Removing Uncertainty in your Decision Making

Business901 Podcast Transcription
Implementing Lean Marketing Systems

Uncertainty in your Decision Making
Guest was Eli Schrangenheim noted
Theory of Constraints Author and Expert

Related Podcast:
Removing Uncertainty in your Decision Making

Copyright Business901


Eli Schrangenheim has been
part of the Theory of
Constraints movement
practically from the
beginning. He started
working with Dr. Goldratt as
a programmer to program a
game for adults that would
teach them how to think over
25 years ago.

In the past 25 years, Eli
Schragenheim has taught, spoken at conferences, and consulted
in more than 15 countries, including the United States, Canada,
India, China, and Japan. He has also developed software
simulation tools especially designed to experience the thinking of
TOC, and consultant with several application software companies
to develop the right TOC functionality in their own packages. Mr.
Schragenheim was a partner in the A. Y. Goldratt Institute and is
now a Director of Goldratt schools.

He is the author of Management Dilemmas: The Theory of
Constraints Approach to Problem Identification and Solutions. He
recently collaborated with William Detmer and Wayne Patterson
on the book Supply Chain Management at Warp Speed:
Integrating the System from End to End. The new book contains
much of the new development of TOC and operations.

You can contact Eli Schrangenheim through his e-mail @
elyakim@netvision.net.il


Joe Dager: Thanks, everyone for joining us. This is Joe Dager,
host to the Business901 podcast. Participating the in the program
today is Eli Schragenheim and Eli is one of the earliest adaptors
of the Theory of Constraints. Dr. Goldratt, Bill Dettmer and Eli are
the three people that I most remember from 20 years ago. Eli,
you have been part of this for a long time?
Eli Schragenheim: Oh, yes! I have joined the Goldratts very
early on '85.
Joe: You have always specialized in the Drum-Buffer-Rope and
wrote some of the original work that expanded on Dr. Goldratt's
DBR theory with "Manufacturing At Warp Speed". You had a new
book last year come out, on "Supply Chain Fulfillment at Warp
Speed". Has those books differed, I mean Theory Constraints has
really expanded; it's changed over the years a little bit, hasn't it?
Eli: Oh yes, indeed. And I would like also to change a little bit
this kind of image that I have because while I had something to
do of course with the production, planning and control and supply
chain et cetera. My interest in TOC definitely surrounds the whole
thing. What intrigues me in this kind of approach, rethinking
management in total. This is what is still very special for me in
the whole thing. Actually my very first book, I called it
"Management Dilemmas", it did not really focus on manufacturing
at all. It was more like identifying problems and devising
solutions to them. I started working with Dr. Goldratt because I
applied for the job of a programmer to program a game for adults
that will teach them how to think. I created some simulations that
are kind of business games around production mainly but did also
worked on projects and distribution. This was my contribution as
a programmer and then also as an educator because who will
think on how to use them in class to deliver ideas. So this again,
what hook me into it is how do we convince people about things
and what kind of experience, even virtual experience, can we give
them that we will convince them about which way to go.

Joe: Most of us think about TOC from the standpoint of a
bottleneck and constraint type of thought. We dive into it a little
deeper and we realize that there is a whole other area of focusing
and thinking processes. That has been really one of the best
things that has grown out of TOC, is it not?
Eli: When TOC sort of started around '85, is the kind of
development from the older O-P-T or OPT software, there were
already some ingredients of the thinking processes. But then also
came some kind of philosophy which I would say is the Five
Focusing Steps and it took me many years to look for what is the
synergy between the two. Eli Goldratt went on to develop the
thinking processes, I believe around 1991 and started to
redevelop them again and pushed them quite a lot. At the time
he pushed aside the Five Focusing Steps which, at the time, I saw
as a mistake. There will be always some kind of synergy between
them. Then he came back a little bit later to it. Throughout the
whole time there was development. Throughout the two chapters
that I wrote for the TOC handbook I really like to put a finger on
the specific development in the area of production planning. So it
went side-by-side with the thinking processes with other
techniques and right now in the last years "Strategy and Tactic
Tree", eventually everything will come to something that is very
united. I'm not sure we already found how to unite everything but
they need to be united. The thinking processes is a very
important thing but not on its own, at least this is my thinking.
Joe: Not on its own. You mean not using it outside of what
context?

Eli: Well, you can use it of course. Look, on paper I can claim
almost everything. So I can claim that every person is a clever
person. This is a claim on paper. It could look very good.
Eventually when you are faced with this kind of claim you need to
translate it into a reality. So I assume at first you will get
something to substantiate it if you look on yourself and I look on

your picture but then maybe you will remember some other
people and there might be some. And then you ask yourself, if
this is so, what is the cause? In a way we need to look into reality
in more than one way. Logic is extremely important. However,
what I really like in TOC is that intuition has its own importance.
Both are not totally secure which means there are question marks
both on the logic, if I can put something very logical but it could
be for whatever reason, it does not apply in reality. So we need
to ask ourselves why, there is some kind of intuition about that it
is a little bit vague but still quite important.
With all of this we need to know how to focus and how to make
decisions and because of this I think we need more than one
thing in order to be really good in what we are doing. So it is
great to do thinking processes analogies but you bring into the
table something else, some generalization from other things that
you have seen elsewhere. So how do we match up those? How do
we match the term constraint with a Thinking Process and how do
you take the Thinking Process and look into the future and to
strategy. How do you handle uncertainty for instance? By the way
something is little bit missing in the thinking processes is how do
you handle something a cause that is not a full cause, it is let us
say 80% cause.
Joe: So are you saying how do you handle uncertainy with the
thinking processes?
Eli: You don't have a very, very good way how to handle it. You
can say sometimes. Once you say sometimes, you already said
well, probably it is not always. You might say that there is
insufficiency. This part of the basic terminology in the thinking
process is that there is insufficiency. If most of what they are
claiming is some kind of insufficiency because it depends on some
things that I don't know and even not sure whether it exists in
this reality yes or no. This is the impact of uncertainty. It is not a
very practical way to handle uncertainty. Then you need to look a

little bit really into DBR and CCPM and then you can see yes. But
somehow TOC did introduce some structured ways to handle
some sort of uncertainty. The whole question about how to
handle uncertainty is for me quite a big challenge to come up
with something even better than what we have now. I think TOC
had contributed quite a lot to it. But still it is a big, a very big
topic that we need much better to understand.

Joe: I mean business is really based on a lot of uncertainties,
especially when we think about forecasting. By the way, I loved
your section on forecasting because forecasting was never meant
to be a number but that's how we think of it.
Eli: Yes, which is what troubles me. The vast majority of the
managers do not really understand the nature of uncertainty. So
they do not understand this tool that some mathematician and
statistician came up with. They were thinking that people
understand the basic assumptions behind it.
Joe: Can you explain for someone that hasn't read that chapter
about uncertainty and applying uncertainty to a forecast?
Eli: Forecasting tries to give me some information. Let us say
partial information about the huge question about what will
happen tomorrow. How much will I sell tomorrow? How much
work will I be able to finish tomorrow or whatever? Which means
we are not prophets, we do not know what will happen tomorrow,
period. We don't know that we do not know anything, anything
might happen and does it have the same weight? If my way from
my home to the airport, something that they do pretty often, let
us say on average takes two minutes. OK but they need to make
a decision about when I go out of home to go to the airport to
take a flight. Could it be 10 hours? Well, let me tell you that this
would be not just surprise; this would be up in the news.
Which means it is probably not impossible but quite improbable.
This gives us some kind of a clue. I can say something about how

long will it take the way to the airport like. I might say how much
we sell next week. Well I cannot tell you something precise but I
can tell you something that is more than nothing. And this is the
key.
In order to know what the partial information is we need at least,
and this is the most minimal mathematical requirement to do.
Anything about it we need at least two things. We need
something, call it an average, a central, something in the middle.
Give me something that gives me an indication how much far
away from this middle it could happen. And this eventually is
coming from forecasting.
In forecasting in order to deliver this very partial information
there is another assumption that says we basically believe that
tomorrow will not be much different than today and the day
before it. So we look into the past in order to predict the future.
We cannot really predict the future. We can predict some
reasonable range of the future, and this is what we need to make
any decision. This is hard to forecasting. Forecasting is an
unbelievably to my mind important tool for managers, but again
they need to understand what does it mean and what does it
contain and how wrong could it be.
I don't know how wrong because they don't like to say how wrong
about forecast, which never intended to give you anything that
precise. So what do you mean by wrong. But it could tell you
whether you can have a narrow, a range or sorry you have quite
a wide range, so make up your mind what you are going to do
with it.
So I think it is very valuable information that is really required for
daily decision making and I am sorry to say that a vast majority
of the people do not understand it.


Joe: That's the logical side of it. The intuition as a business
manager, how does he go about justifying his intuition to himself?

Eli: Well intuition probably is the word to the uncertainty, is also
a word to what I like to call the reasonable range. Because of this
intuition many times leads you to the right thing. But the intuition
as such has a huge disadvantage. Intuition is lost when there is a
real change, when tomorrow is definitely not the same as today.
So if I take a flight, let us say that I go to St. Petersburg in
Russia. Well, it looks like that the transport, the language, the
behavior of people are all different. Because of this suddenly I
realize that I lost my intuition.
There is another huge disadvantage of intuition which is, it is not
a good communication line. Goldratt likes to make a point of this.
Which means as long as I feel something I cannot deliver to
others this kind of feeling. Which means that while people are
aware of uncertainty, each one of them is taking their own
decision based on intuition? There is no communication, the
communication is pretty much lost and there is huge amount of
misunderstanding around the people who are supposed to do
something with a decision around forecasting or something of
that sort.
Joe: One of the points that you have made before is making
decisions based under severe uncertainty. The first thing that
popped out of me with that line was the fact that under stress we
follow our intuition, don't we?
Eli: Probably yes and in a way we should but I think we also
need to put our logic as a control. Normally I would guess that we
act based on intuition or even emotion but then luckily we have
also some logic that is kind of guards to prevent us from doing
major mistakes. But uncertainty is difficult, because it is difficult
even on the intuitive side, certainly on the emotional side to deal
with some things that you don't know. Because you don't know


what will happen and from where and so you need some kind of
guidelines from logic to guide you eventually, your emotion led
decisions.
Joe: If you are applying logic trees and the TOC thinking tools,
you would make a better decision based on that. One of my
considerations is the time that you invest in developing one; can
you really do that when you are uncertain about things? Don't
you get lost in the process a little bit?
Eli: Well, it depends a little bit about guidance. In articles that I
wrote, I came out with a kind of definition of what I call the
reasonable range. There is a statistical tool that is sort of similar
to it; somehow the name escapes me right now. But for me,
reasonable range is based on intuition which means it is the worst
and the best possible results. When you need to make your
decision, what I think you should do, you look on the two
extremes. They are not full extremes as unreasonable. But within
the reasonable that is extremes for pessimistic and optimistic,
and you try to go out of this. If this happens, what will be the
damage, what can I do about it?
So eventually you have a kind of two alternative lines of action
and then you are saying based on what I went through, what is
the least damaging way. This is what you will do. So you buffer
yourself from the other side that is much more damaging.
Joe: So when you are making a decision, under let's say
uncertainty, you are going to take more the path of minimizing
risk.
Eli: Minimizing damage may be you meant the same, but risk
some people might find it a little bit different. What I am saying
really is minimizing damage. A situation with uncertainty is that it
causes damage, and you like to minimize the damage. I see we
need to do it. By the way when I wrote to you I didn't really
mean severe uncertainty because severe uncertainty really goes

to something like I don't know, you need an operation, would you
go or not go, and something of that sort. This a little bit that
frightens me because, usually this is very, very high risk but with
very, very small chance.
This is exactly where from my own point of view I raise my hands
I don't know how to decide, each one will have to decide for
himself. For me the problem is, let me call it in a kind of a funny
name, common unexpected uncertainty. Which is a vast majority
of uncertainties that we are dealing with every day?
Organizations are dealing with, how many sales per day or per
week? How many people have showed up to work? How many
complaints were received?
All those kind of fluctuating things are much easier to handle than
the really, really, really big decisions that are really life and death
kind of decisions. Funny enough, the whole thing about dealing
with common unexpected uncertainty is not very well established.
So very lately books by Nassim Taleb 'The Black Swan' and things
like these refer a little bit to it. Taleb came from Wall Street and
his daily uncertainty is definitely different than mine or the reality
of most of the managers. But he did point out to this kind of a
misunderstanding of the nature of uncertainty I think he did it
very well.
Joe: We think of uncertainty as not a day-to-day thing but what
you are saying the important parts of managing uncertainty is the
day to day?
Eli: This is where TOC have introduced the concept of a buffer.
The buffer is really a protector on one side of the reasonable
range, against the damage of the other side, by you willing to pay
the price of the buffer or understand that you should pay the
price of that buffer in order to protect yourself from the other
side. But it does something more, because you put the buffer in a
very visible format. It is part of your planning is that there is a


buffer. So you recognize the existence of uncertainty in a very
clear way. Look Joe, look on something like a budget. How much
of the budget is really net safety reserve? In some of the good
budgeting scenes they put maybe 5% reserves.
I think this is a joke. What do you want to say that you know
exactly how much money is required to do all these operations
that a certain organization or a department needs to do in a full
year? And this is 5%. So clearly how much things will really cost.
It looks to me total misunderstanding of the nature of a planning
in a world of reality of some certainty. Of the daily and common
and expected uncertainty, and I really do not mean here huge
disasters but normal disasters.
Joe: Buffers don't apply just to inventory, it applies to life. A
simple example in my mind is when you are at a grocery store
with four or five check-out lanes. Two or three of them are empty
and when they see people backing up in one of the check-out
lanes a manager comes from behind a counter and opens another
lane up. His buffer was...when needed, he had the resource to
draw upon to fulfill the needs of his customers.
Eli: Absolutely. This is very good example.
Joe: And the budget is...
Eli: But I have seen it in organizations in which this could apply
something much more doable in the budget. Instead of fixing it
for a whole year, and in order that to prepare a budget for a
whole year you need to start to do it about half a year, even
before that. Which really makes a joke out of the whole
budgeting thing? Really, I have seen an organization not too
large. And in July-August is totally dedicated on all middle-level
management to prepare for next year’s budget. I mean, to guzzle
all the numbers, as you say, is the start with the current level of
expenses and then trying to speculate. But, then all becomes a
game because, I will anyway, will accelerate on everything

because I need the buffer, but I'm not allowed even to use this
word. So I just hide it from the... These are my best
estimations... So it's a little bit crazy.
Joe: Outside of budgeting, because I don't want to dwell on
that, you have to develop these buffers throughout your whole
business a little bit then.
Eli: Absolutely, Absolutely. You need to take the logic of DBF,
and CPM and start to look on sales and marketing, and back
office, and on almost everything. Any kind of planning needs to
have buffers and needs execution. You need to look onto
consumption of the buffers. I truly believe this is doable but we
have a lot still to do.
Joe: When I'm sitting here thinking of the buffers, I think, you
move back to that common point where you reduce variants or
uncertainty, and you replenish that point or that's really where
you're buffer stock goes. Am I thinking incorrectly there or?

Eli: You pull it into your supply chain. When they want
something, they want it now. In order to have it now, you must
have stock frozen. So, what you see sales keep a certain buffer of
stock in the system. And keep this buffer of stock. Now when I
say keep this buffer of stock, it means if someone is drawn to
your needs and they need now as fast as possible to replenish
them. So, replenishment actually is the keeper of the buffer.
Joe: Is uncertainty the same as variants? The variants in your
decision making process or variants in your management, can I
correlate that uncertainty a little bit?

Eli: OK, yes, because eventually, variants are the source of
uncertainty. I think when people look on variants, they look on
data and they say by how much the data fluctuates. You look at
the sales every day, so selling Monday how many sales, how are
they on Tuesday, Wednesday, Saturday, etc. So, you look on the

ups and downs of the data. I look on the uncertainty something
that is threatening because here I am the manager, or the owner,
and every item that they put in stock cost me money. It is risky
in a way. And because of this uncertainty, the mere fact that it
does fluctuate, is a strength to me. They need to face the stretch,
so I need to make up my mind how do I manage, well this
stretch. So it leads me to certain decisions that I make.

Within the decision, of course, how many variants exist is of
course, quite relevant, but variants are relevant when I know
what decision you are now contemplating. Let me give you an
example. OK?
On one hand suppose I own a shop. Somehow, I need to know
how much of my money I have put in inventory in the shop, total
inventory in the shop. If I look on the changes in this total
inventory in my shop day-by-day, the variants are... I don't
know, small, but not very large. But, when they look on one
particular item, the variants are very large.

Now, and because of this decision about an item, a decision about
the total, even though of course, a link to each other...pretty
much different. So you need to put into yourself to understand
this nature of uncertainty. Mainly, what is the damage that is
coming up for it?
Look, the whole question, "What is the damage" is a very big
question. What is a damage of the shortage? Could be, you lost
one sale or two possible sales. This is, could be one damage.
However, is it the whole damage, while this is a huge question
mark because is your reputation harmed because of it? Will the
disappointing customer tell other customers that maybe they
should not come into your shop?

This is something that you cannot measure by variants. Variants
look very mathematical. It is an outcome of calculations.
Uncertainty for me something a little bit more generic, but also a

little bit more fancy because some of it, sorry we will never know
the real numbers. We never know the real numbers, maybe we
need to understand the mathematics, but maybe our decision
cannot be truly mathematical in this sense. We cannot rely on
mathematics to solve, really solve those kind of problems in our
lives. Maybe guide us to some kind of a good-enough solution is
what we try to do. But in itself, they cannot solve.

If I had something against variance, it's because it looks precise.
It looks like the outcome of a calculation of some real numbers.
Then sometimes in life, we simply don't have the numbers.
Joe: How do we go about justifying that decision then? I mean
are we going to... is that where, to you, the thinking process
comes back in, is using some of the trees...?
Eli: You can explain it eventually with some trees, but actually, I
think part of the genius idea of buffer management coming now
in and says, look; at first you put the buffers that this is not more
than a guess. But then you check the buffer. But what do you
mean you check the buffer? Because you don't check the absolute
value of the buffer, but you do check whether the buffer is about
right, or is the buffer definitely... not definitely, it might be not
right. And this is already quite a lot. Which means, I put a buffer
and then I'm getting signal from reality that the buffer is too
long? How do I get the signal?
When I look on the colors of the buffer, in the vast majority of
the time, it is green, sometimes yellow. It never went into be red
in a quite long time. And I'm saying, well, I'm getting a clearly
good signal so that I don't need such a buffer, I can reduce it.
But if it were... quite a substantial amount of time it was in the
red, hey, the buffer is not enough. By how much it's not enough?
Oh, sorry, I cannot tell you. So increase it and then check again,
this is the best you can.


Joe: If I'm fighting fires all the time, I need to add some more
water, OK?

Eli: Yes, because fighting fires is very bad for business. This is
not known to many people that if all the time you fight fires,
which means all the time you are on the verge of getting big
damage. Statistics will say some of it will turn to be real damage.
Why do you want this huge damage? Put up this kind of
insurance if you want, kind of a buffer, pay the price for it. Then
you are so much more stable. Not 100 percent stable, but much
more stable.
Joe: We've done a lot of work in Kanban, where it's more of a
personal Kanban, or managing a work-in-process using Kanban
where we'll put the limits on what you're actually working on.
This is an extension from software development, the agile
methods and things being used right now. You do that, and I like
the idea of red, yellow, green or red, yellow, orange; what
everybody is going to use there to be able to signify where you're
at and what you're doing, because really it's... the doing part of
most of the things isn't as important as managing the queue or
managing the to-do in front of it; managing what you would say
your buffer.
Managing the buffer is the key to really managing uncertainty,
managing variability, and managing your workflow.
Eli: Yes, exactly, this is what I think it is. This is kind of an
additional idea. Because between Kanban and drum-buffer-rope
flow, there are two systems that tried to achieve the same result,
and they're doing a little bit differently. We might say
drum-buffer-rope is a little bit better. But OK, maybe is and
maybe not. Buffer management I think is another idea that really
says, with all due respect, you can reduce variance in your walk
up to a point, and you cannot reduce it more than that. You do
have other as a sort of uncertainty in which you do not control


because it comes from your market or from suppliers, from
people in general, and there is a limit how much you can reduce
it.
So what you can do, how do you leave... you can do by
monitoring the buffers, is that you need to put anyway. So you
put the buffers part of your planning, and you manage your
priorities based on the consumption of the buffer. This looks to
me as a really far-reaching idea.
I'm pretty certain we are just at the beginning of really utilizing it
truly well. In TOC, we did it, I've seen very good job in the shop
floor in production and in projects. But we can do it in our life; we
can do it in huge amount of things.
The one I'm saying, if I'm clear in my mind what is the
uncertainty and what are my buffers, my next thing to do is to fix
my red line. At what point I know that something is not OK and I
need to react? And drawing these red lines, I think this is a very
important message for every kind of manager, actually to every
person.
Joe: In generalities, when you relate this to TOC, Theory of
Constraints, is this something totally different than TOC? Is it
something that is still tied to TOC, Eli? Where do you think this is
developing?
Eli: For me, it's part of the overall TOCs that have not been fully
developed yet. Which means, sorry, I might call it TOC-inspired,
but this is for me what is TOC, because I don't think that TOC
right now is something that I don't know even the TOC handbook
is only topics. It's still the beginning. These are the basic ideas in
which we suddenly learn that we need to make some kind of a
change, expand our mind. So TOC is not something that I can
already put up a limit to say this is TOC, what is outside is not
TOC.


Joe: If I'm looking at the TOC handbook; it was kind of a
current-state map.

Eli: OK, it could be. Funny enough for, I think, to check this, I
haven't seen it yet. The whole book, I mean. But yes, I really
agree that this is probably the closest to the current state. But it's
expanding and going everywhere, and the governments at least
going very far ahead all the time. And I would like very much that
many other people, will also start to develop more and more kind
of additions in which we take the basic concept and we put them
somewhere else and we re-develop them.
Joe: It always seem such a shame that the popularity of The
Goal and the branding that happened to theory constraints
because of it. That it was always thought of a bottle-neck instead
of something to handle a constraint. I thought it was interesting
in your chapters where you wrote that it was called a bottle-neck
because constraint wasn't really a word they were using back
then. One of the things that is difficult for people outside of the
field the TOC world is, I think, is learning the thinking process
and the tools. Without good direction it seems it's difficult to learn
from a book even though there's been quite extensive work done
in books. I think it's tough to do that. Do you agree with that
statement?
Eli: Yes I agree so far it's pretty tough. It might also say that
maybe we should also come back to the tools themselves and
maybe look how to simply file them to some degree or how to
verbalize it better. The thinking processes are not easy to
learn - not even in class. But it also seems to me with the new
appreciation I have for the thinking processes that still I think I
am not sure what, but there is still something in it that is a little
bit too... I don't want how to say complicated I don't think it's the
right word but something of the sort. It's not friendly. OK?
Joe: Cumbersome would be my word.


Eli: Yes, yes, yes. Good. Thank You. Yes it does fit. It is a little
bit cumbersome and we need to find ways to simplify it to some
degree and we need also people to educate themselves how to
look into it and how to judge it. Because just because you
succeeded to put the whole tree does not really mean that all that
is written in the true is really a very good reflection of the cause
and effect in reality.

But this is a struggle for us all the time. Do we understand the
cause and effect in reality? And I think we should always try to
understand it better.
Joe: Everybody's perception is somewhat different. That's what
makes us unique, of course. This may be kind of a real big picture
type look at it. We all arrive at different decisions and when I look
at the logic side, it is what grounds us and enables us to make a
common decision.
Eli: Yes this would be very good to make a common decision.
Still I believe that our decision, how much more oriented by
emotion. But, we do have our logic as a control. This control is
extremely important. And I think this control that eventually
enables us to come to a common decision. Because we realize
that we need to come to a common decision and there is some
kind of a realizing each other, even emotions, even feelings, and
then come up to something that is good enough. The concept of
the good enough is actually very important. Because I think this
is where we differ so much from the academia that tries really to
go into a mathematical term of optimizing.

This already is realization that there is a lot of uncertainty so we
cannot optimize within the noise. Because of this we have things
that are good enough. Maybe on a certain inventory label I would
say 100 and you will say 90 and so I will agree to 90 just because
90 is good enough and who knows the difference between 90 and
100 anyway.


Joe: I think those were great points. I'm sitting here just the
tidbits that I've gotten out of this podcast Eli has been great and
the different things that you've added. Is there something that
you would like to add? I've come to the conclusion that this
podcast is good enough right now. Is there something you'd like
to add that maybe I didn't ask?
Eli: Well, I would like to recommend people to read those two
chapters. Maybe not so much because of just the content or
interest in the chart flow but because I tried to give some kind of
substantiation to the development of ideas and if you understand
that maybe you yourself or any reader could generalize it to
something different and then I will be really happy.
Joe: I would like to finish up by saying thank you very much.
Eli: Thank you Joe. Thank you very much.



Joseph T. Dager
Lean Six Sigma Black Belt
Ph: 260-438-0411 Fax: 260-818-2022
Email: jtdager@business901.com
Web/Blog: http://www.business901.com
Twitter: @business901
What others say: In the past 20 years, Joe and I
have collaborated on many difficult issues. Joe's
ability to combine his expertise with "out of the
box" thinking is unsurpassed. He has always
delivered quickly, cost effectively and with
ingenuity. A brilliant mind that is always a pleasure to work with." James R.

Joe Dager is President of Business901, a progressive company providing
direction in areas such as Lean Marketing, Product Marketing, Product
Launches and Re-Launches. As a Lean Six Sigma Black Belt,
Business901 provides and implements marketing, project and performance
planning methodologies in small businesses. The simplicity of a single
flexible model will create clarity for your staff and as a result better
execution. My goal is to allow you spend your time on the need versus the
plan.

An example of how we may work: Business901 could start with a
consulting style utilizing an individual from your organization or a virtual
assistance that is well versed in our principles. We have capabilities to
plug virtually any marketing function into your process immediately. As
proficiencies develop, Business901 moves into a coach’s role supporting the
process as needed. The goal of implementing a system is that the processes
will become a habit and not an event.

Business901 Podcast Opportunity Expert Status


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