Security Best Practices for Mobile Development @ Dreamforce 2013
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This document discusses security best practices for mobile development. It covers fundamental security principles like vulnerability, threat and mitigation. It details security measures in iOS like application sandboxing, permissions and encryption. It also discusses Android security concepts like application components and permissions. The document recommends practices like static analysis, encryption, jailbreak detection and the use of the Salesforce mobile SDK to help secure mobile apps and data.
Security Best Practices for Mobile Development @ Dreamforce 2013
- 1. Security Best Practices for Mobile Development Tom Gersic, Salesforce.com Director, Mobile Services Delivery @tomgersic
- 2. Safe harbor Safe harbor statement under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995: This presentation may contain forward-looking statements that involve risks, uncertainties, and assumptions. If any such uncertainties materialize or if any of the assumptions proves incorrect, the results of salesforce.com, inc. could differ materially from the results expressed or implied by the forward-looking statements we make. All statements other than statements of historical fact could be deemed forward-looking, including any projections of product or service availability, subscriber growth, earnings, revenues, or other financial items and any statements regarding strategies or plans of management for future operations, statements of belief, any statements concerning new, planned, or upgraded services or technology developments and customer contracts or use of our services. The risks and uncertainties referred to above include – but are not limited to – risks associated with developing and delivering new functionality for our service, new products and services, our new business model, our past operating losses, possible fluctuations in our operating results and rate of growth, interruptions or delays in our Web hosting, breach of our security measures, the outcome of any litigation, risks associated with completed and any possible mergers and acquisitions, the immature market in which we operate, our relatively limited operating history, our ability to expand, retain, and motivate our employees and manage our growth, new releases of our service and successful customer deployment, our limited history reselling non-salesforce.com products, and utilization and selling to larger enterprise customers. Further information on potential factors that could affect the financial results of salesforce.com, inc. is included in our annual report on Form 10-K for the most recent fiscal year and in our quarterly report on Form 10-Q for the most recent fiscal quarter. These documents and others containing important disclosures are available on the SEC Filings section of the Investor Information section of our Web site. Any unreleased services or features referenced in this or other presentations, press releases or public statements are not currently available and may not be delivered on time or at all. Customers who purchase our services should make the purchase decisions based upon features that are currently available. Salesforce.com, inc. assumes no obligation and does not intend to update these forward-looking statements.
- 3. Tom Gersic Director, Mobile Services Delivery @tomgersic
- 4. Agenda • Fundamental Principles • What iOS and Android Share • iOS Specific Characteristics • Android Specific Characteristics • Salesforce Mobile Offerings
- 5. Who thinks the data on their phone is secure?
- 6. Everything on my iPhone is encrypted because I use a PIN code. Is this a true Statement?
- 7. Anybody here use Facebook?
- 8. Improved in iOS7, though
- 9. What about Salesforce 1?
- 12. Vulnerability
- 13. Threat
- 14. Consequence
- 15. Mitigation
- 16. Separation of Concerns – Principle of Least Privilege
- 17. Security Stack
- 19. Libtiff Image Exploit / Jailbreak • iPhone 1 – patched in 1.1.2 • Tiff buffer overflow • Nothing to prevent executing code on the heap • Gained root access from viewing an image on the web
- 20. ASLR (PIE) and DEP
- 21. iOS 7 Lock Screen Bypass
- 23. “Bluebox uncovers Android Master Key -- 2013”
- 24. Concatenated SMS Exploit – Charlie Miller
- 25. Concatenated SMS Exploit • Takes 519 SMS messages – all but 1 is invisible • Send message -1 of X to underflow the array buffer • Can’t be stopped by the user • Used to write an entire binary executable to the heap, and run it, taking over the phone.
- 26. NFC Exploit
- 27. But most of the time…
- 28. Data Security – Hardware Encryption Requires PIN/Passcode on both iOS and Android On iOS, apps opt-in Supported on iPhone 3GS w/ iOS v4+ (AES 256 bit) Android Honeycomb+ (AES 128 bit) • Some manufacturers increase to AES 256 bit (Samsung SAFE) SD Card encryption on Android is manufacturer specific.
- 29. App Security
- 33. iOS Sandbox • All apps (Apple’s and App Store) run as “mobile” user. • Sandboxing is bolted on -- handled via XNU Sandbox “Seatbelt” kernel extension. • Applications run in separate subdirectories of /private/var/mobile/Applications • Any app in this directory is loaded with “container” (sandboxed) profile.
- 34. Android Sandbox • Uses underlying Linux security model • Every app runs as a separate user • Apps signed by the same developer can run as the same user, if desired (not the default, though) • Every app runs in its own instance of the Android Runtime (Dalvik Virtual Machine) • Like iOS, every app has its own directory structure • SD Card, though, is generally public – accessible to all apps and unencrypted unless manufacturer has added encryption (Samsung SAFE)
- 37. Background Processes / App Interaction
- 38. Types of Android Components Activities Intent Service Content Provider Broadcast Receiver
- 39. Public / Private Components
- 40. But what about custom keyboards?
- 43. Permissions
- 44. Mitigation
- 46. Application Encryption • Encrypt your data yourself using PIN / Passcode • CoreData/SQLCipher NSIncrementalStore Good Dynamics • FMDB/SQLCipher Salesforce Smartstore
- 47. Jailbreak Detection • Sandbox integrity check: fork() should fail • Check for jailbreak files: /Applications/Cydia.app /Library/MobileSubstrate/MobileSubstrate.dylib /var/cache/apt /bin/sh /bin/bash
- 49. Salesforce.com Mobile SDK Customer Data
- 50. SmartStore Stack
- 51. Enable ASLR in your app • ASLR: Address Space Layout Randomization
- 52. Stack Canaries • AKA Stack Smashing Protection • Protect against buffer overflows • Places random known value (canary) before local variables • Use Apple LLVM – won’t work with LLVM GCC
- 53. Hide Data from App Snapshot Images
- 54. Who STILL thinks the data on their phone is secure?
- 55. Tom Gersic Director, Mobile Services Delivery @tomgersic
- 56. @tomgersic
Editor's Notes
- #12: No system is perfectly secure Security is all about managing risk
- #13: Something that allows an attack to take place. To use credit cards, we frequently have to let them out of our sight
- #14: Someone we give our credit card to could skim it
- #16: Reduces the severity of one (or more) of the three Laws and credit card company policies limit our liability to $50 (by law) or frequently $0 (by policy) The vulnerability and threat still exist, but the consequence is nullified (for the consumer, anyway)
- #17: Separation of Concerns: Apps, modules, etc. are separated – each module has a specific function Principle of Least Privilege – Each of these modules has only the permissions necessary to do its legitimate function
- #18: CIA applies to: Application Security – Up to the developer Operating System Security – Sandboxing, permissions Device Security – PIN, Hardware Encryption Infrastructure Security – Codesigning, app store reviews, etc.
- #20: Would not be possible today because of DEP ASLR: Address Space Layout Randomization DEP: Data Execution Protection Ref: http://books.google.com/books?id=1kDcjKcz9GwC&pg=PT10&lpg=PT10&dq=libtiff+iphone+dep&source=bl&ots=9KcFvBCd0n&sig=qjQdCSJWyWOnzsKmeVuw1psrCmU&hl=en&sa=X&ei=Yn8TUOiHLaeviQfvkICoBw&ved=0CFwQ6AEwAQ#v=onepage&q=libtiff%20iphone%20dep&f=false Ref: http://365.rsaconference.com/servlet/JiveServlet/previewBody/3488-102-1-4589/MBS-402.pdf Ref: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Data_Execution_Prevention Ref: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Address_space_layout_randomization
- #21: iOS 4.3+, Android ICS (broken), Jelly Bean (fixed) ASLR: Address Space Layout Randomization DEP: Data Execution Protection
- #22: http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_detailpage&v=tTewm0V_5ts#t=52
- #23: http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_detailpage&v=HM8b8d8kSNQ#t=46
- #24: META-INF checksums – keep would-be hackers from modifying files in the APK after it’s been signed Files of the same name Checks first, installs last http://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2013/07/10/anatomy-of-a-security-hole-googles-android-master-key-debacle-explained/ http://bluebox.com/corporate-blog/bluebox-uncovers-android-master-key/ http://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2013/08/09/android-master-key-vulnerability-more-malware-found-exploiting-code-verification-bypass/
- #25: 2009 SMS is an excellent attack vector – no way to turn it off, no way to firewall it. It’s used to make the phone ring in addition to text messages, so it’s a wide open port on all phones Attack exploited the fact that the start of a concatenated SMS message tells the phone how many individual 140 byte messages to expect – no messages are displayed until all are received Ref: http://www.docstoc.com/docs/52434984/iPhone-SMS-Fuzzing-and-Exploitation Ref: http://www.youtube.com/watch?gl=US&hl=en&client=mv-google&v=hUr4ilw0AeI&nomobile=1 Ref: https://community.rapid7.com/community/metasploit/blog/2007/10/11/cracking-the-iphone-part-1 Ref: https://community.rapid7.com/community/metasploit/blog/2007/10/14/cracking-the-iphone-part-2 Ref: https://community.rapid7.com/community/metasploit/blog/2007/10/16/cracking-the-iphone-part-21 Ref: https://community.rapid7.com/community/metasploit/blog/2007/10/21/cracking-the-iphone-part-3
- #27: Another Charlie Miller exploit – presented at Black Hat, July 25 2012 NFC tag can launch any URL in the browser – makes use of known WebKit exploit to take over the phone. Doesn’t require user to give permission to launch the URL Biggest threat is someone placing a rogue NFC tag on/near a legitimate NFC reader http://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2012/07/25/darpa-funded-researcher-can-take-over-android-and-nokia-phones-by-merely-waving-another-device-near-them/
- #28: But my phone’s encrypted!
- #29: 128 bit / 256 bit really only makes a difference if password is greater than 16 characters (16*8=128) With a PIN/Passcode, Email, Attachments, and some other system files are encrypted while device is locked Any other app is storing the keys with the lock unless app specifies NSFileProtectionComplete Sources: http://source.android.com/tech/encryption/android_crypto_implementation.html http://www.wilderssecurity.com/showthread.php?t=320996 http://www.ubergizmo.com/2012/06/samsungs-safe-initiative-will-make-the-galaxy-s3-enterprise-friendly/
- #32: on official App Store / Marketplace, all apps are digitally signed by the developer – ties malware back to an individual or company -- With iOS, Apple is the Certificate Authority. With Android, self-signed certificates are acceptable.
- #33: applications are limited in what they can access with regards to other applications or system resources limits damage that can be done by exploiting any one app
- #36: What’s new in iOS 7: https://developer.apple.com/library/ios/releasenotes/General/WhatsNewIniOS/Articles/iOS7.html App States and Multitasking: https://developer.apple.com/library/ios/documentation/iPhone/Conceptual/iPhoneOSProgrammingGuide/ManagingYourApplicationsFlow/ManagingYourApplicationsFlow.html#//apple_ref/doc/uid/TP40007072-CH4
- #38: One of the biggest security concerns people have with Android is that they know apps can run in the background, and they can interact with other apps
- #39: Activities Service Content Provider Broadcast Receiver Intent
- #42: “Except passwords”?
- #44: Android apps need to specify which system resources they need access to Users accept these when they install the app
- #48: Some things you can do, but none are 100% reliable.