • The impact of a computer order entry system on antibiotic
therapy has been documented by Evans et al.
• They studied the prescribing of antibiotics in an intensive care
unit where orders were entered into a computer program that was
linked to clinical information and provided the prescriber with
recommendations and warnings about drug therapy.
• Significant reduction was observed in antibiotic susceptibility
mismatches before and after the computer program was
implemented (12 vs. 206).
• Fewer antibiotics were prescribed for patients with known
allergies to those drugs (35 vs. 146).
• The incidence of overdoses and mean number of days of excess
treatment were lower (87 vs. 405 and 2.7 vs. 5.9), as was the
incidence of ADEs (4 vs. 28). Most importantly, a safer system
reduced the total hospital cost to the patient ($26,315 vs.
$44,846).
43. • Bates et al. reported the effect of computer order entry and team
intervention on the prevention of serious medication errors.
• They found that providing a computerised order entry system along with a
team-based intervention programme that increased the availability and role
of the pharmacist reduced serious medication errors by 55%, from 10.7%
per 1000 patient days to 4.86 events per 1000 patient days.
• If improperly configured or implemented, CPOE systems may facilitate
the risk of medication errors. Koppel et al. reported about 22 types of
medication error risks resulting from a CPOE system, including:
• Fragmented CPOE displays that prevent a coherent display of patients’
medications
• Pharmacy inventory displays mistaken for dosage guidelines
• Ignored antibiotic renewal notices placed on paper charts rather than in
the CPOE system
• Separate functions that facilitate double-dosing and incompatible orders
• Inflexible ordering formats generating wrong orders
44. • CPOE, like all technologies, is a tool, not a solution to
medication errors, and must be designed and implemented
carefully to realize benefits.
• The use of CPOE systems in US hospitals has grown slowly but
steadily. In 2007, 17.8% of US hospitals had a CPOE system.
• The rate of adoption of CPOE differed significantly by type and
size of facility.
• Clinical decision support systems (CDSSs) are important
components of CPOE, directing prescribers toward evidence-
based drug therapy.
• Of those hospitals with CPOE, 67.2% had CDSSs in use to
improve prescribing. Nearly one-third of hospitals with CPOE
systems did not have a CDSS.
45. • In these facilities, clinicians entered orders into electronic systems that did not
have rules that integrated order information, patient information and clinical
practice guidelines into computer system logic to provide feedback to
prescribers.
• Therefore, it was estimated that 12% of US hospitals at the end of 2007 had
CPOE with a CDSS.
• The use of computer order entry systems in the outpatient setting has been
limited by the lack of a network of providers and an electronic infrastructure
connecting them.
• Workflow does not favour having prescribers enter prescriptions in the office
setting.
• The increase in networking providers and the rapid growth of wireless
communication will very likely fuel the development of computer order entry
in the outpatient setting.
• Despite the seeming consensus that this is an important change concept, rapid
implementation has been, and will continue to be, limited by expense, design
of decision support systems and the difficulty in changing the habits of
prescribers.
46. • Bar code, bedside care systems:The second recommendation
from the medication safety expert panel assembled by ASHP
to recommend toppriority actions for preventing ADEs in
hospitals was evaluating the use of machine readable coding
(for example, bar coding) in their medication use processes.
• In 2008, 24% of hospitals used some form of machine
readable coding to verify doses before dispensing, and 21.5%
of US hospitals had barcode medication administration
systems (BCMA) at the bedside in place.
• Bar code systems are particularly suited for efficient and
accurate checking functions.
• It has been suggested that the checking and documentation
functions that occur when medications are dispensed and
administered could be done more efficiently and accurately if
aided by bar code scanning.
47. • This application would include having bar codes on the package of
each medication dispensed and administered, on a patient identifier
(such as a wristband), and on the person dispensing and
administering the dose (such as a name badge).
• A BCMA can be linked to clinical information and the medication
profile, so that when the dose is dispensed and administered to a
patient, an automatic check could be made to ensure that the drug
was prescribed for the correct patient, the dose, time and route of
administration is correct, and that the patient does not have an
allergy to the medication being dispensed and administered.
• The nurse could even be reminded to administer a dose with such a
system. In addition to improving safety through these series of
automatic doublechecks, the documentation of the dose dispensed
and administered would be improved. Furthermore, performance
measurement systems such as late doses and doses omitted could
automatically be tracked, reducing the dependence on voluntary
reporting or observation-based studies.
48. • Poon et al. reported that a bar code- assisted dispensing
system decreased dispensing errors by 86% and potential
ADEs by 97%.
• Paoletti et al. reported a 54% reduction in medication
administration errors after implementing a new medication
administration system that included BCMA.
• Barriers to implementation of the bar code bedside care
system include cost, the need to use cumbersome equipment,
lack of universally bar-coded medication packages, lack of
standardisation of bar code languages, and problems linking
bar code systems to other hospital computer databases and
programs.
49. • Integrated clinical information systems: Information systems
within healthcare are often configured as standalone systems that meet
the needs of individual departments, but can be difficult to integrate.
• The healthcare industry has under-capitalised information systems in
comparison to other industries. The result is fragmented information
and difficulty obtaining the complete clinical information needed to
care for patients.
• Physicians often do not have access to medication profiles.
Pharmacists often do not have access to diagnosis, weight, organ
system function or allergy history. As a result, medication-related
problems occur.
• Advances in technology and increased consolidation and integration
among healthcare providers are resulting in rapid integration of clinical
information systems.
• Two examples of advances in technology are the Internet and smart
cards
50. • Each of these technologies is enabling the storage and transfer
of large quantities of clinical information efficiently among
caregivers.
• Concerns about confidentiality of information have been
raised as efforts to transmit clinical information have
increased.
• It is imperative that clinical information among caregivers
who do not practice in contiguous sites and see patients at
different times be integrated.
• Only with access to complete information about why the
patient is being treated, previous experiences with
medications, and conditions, medications and foods that may
affect the choice or responses to pharmacotherapy, can
medication safety be improved.
51. Implications for Pharmacists in India
• India is a rapidly developing country but may still not have
the resources that exist in countries that have created and
evaluated safe medication use systems.
• It is unrealistic to expect the rapid adoption of expensive
technologies that can improve patient safety, such as CPOE
and bar code systems.
• It is also a country with more variation in how healthcare is
provided, including the use of homeopathic and ayurvedic
medicines in addition to the allopathic medications used more
commonly in the West.
• This variation might result in even more problems with
medication errors resulting from interactions among these
different medications.
52. • While there are more pharmacists in India than most other
countries, most do not practice in settings where they can work
closely with prescribers or nurses to discuss medication-
related problems and develop safer medication use systems.
• Where should pharmacists in India begin? Perhaps some
lessons can be learned from the experience of other countries.
Some suggestions include:
• Acknowledge that medication errors and ADEs occur and are
a problem in India. Part of this realisation might include
studying the problem of medication use safety and developing
methods to detect errors and ADEs in hospitals and clinics.
• Declare that improving medication use safety is a serious and
dedicated aim for pharmacists in India. This might be
accomplished by adding this topic to coursework in pharmacy
colleges and as a focus for discussion at meetings of the
pharmacy associations in India.
53. • Use your experience to identify medication errors that frequently
cause patient harm and focus attention on finding ways to improve
the system so that those errors are less likely to happen again.
Attention should be directed to errors that are most common, most
likely to cause harm and least likely to be detected before harm
occurs. An example of such an error is having toxic medications
(like concentrated solutions of potassium chloride) available as floor
stock in a hospital. An example of a medication that can result in
harm if errors occur in outpatients is the anti-coagulant warfarin.
• Critically examine each step of the medication use process in your
hospital or pharmacy and identify areas where the risk of
medication errors can be minimised.For example, transcription of
drug orders is common in many Indian hospitals and is a well-
recognised cause of medication errors. Some other potential causes
of medication errors in India are listed in Table 28.1.
• Begin by making the improvement of medication use safety an
individual pharmacist’s duty, day by day and patient by patient.